



**MINISTÈRE
DES ARMÉES**

*Liberté
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ANNUAL REPORT 2024



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2024

The DGRIS in 2024

Meeting with Alice Rufo,
Director-General for International Relations and Strategy.

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***Europeans need to talk to
each other again about strategy.***



As international tensions escalate amid wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, and renewed competitions among major powers, Alice Rufo reflects on the essential missions and actions of the DGRIS.

The year 2024 has proven to be very busy for the DGRIS. What do you take away from it?

The trends that have guided the main orientations of the Military Programming Law have been confirmed and amplified. Events in the Middle East have been added to the return of war to the European continent, with an intensification of conflicts in hybrid and globalised areas of confrontation that we must face. The expansion of crisis zones, whether in the Red Sea or the Indo-Pacific region, also indicates an increase in confrontation, with no improvement regarding traditional threats, such as terrorism or proliferation. We are thus witnessing a hardening of the strategic context in an increasingly fragmented international order, where mechanisms for regulating crises and conflicts are weakening and sometimes become the stage for confrontations between powers.



Would you say that it is a 'return of empires', an era, where territorial expansion is once again a political goal?

Yes. The return of imperialism is obvious in the case of Russia with the invasion of a sovereign state and the will to subjugate Ukraine. This is a violation of the United Nations Charter. However, when international law is undermined, when those who are supposed to uphold it cease to respect or enforce it, then the law of the strongest risks becoming not the exception but the rule. In several regions, powers are asserting themselves through increasingly competitive, even confrontational strategies. This is the reality of the strategic assessment that we make and analyse daily.

However, cooperation and respect for the law are the only means of ensuring that everyone's interests are respected. We stand up for them. This is the case, for example, with freedom of maritime navigation. In the Red Sea, our ships are targeted, but we have anticipated and have the means to respond in conjunction with our partners. In the Indo-Pacific, we reject any challenge to the status quo by force and adopt a robust stance to uphold international law.

Simultaneously, we are developing partnerships with regional powers that share our vision of a rules-based international order. Our goal is to empower them to ensure their sovereignty and to face challenges, by betting on increased cooperation in the Indian Ocean, particularly with India.

In this transformed strategic context, what is the role of defence diplomacy?

Defence diplomacy is conducted in close cooperation with the Defence Staff and the Directorate-General for Armament and relies on the very important tool that are our defence sections. Our defence network is the third largest in the world after those of China and the US. This major tool of influence has been somewhat neglected in the past. The Minister for the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, has asked us to strengthen it and make it more agile. Our action has gone in this direction. Our network cannot remain static in the face of developments. Some defence sections have closed, notably in the Sahel, while others have opened, in Armenia and Moldova for example. We have also strengthened our presence in certain areas, such as in Ukraine. In Europe, our sections have been reinforced in Austria and Poland, as well as in Georgia and Türkiye. For 2025, we plan to strengthen our presence in the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, in connection with enhanced cooperation with these partners.

In a strategic context where everything is accelerating and where the speed of analysis and reaction is decisive, our defence diplomacy is becoming increasingly responsive to protect our interests and to support our allies and partners.

The defence policy also aims to inform the choices of our authorities by taking into account the strategic context. It is imperative in this framework to maintain a long-term perspective and to avoid any short-sightedness. This is why the DGRIS contributes to analysing and deciphering situations in real time, while keeping the means to assess the long term, in-depth evolutions and rupture scenarios.

The DGRIS addressed in 2024 issues such as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, air defence or deep strikes. Why these topics in particular?

First, because Europeans need to talk to each other again about strategy. In the face of global order upheavals, it is a necessity, a sovereignty imperative.

Next, because the construction of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance is a necessity. Since 2017, we have advocated for the strengthening of a European defence that fully contributes to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Significant progress has been made in recent years. Previously, many European countries considered the development of European defence incompatible with the interests of the Atlantic Alliance. The war in Ukraine and the American repositioning have radically changed this perspective.

Within the framework of NATO, we have provided collective support to our Eastern partners, notably by deploying to Romania as a framework nation and supporting our Baltic allies. Moreover, the European Union has proven to be perfectly complementary to NATO. The European Peace Facility has enabled the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine, while sanctions have been adopted by the EU. The compatibility between the EU and NATO is therefore no longer in question.

Finally, we must ensure that the ongoing European rearmament is ambitious, effective and coherent to concretely strengthen European security and sovereignty. It is in this spirit that we have promoted European coordination initiatives within the framework of the European pillar of the Alliance. This is the case with the initiative

ELSA (European Long-range Strike Approach). It aims to coordinate the development of these capabilities in the long term to have European solutions. Progress is tangible compared to the debates we have had in the past.

Concerning air defence, all European countries, including France, have acknowledged a lack of investment in this area, as evidenced by our Military Programming Law as well. We are also working to coordinate our efforts with our partners and to build European solutions.

The DGRIS has also worked on security guarantees in Ukraine. Is this the next challenge?

The return of war to the European continent, a choice made solely by Russia and for which it bears full responsibility, directly impacts our security interests. We must continue to support Ukraine, achieve a complete and verifiable ceasefire, and build a just and lasting peace. Ukraine is on the front line against Russia. It is necessary, to build a robust peace, that it has support and in the future solid security guarantees so that a 24 February 2022 cannot happen again. This is about the freedom and sovereignty of Ukraine, but also about the European order, which we must rebuild. This is not a challenge: it is a necessity for peace. ■

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We must also give ourselves the means to achieve peace by force.

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PROGRAMME 144

A BIT OF HISTORY

In December 2014, Jean-Yves Le Drian, the then Minister of Defence, presented the decree setting the responsibilities and organisation of the DGRIS, to succeed the Strategic Affairs Delegation (DAS). On 2 January 2015, both the decree No. 2015-4 and the order, setting the responsibilities and organisation of the future DGRIS of the Ministry of Defence, were signed. The creation of the DGRIS responds to a desire to ensure better coherence in the monitoring and management of the Ministry's international action, while making proposals in the field of defence strategy and counter proliferation and conducting prospective reflection.

WHO ARE WE ?

The DGRIS is directly attached to the Minister for the Armed Forces. It leads the development of the defence strategy and the international action of the Ministry, with the Defence Staff (EMA), the Directorate-General for Armament (DGA), and the General Secretariat for Administration (SGA), in close liaison with the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE).

It also leads the strategic foresight work and coordinates, for the Ministry for the Armed Forces, that necessary for the preparation of the White Paper on Defence and National Security and its regular updating. It ensures, in liaison with the EMA, the DGA and the SGA, the articulation between the defence strategy and military programming.

The DGRIS represents the Ministry to other ministerial departments for matters related to international action, with the exception of the conduct of military operations, cooperation in the field of armaments and support for exports, for which it provides support and coordinates with the EMA and the DGA, which remain responsible for these areas.


ORGANISATION

The DGRIS has a management level that includes the Directorate-General's office, the Strategic Steering Support Group (PAPS), responsible for managing and coordinating cross-cutting issues and implementing the strategic function 'Influence', as well as the office of the coordinator for maritime space security (CSM), who performs its function in the interdepartmental field.

To carry out its mission, the DGRIS consists of a central administration directorate and three services..

DEFENCE STRATEGY, FORESIGHT AND COUNTER PROLIFERATION (DSPC)

The Defence Strategy, Foresight and Counter Proliferation Directorate is responsible for developing studies and proposals in the field of defence strategy. It develops the Ministry's position and coordinates the actions of the general staffs, directorates, and services in the fields of counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter dissemination of conventional weapons, conventional and non-conventional arms control and disarmament. The DSPC also coordinates the Ministry's work on the control of exports of weapons and related items and dual-use goods. It is also responsible for leading strategic foresight work and coordinating all foresight work carried out within the Ministry by the general staffs, the DGA and the SGA.



EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS (SEAM)

Office for Europe, North America and Multilateral Affairs is responsible for contributing, on behalf of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, to the international policy on bilateral and multilateral relations with the Member States of the European Union, the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, other European states, Russia, and the states of the Caucasus. It involves, within their respective field of competence, the EMA and the DGA. It must also organise and lead the bilateral and multilateral dialogues related to defence issues, with the exception of bilateral military and armament dialogues. In this capacity, it validates the bilateral defence cooperation plans and oversees their implementation. It also validates and issues instructions intended for the defence sections in its area.

Sub-Directorate	Department	Department
European Defence	Russia and Continental Europe	NATO and Transatlantic Relation
Department		
European Union		
Department		
Bilateral Relations Europe		

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (SASI)

To carry out its missions effectively, the Office for International Security Affairs is responsible for contributing, on behalf of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, to the international policy on bilateral and multilateral relations with the states of Latin America, Africa, the Near and Middle East, Asia, and Oceania. It organises and conducts the bilateral and multilateral dialogues on defence issues, with the exception of bilateral military and armament dialogues. In this capacity, it validates bilateral defence cooperation plans and oversees their implementation. It may take part in bilateral military, R&T and armament dialogues conducted by the EMA and the DGA, as well as validate and issue instructions intended for defence sections in its area.

Department	Department	Department	Department
Middle East and North Africa	Africa	United Nations and Global Affairs	Asia, Oceania, Latin America

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND GLOBAL INFLUENCE (SPRI)

The Office for Resource Management and Global Influence is responsible for overseeing the work related to the preparation and execution of the budget for Programme 144 'Environment and Foresight of Defence Policy' under the responsibility of the Director-General for International Relations and Strategy. It also provides close support to the Directorate-General and its directorate and services, and ensures the protection of defence secrets. As part of the international influence strategy of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, this service is responsible for managing the network of defence sections, military and defence representations, and permanent posts abroad. It ensures the links of the Ministry with these entities and identifies the posts to be filled abroad. This service also proposes the policy for welcoming foreigners to organisations, particularly training ones, that come under the Ministry or are of interest to defence, and for monitoring these relations, as well as a policy for decorating foreign military personnel.

Department	Department	Department	Department
French Defence Network Abroad	Liaisons with Foreign Missions	programme 144, Budget and Services	Human Resources Management

THE YEAR 2024 IN FIGURES





Nearly
250

personnel



164

countries in the
diplomatic defence
network



1571

permanent positions
abroad

344

in the diplomatic
defence network

1227

outside the diplomatic



35

strategic dialogues



135

cooperation plans
signed



93

Defence sections
in embassies

In 2024, the DGRIS strengthened its communication and presence on social media. A new editorial line and new contents are shared every week: focus on the topics covered by the DGRIS, portraits, audio formats, quizzes, recruitments, etc.

All the latest news about the Directorate-General is accessible on:



@DGRIS



@DGRIS_FR
@DG_DGRIS



defense.gouv.fr/dgris

HIGHLIGHTS OF 2024

21-23 January
Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting in Singapore

7-9 February
France – Brazil 2 + 2 Meeting in Brasilia

22 February
Inauguration of the IRSEM Europe office in Brussels

21-23 February
Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi

26-27 February
France – Germany 2 + 2 Meeting in Berlin

5 March
Briefing for the foreign Defence Attachés in France on the Ministry's commitment to the security of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games

13-14 March
First Paris Defence and Strategy Forum in the French Military Academy

19-20 March
Second Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) in Tokyo



10-11 July
NATO summit in Washington



9 September 2024
Publication of the Report to Parliament on France's Arms Exports

9-10 September 2024
Responsible AI in the Military domain Summit (REAIM) in Seoul

22-27 September
79th United Nations General Assembly in New York

12 April

Conference: 'Do young people believe in war and are they ready for it?' DGRIS-IRSEM-CEVIPOF at Sciences Po Paris

17 April

Signing of a framework agreement with the French National Research Agency (ANR)

23 April

Visit of the Nato Defence College in Paris



23-24 May

8th Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum 2024 in Bucharest

1-3 June

Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore

18 June

Commemoration of the Appeal of the 18th June and DGRIS military ceremony in Paris

27-28 June

European Council in Brussels with the adoption of the strategic agenda 2024-2029



1st October

Strategic return of the IRSEM with the French Chief of Staff at the French Military Academy

1-3 October

South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) In Auckland

17-18 October

Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels

4-5 November

Meeting of the 'Quad Medor' Defence Policy Directors in Athens

7 November

Meeting of the Defence Policy Directors of the 27 European Union Member States in Brussels

11 November

Participation of foreign Defence Attachés in the official Armistice ceremonies

2-3 December

First plenary meeting of the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative in Paris

3-5 December

Meeting of the representatives of the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative in Florence

12 December

Meeting of the Defence Ministers of the 5+5 initiative in Madrid





INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A year marked by
our partnerships and alliances



■ PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON

2024 was marked by the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance and the high level of French contribution to the Alliance's activities. Throughout the year, the DGRIS participated in the preparation of daily negotiations, various ministerial meetings and the Washington summit in July, contributing to the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO. By consolidating and promoting the politico-strategic positions and analyses of the Ministry on a wide range of subjects (support for Ukraine, review of defence plans, military mobility, joint financing, capacity building, disruptive technologies, etc.), the DGRIS defended the need

to take into account France's interests, while strengthening its position as a reliable, credible, and supportive ally within the Alliance.

The DGRIS provides direct support to the Minister and its Cabinet office on politico-military issues related to NATO. It develops the politico-military positions of the Minister for the Armed Forces on all these subjects, in close liaison with the EMA, the DGA, and the SGA. It also actively participates in the development of the positions defended by France in the North Atlantic Council and its Technical Committees, in regular coordination with the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs.

■ DEFENCE SPENDING PLEDGE

Following a resurgence of threats against NATO countries, the Defence Investment Pledge (DIP) was adopted in 2014 to anticipate, prevent, and respond to any type of attack. This pledge is based on three major and indispensable pillars for its proper execution: cash, capabilities and contributions.

Cash: the objective is for each Member State to maintain or aim for expenditure equivalent to 2 % of GDP. This objective, established in 2024, has become a 'floor value' since 2023. In 2024, among the states with the highest share of military spending, we find Poland (4.1 %) and the Baltic states bordering Russia: Estonia (3.4 %), Latvia (3.2 %), and Lithuania (2.9 %).

Six countries allocate 2.1 % of their GDP to defence spending, including France, as well as Sweden, which officially joined NATO on 7 March 2024. The other goal for the Allies is to invest 20 % of these funds in new equipment, including research and development.

Capabilities: the military capabilities include the material and human resources available to the Allies. They are broken down into several areas: material, but also organisational, human, doctrinal, training, educational, financial, and interoperability capabilities.

Contributions: it refers to the set of human resources made available by the Member States for the benefit of NATO, both in the command structure and in the forces placed on alert. This also includes in-kind contributions, such as the completion of flight hours. In an objective of impartiality, this pillar takes into account the national imperatives of the Allies as well as their commitments outside the Alliance, such as the European Union or the UN. The three pillars, these famous '3C' ensure a fair sharing of the burden among the Allies. To quote the Secretary-General from 2014 to 2024, Jens Stoltenberg: 'today's purchases for tomorrow's capabilities and contributions to operations and missions of the day after tomorrow.'

■ THE EUROPEAN STRATEGIC COMPASS

The DGRIS oversaw the continuation of the implementation of the Strategic Compass adopted in the spring of 2022. It notably coordinated, in close liaison with the EMA, the DGA and the SGA, the Ministry's positions at the politico-military level on:



- the continuation of European military support for Ukraine. In the framework of the European Peace Facility (EPF), Member States have delivered military equipment approximately worth €40bn to Ukraine (corresponding to EPF reimbursements of €19bn). Security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine were concluded in the summer of 2024, allowing for the long-term support of the Union to Ukraine, whose accession process was officially initiated in December 2023.
- negotiations, which began in March 2024, on the next instrument for strengthening the European Defence Industry, EDIP, proposed by the European Commission. EDIP will be a preview of the tools in favour of the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) that will be developed within the framework of the next European budget (covering the period 2028-2034).
- the launch of a new operation, EUNAVFOR Aspidès, in the northeast of the Indian Ocean, in response to Houthi attacks affecting maritime traffic in the region.
- the implementation of the European space strategy for security and defence, to which the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) will fully contribute.
- the strategic guidelines of the European Defence Agency (EDA), on which the Twenty-Seven agreed in the spring of 2024. These guidelines, presented in the EDA's Long-Term Review, position the Agency at the very heart of the European capability process. As a reminder, France's contributions to the EDA are funded by Programme 144.
- the reform of the Permanent Structured Cooperation.
- the establishment of Rapid Reaction Teams in the hybrid domain at the European level.
- the drafting and adoption at the departmental level of the Council's security-defence conclusions in the spring of 2024. These conclusions, the first since 2021, have enabled the EU to draw up a progress report on the implementation of the Strategic Compass.

Support in the development of French positions at the UN

■ CLIMATE SECURITY, TRAFFIC AND GLOBAL MARITIME ISSUES

The DGRIS has contributed to the reflection on the future of peacekeeping. First, by supporting French and English research within the framework of funding the Boutros-Ghali Observatory (OBG) located in Brussels (a structure created by the DGRIS in 2016) and the Peacekeeping Observatory in New York. To this end, a seminar on the future of peacekeeping was held in May 2024 in New York and another seminar dedicated to the role of Francophonie in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) was organised on 20 November 2024 by the OBG.

In response to a request from the UN, the DGRIS also committed, in partnership with the International Organisation of Francophonie (IOF), in a strategic support project for the benefit of troop contributing countries (TCCs) wishing to formalise their commitment within the PKOs.

Moreover, the DGRIS updates the guide on the process of generating forces in the UN PKOs ('Being an actor in peace operations of the United Nations'), initially published in 2019, in partnership with the MEAE and the IOF.

Finally, the DGRIS also contributed to advancing the Ministry's positions on the renewal of mandates for several PKOs, in coordination with the MEAE, particularly those of the MONUSCO (in the DRC), the MINUSCA (in the Central African Republic), the MINURSO (in Western Sahara) and the UNIFIL (in Lebanon) in a context of strong regional security tensions.



The DGRIS is particularly involved in the implementation of the 'Climate and Defence' strategy, notably through the management of its 'Defence and Climate' observatory, which has organised several seminars (including on the adaptation of the French Armed Forces to climate change) and published several papers (for example on hydric stress in Europe) or podcasts (including one on geo-engineering). Additionally, the DGRIS took part in the monitoring of international negotiations on cross-cutting threats (arms trafficking, environmental crime). It also contributed to several analyses of strategic competition and sovereignty issues in Antarctica, as part of the Ministry's Polar Strategy.

No fewer than 35 strategic dialogues were also an opportunity for high-level exchanges between the DGRIS and its foreign counterparts. These meetings allowed us to share our respective views on the transformations of the international strategic environment and to highlight the convergences on mutual defence and security issues.





■ JAPAN PACIFIC ISLANDS DEFENCE DIALOGUE (JPIDD) IN TOKYO

Vice Admiral Christophe Lucas, Deputy Director-General for International Relations and Strategy, travelled to Tokyo on 19-20 March to attend the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue (JPIDD) organised by our Japanese partner with all the Pacific Islands states. On those two days, discussions covered crucial topics, such as new threats in the Pacific, maritime security, and climate change.

It was also an opportunity for Vice Admiral Lucas to conduct numerous bilateral meetings with Pacific countries: Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Fiji, Tonga, Cook islands, Kiribati, as well as our partners from the US, Australia, and New Zealand.

The DGRIS strengthens its ties with its partners in the key region of the Indo-Pacific through these trips by its Deputy Director-General.

■ SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE IN SINGAPORE

A major strategic meeting in the Indo-Pacific region, the Shangri-La Dialogue took place from 1 to 3 June. The Minister for the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, travelled to Singapore to attend the event and meet his counterparts. The DGRIS was involved in the preparation for this annual event.

Inaugurated in 2002, this high-level forum is the main summit on security and defence issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Jointly organised by the Singaporean

Government and the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore, it convenes Defence Ministers and actors from the Indo-Pacific every year. The Shangri-La Dialogue therefore constitutes a unique platform for emphasizing our Indo-Pacific defence strategy and highlighting the actions of the Ministry for the Armed Forces in the region.

■ SOUTH PACIFIC DEFENCE MINISTERS' MEETING IN AUCKLAND

Lieutenant General Éric Peltier led the delegation of the Ministry for the Armed Forces at the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) from 1 to 3 October in Auckland. The Minister for the Armed Forces was represented by the French Ambassador to New Zealand, for exchanges with all the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of the Defence Staff of the seven Member States of the South Pacific with Armed Forces (Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, PNG, Tonga) and representatives of three observer states (Japan, UK, US).

Conducive to high-level exchanges, this summit aims to jointly analyse the defence issues, anticipate the evolution of our deployments and deepen the coordination of responses to the threats that weigh on the region. The previous edition of the SPDMM had been organised by France from 4 to 6 December 2023 in Nouméa, New Caledonia.



■ LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

In 2024, the DGRIS continued fruitful exchanges with its partners in Latin America, highlighted by the holding of four strategic dialogues and two seminars, which brought together the community of Latin American Defence Attachés in Paris and French Defence Attachés in Latin America in Buenos Aires.

This year has also confirmed that Brazil remains France's first defence partner in this region. In February 2024, the 2+2 dialogue (which brings together the Defence and Foreign ministries) allowed us to strengthen our bilateral defence relations, highlighted by the signing of the 'renewed defence partnership'.

The strategic dialogue 'Guiana Highlands' held in Georgetown in April 2024 with two partners from our 'near environment' of Suriname and Guyana confirmed our willingness to continue our interdepartmental work on the Guiana Highlands region. Finally, the Ministry for the Armed Forces continued its cooperation dynamic with regional partners in Latin America, such as Chile (strategic dialogue in June 2024) and Peru (September 2024).

■ IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

In the Near and Middle East, the consequences of the terrorist attacks on 7 October have been at the heart of our action. Fully committed to managing the crisis and contributing to the efforts of de-escalation,

the DGRIS participated in successive exchanges and visits in Foreign-Defence format with Israeli and Lebanese diplomatic and security authorities. These efforts, combined with the strong mobilisation of American diplomacy, led to the adoption of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon on 26 November 2024. Simultaneously, consultations with all regional partners, particularly Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf countries, have been conducted to work

towards a resolution of the crisis and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza.

Regarding the Red Sea, the DGRIS has contributed to developing the national stance in response to Houthi attacks on commercial traffic and Israel, as part of their support for Hamas. Since autumn 2023, these attacks, at sea and against Israeli territory, undermine freedom of navigation and contribute to the risk of regionalising the conflict. In close coordination with all the relevant headquarters and services, the DGRIS coordinated the political positions of the Ministry for the launch of the EUNAVFOR Aspidès operation aimed at defending European interests threatened in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by the Houthis. This access to decision-making circles, combined with analytical work, has enabled the consolidation of the situation assessment for the Ministry's political and military authorities.

■ IN AFRICA

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the DGRIS first contributed to the political support of the presidential will to reconfigure our military deployments to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Chad, and Gabon as part of a more agile and mutually beneficial French renewed partnership offer. This work will continue in 2025.

In Djibouti, which is not affected by this reconfiguration, the renewal of the defence cooperation treaty in the summer of 2024 marks the accomplishment of an effort that has fully mobilised our services throughout the year. It allows for the perpetuation of the French presence and the securing of our air and maritime access, for the benefit of the French Forces stationed in Djibouti (FFDj), in the highly strategic strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and across the sub-region.

Like those conducted in previous years, various strategic exchanges have also been conducted in 2024: strategic dialogue with Angola, strategic consultations with Botswana, High Defence Committee with Nigeria and strategic dialogue with the Democratic Republic of Congo. These meetings enabled to open up new partnership prospects

and to provide a concrete and tailored response to the needs and demands of partners facing security, demographic and climate challenges.

Finally, in the Sahel, the DGRIS contributed to the support of the MINUSMA's disengagement, both within our military representation at the UN and on the ground. To conclude, within this general framework of reconfiguration and change, two regional seminars allowed to consolidate the position of our Defence Attachés by enabling high-level exchanges with Parisian decision-making levels.



■ THE 5+5 DEFENCE INITIATIVE

The 20th edition of the 5+5 Defence Initiative took place under the presidency of Spain.

Created in 2004 at the initiative of France, the 5+5 Defence Initiative is a forum for multilateral cooperation between the two shores of the western Mediterranean to foster mutual understanding of the security issues of the 5+5. It groups the five states of the northern shore of the Mediterranean (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta) with the five states of the southern shore (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya) and allows for high-level meetings (Defence Ministers, CDS).

In liaison with the general staffs, directorates and services of the Ministry, as well as with the Ministry's Cabinet office, the DGRIS oversees the management of the 5+5 Defence Initiative for the French delegation. It notably represents the Ministry at the two annual steering committees, where the decisions taken by the Defence Ministers of the 5+5 at their annual meeting in December are prepared: launch of new projects, drafting of the joint statement establishing an assessment and the prospects of the Initiative, as well as the plan of action for the following year.

In this initiative, France is driven by a desire to maintain investment in view of the strategic challenges of the region, support the operationalisation of exchanges and ensure the continuity of annual meetings. This regional cooperation is structured around the following pillars: maritime security and surveillance, air safety, contribution of the Armed Forces to civil protection and, finally, education and research.





Defence diplomacy



■ PORTRAITS OF DEFENCE ATTACHÉS

The DGRIS oversees the bilateral diplomatic defence network, which today includes 93 defence sections in France's embassies abroad. It manages the French bilateral diplomatic defence system abroad that covers 164 countries. In 2024, four new defence sections were established in Fiji, Ghana, Moldova, and the Philippines.



Lieutenant-colonel
Claire B.
Defence Attaché in Finland

What is the role of a Defence Attaché within an embassy?

Defence Attachés are the military adviser to the Ambassador. They are responsible for managing the bilateral defence relationship and promoting the defence policy. They represent the French military authorities and establish contacts with those of the host country. They also promote the French armament industry and may be tasked with operational missions.

We talk about 'Defence diplomacy'. What does this mean concretely?

I always think of Clausewitz: 'War is the continuation of politics through other means'. To me, defence diplomacy is both the use of diplomatic means to avoid war and the use of forces for the sake of peace or the restoration of peace. Although this concept may seem contradictory, implementing a defence diplomacy allows influencing international bodies, notably through strategic partnerships that are then absolutely indispensable. ■



Général de division aérienne
Bertrand J.

Defence Attaché in the US

What is the specificity of the Defence section in the US? Does it distinguish itself from the others, and, if so, in what way?

The Defence section in Washington distinguishes itself in particular through its size and skills. While Defence sections are most often composed of about ten people, ours brings together no fewer than twenty-four people and as many different skills from the Armed Forces, directorates and services, such as DGA, particularly in the field of acquiring American military equipment.

In this section, I am assisted by eight deputy Defence Attachés of the rank of Colonel or equivalent. This particular format also applies to the network of exchange and liaison officers positioned with the various entities of the US Department of Defence: more than 70 in total. The Defence section in Washington manages and supports this network on a daily basis in relation with the Parisian entities, to which these people are attached.

This human resource, directly involved in the France-US bilateral relationship, remarkable for its size and the topics covered, is the very illustration of the place of the US in our defence and security policy:

strategic and multifaceted. The US being moreover a global power, we must cover all geographical areas, all domains ranging from outer space to seabed, including cyberspace. This leads us to interact with a multitude of entities within the Ministry for the Armed Forces and beyond.

What are the specific issues the Defence section in Washington is dealing with, or key issues?

Given the extent of the geographical areas and fields covered, one of the first challenges for the Defence section in Washington is to manage to develop an overall vision both of the bilateral defence relationship and American foreign and defence policy, as well as of the transformation of the US Armed Forces.

In a context of rapid evolution of technologies and technical standards (the US dedicates nearly \$140bn to research and development every year), one of our main areas of focus is the interoperability between our Armed Forces, i.e. the ability to act together, regardless of the operational framework, in which our forces are and will be engaged. ■



Général de corps d'armée
Jérôme G.
France's military representative
to NATO

What is the role of French forces within current NATO operations?

The role of French forces within current NATO operations is very important. As a matter of fact, the term 'operations' encompasses all military activities of the Alliance aimed at establishing a strategic deterrence and defence posture.

These operations are intended to send a double message: first, for internal purposes, to send a reassurance signal to the members of the 'Eastern flank' and thus reassure them about the Alliance's determination to ensure their defence, if necessary. This is the case for Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria; then, with a deterrent purpose, towards Russia to show the determination and preparedness of the entire Alliance to oppose any armed aggression by relying on its pre-deployed forces.

This preparedness is illustrated through combined and joint exercises, naval deployments in seas, where the Russian navy deploys its own assets, or regular flights to ensure air policing on the Eastern flank. All these actions aim to gather intelligence and demonstrate a European capacity for action and immediate reaction to Russian hostile actions.

The French contribution to these deployments is quantitatively and qualitatively very important. For instance, land forces ensure command and the main backbone of

a multinational battalion deployed to Romania as part of this posture. This battalion consists of more than a thousand men and women and has heavy armoured vehicles. Our Armed Forces are combat-proven forces, trained and equipped with modern materials, allowing France to adopt a credible and determined posture within NATO.

And what about the role of the DGRIS?

The DGRIS contributes, under the responsibility of the Minister for the Armed Forces, with the EMA and in coordination with our diplomacy, to define the objectives of this contribution of our Armed Forces and of all these deployments. It also plays a role in the communication surrounding these deployments as a relay and support for the strategic communication of the Alliance.

The DGRIS works in coordination with the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs for the ongoing politico-military negotiations at NATO, and can, if necessary, trigger political-level arbitrations. Furthermore, it drafts longer-term strategic papers on identified topics to provide the most realistic picture of future challenges for the Minister's Cabinet office and the top decision-makers of the Ministry for the Armed Forces. ■



**Colonel
Pierre P.**

**French Defence Attaché
in Romania**

France is the framework nation of the Eagle mission in Romania. What role does the Defence section in Bucharest play in such a context?

Eagle force and the Defence section have distinct roles. The former is an operational force deployed as part of NATO's defence plans, while the latter's primary role is to represent the authorities of the Ministry for the Armed Forces to the Romanian authorities. In this capacity, the Defence section maintains dialogue and bilateral defence relations with Romania.

However, the presence of 1,500 troops in Romania has a strong impact on the defence relationship we maintain with our Romanian partners, in addition to supporting the Eagle force. The Defence section is thus the indispensable interface for this deployment with all civilian departmental and interdepartmental authorities. Let me give you an example of this cooperation: the renovation project of a bridge that is meant to be used by our forces is brought to the government level by the embassy and not just the Eagle force.

Concretely, every day, the Eagle force, the Defence section and the embassy's chancellery work very closely together to facilitate the dialogue with our partners. It is indeed essential that our messages and actions be perfectly

coordinated to ensure complete coherence with our partners. We, the Defence section and Eagle force, thus take part, together, in regular working meetings with the Romanian Defence Ministry.

What are the specific issues the Defence section in Bucharest is dealing with, or key issues?

My scope of work includes all areas a Defence Attaché can have, and with a significant volume: military operations, cooperation between Armed Forces, duty of remembrance, capacity cooperation, exercises, deployments, defence policy, NATO and EU issues, etc. Of course, operations are a priority, but all areas are important and should not be neglected.

Ultimately, despite the geographical remoteness and a different history, all elements are brought together for the bilateral relationship with our Romanian friends to develop under the best conditions. I note that our interests and approach are often very similar and that there is a mutual interest in strengthening ties after decades of lower priority. I am pleased to be able to contribute to building a solid and lasting relationship within a fraternal Europe. ■

Liaison with foreign Defence sections in France



■ THE DIPLOMATIC NETWORK OF FOREIGN DEFENCE ATTACHÉS IN FRANCE

The DGRIS is responsible for ensuring the liaison between the Ministry and foreign Defence Attachés in France, from their arrival, particularly for accreditation, and throughout their stay in France. Thus, the DGRIS facilitates their daily work by welcoming them and putting them in relation with their counterparts within the Ministry..

In 2024, it is a network of 175 foreign Defence Attachés accredited in Paris that the DGRIS has contributed to manage, thus strengthening work relations with each of the 107 countries represented by a Defence section in France.

The DGRIS accredited more than 60 Attachés in 2024, some of whom, from Paris, maintain their country's defence relations with other major European capitals. The special bond that the DGRIS maintains with its international partners was strengthened in 2024 with a unique international commemorative tableau during the 14 July parade and an invitation extended to 31 flag bearers from the various allied nations that participated in the liberation of France in 1944.

As every year, the Defence Attachés were invited to the national ceremonies led by the President of the Republic. The commemoration of 11 November notably honoured the France-UK relationship, within the framework of the 120th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale, in the presence of Prime Minister, Keir Starmer. Attachés were

also able to attend the welcome ceremony organised under the Arch of Triumph on the occasion of the state visit of the US President, Joe Biden, on 9 June.

Throughout the year, the DGRIS has conducted, in conjunction with the Armed Forces, directorates and services of the Ministry, various activities dedicated to foreign Defence Attachés, including an annual seminar bringing together the highest authorities of the Ministry (DGRIS, CEMA, SGA, DGA, CPCO).

Finally, the DGRIS ensured the awarding of 900 decorations, whether they were ministerial medals or national orders, and guaranteed the enrolment of more than 460 foreign trainees in training organisations under the Ministry.

■ FUTURE DEFENCE LEADERS PROGRAMME

Launched in 2009, the Future Defence Leaders programme of the Ministry for the Armed Forces aims to raise awareness among future elites, both civilian and military, about France's positions on defence and security matters, and to build a network of influence over the long term. Every year, the French institutional defence and security landscape is presented to about thirty foreign leaders during a week of meetings and visits in and outside Paris.

The organisation and implementation of this programme are managed and coordinated by the DGRIS, which involves the EMA and the DGA, each entity acting within its remit. In 2024, the Programme celebrated its 15th anniversary: more than 350 leaders from over 100 countries and regional or international organisations were hosted on this occasion.







THE STRATEGY



The Defence strategy and support for research

■ DEFENCE STRATEGY

Decrypting our highly unstable, volatile, and complex international environment, the DGRIS is tasked with providing political decision-makers with keys to understanding. In 2024, it formulated strategy proposals: geographical (Arctic, Indo-Pacific), thematic (cyber, space, deep strikes, deterrence) or technical ones, in connection with future operational capabilities. The DGRIS thus positions itself upstream of the political decision by federating the actors responsible for identifying threats and by developing solutions aimed at tackling them. This work has enabled, in particular, the launch of a European initiative on deep strike capabilities, based on in-depth work to integrate strategic, operational and capability dimensions. This was materialised by the signing of the 'European Long-Strike Approach (ELSA)' Letter of Intent with several partners (Germany, Italy, Poland) at the Washington summit on 10-11 July. The UK and Sweden signed a letter of accession to this Letter on the sidelines of the NATO ministerial meeting on 17-18 October.



■ SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH

The support for strategic research enables an external and autonomous appreciation of the situation and an in-depth analysis of the strategic context. For this reason, the DGRIS funds – through several dedicated mechanisms – French academic research in defence and security and facilitates the cross-circulation of analyses from the administration, research, and think tanks.



In 2024, the DGRIS thus funded more than eighty-five outsourced strategic studies (twenty-nine observatories, sixteen prospective and strategic studies, and more than forty short studies, called consultancies), twenty-seven grants for publications, three research centres, and more than thirty doctoral and postdoctoral students. It has also deepened its dialogue with the research community: a framework agreement was signed on 17 April with the ANR, partner of the second edition of the 'Centre of Excellence' label of the DGRIS. The ten events organised by the Club Phoenix in various formats throughout the year fostered the circulation of knowledge on various topics (economic sanctions, evolution of Russian strategic thinking, peace and post-conflict, women and war, security challenges in Africa) and exchanges between actors and researchers (meetings with the COS and the CICDE, in particular). On 4 June, the first alumni evening for young researchers supported by the DGRIS since 2015 brought together around a hundred people at the Military School. Finally, the opening in February 2024 in Brussels of an office of the Institute for Strategic Research of the Military School (IRSEM-Europe), an organisation attached to the DGRIS, also helped strengthen the European dimension of the research supported by the Ministry for the Armed Forces. On 1 October, the young researchers, who received financial support in 2024, were invited to participate in the strategic kickoff of the IRSEM in the presence of the Chief of the Defence Staff, organised by the IRSEM and the DGRIS.

Counter Proliferation

■ NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND REGULATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

In the field of nuclear disarmament, the DGRIS has produced work to help establish the national position and participate, in support of the MEAE, in the Preparatory Committees to the Eleventh NPT Review Cycle. Regarding the regulation of new technologies, the DGRIS participated in international initiatives in the field of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) through the four annual meetings of the LAWS Group of Governmental Experts and responsible AI applications in the military domain with the REAIM (Responsible AI in the Military Domain) summit on 9-10 September. Regarding the military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), the DGRIS has studied with the MEAE the possibility of organising a regional REAIM summit (WEOG) aimed at highlighting French best practices in the responsible use of AI in the military field. In terms of regulation, the DGRIS has formulated recommendations regarding strategic stability and escalation issues, just as it has conducted work on responsible behaviours, particularly in new domains (outer space, cyber, deep sea bed).

■ EXPORT CONTROL

In the field of arms export control, the DGRIS coordinated the work of drafting the Ministry's position on licence applications, presented to the French Committee on Arms Export Control (CIEEMG) by the Minister's Cabinet office. The DGRIS also provided its expertise, particularly in terms of political and strategic implications at the regional and international levels: it ensured the ministerial coordination of 11 CIEEMG and 11 post-C during the year 2024. The DGRIS coordinated and produced the Report to Parliament on France's arms exports. This document presents the arms export policy, as conducted by the various services of the State on its three aspects, which are the coherence with the strategic priorities, export control and export support. The Report to Parliament addresses the imperative of accountability and transparency to the national representation in the field of French arms exports. It was published on 9 September. The DGRIS also ensured the synthesis of the work

of the various bodies of the Ministry to establish the annual documents relating to transparency mechanisms on arms transfers. In this capacity, it has prepared the annual reports for various international treaties and organisations: Arms Trade Treaty, EU Report, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNRoCA), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union, Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).


■ BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREATS

In 2024, the DGRIS worked on the impact of new technologies on the proliferation of biological and chemical threats. As part of its mission to monitor prohibition conventions, the DGRIS also provided the expertise of the Ministry for the Armed Forces to the MEAE during the Executive Councils of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The DGRIS has also implemented cooperation actions under the G7 Global Partnership, dedicated to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. New initiatives have thus been launched in 2024: in March, the three-year scientific cooperation project between the DGA NRBC Control and Senegal's Institute for Health Research, Epidemiological Surveillance and Training, in April, the two-year scientific cooperation project between the Biomedical Research Institute of the Armed Forces (IRBA) and the Institute of Biotechnology of the National Academy of Sciences of the Kyrgyz Republic, in December, the presentation of the SEC BIO platform at the BTWC, a tool for contributing to the improvement of biosecurity and biosafety.

■ SOME FIGURES




246
PERSONNEL



38.5
AVERAGE
AGE

Distribution of military personnel per branch (in %)



1571 PPE

Figure after annual mobility plan (PAM)

Diplomatic Defence Network: 344

Outside Diplomatic Defence Network: 1 227

BILATERAL NETWORK

93
Defence sections
+ 1 consmil

278 PPA

**MILITARY
REPRESENTATIONS**

66 PPA

MULTILATERAL

826 PPA

**BILATERAL
OUTSIDE
DIPLOMATIC**

401 PPA



In Memoriam: Colonel Arnaud Lafolie

The staff of the DGRIS, the officers of the General Lalande promotion of the Special Military School of Saint-Cyr, fellow soldiers, colleagues, and friends, honour the memory of Colonel Arnaud Lafolie, who passed away on 30 September after a long illness.

Unanimously praised for his professionalism, his sense of dialogue, and his exceptional expertise, Colonel Lafolie was a leader listened to, respected, and appreciated by his subordinates, his peers, and his superiors. A skilled, cultured, and far-sighted adviser, he distinguished himself until his last days by extraordinary courage, never sparing himself, and remaining present for all important deadlines. A man of exceptional integrity and commitment, commanding with great kindness and a lot of humanity, he will remain, for all those who have crossed his path, an exemplary officer.

Colonel Arnaud Lafolie was our Defence Attaché in Jordan, then in Israel. He has been the head of the Department French Defence Network Abroad since 1 August 2024.

■ PROGRAMME 144: A BUDGETARY PROGRAMME OF THE MINISTRY MANAGED BY THE DGRIS

The programme 144 'Environment and Foresight of Defence Policy' brings together the funds intended to inform the Ministry for the Armed Forces about the current and future strategic environment with a view to developing and conducting France's defence policy. The Director-General for International Relations and Strategy is responsible for this programme, which is of the 4 programmes of the Mission 'Defence'.

With €2bn in 2024, this programme encompasses several operational budgets for:

- The Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE);
- The Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DRSD);
- French Defence Staff (EMA);
- The Directorate-General for Armament (DGA);
- The Directorate-General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS).

The DGRIS is also responsible for a budgetary allocation that is specific to it and intended to:

- support strategic research, which helps anticipate future threats

Strategic research provides the Ministry for the Armed Forces with complementary insights to internal expertise on emerging and complex phenomena, as well as on current and future issues. Its dynamism helps promote a French strategic thinking.

The DGRIS has supported strategic research since 2015 with the ambition of strengthening the French scientific ecosystem (universities, research institutes, think tanks, etc.). This support helps ensure the outreach and development of this ecosystem over the long term.

For the short term, the DGRIS funds external expertise through strategic foresight studies (EPS) and Observatories, ensured by the same research ecosystem.

- Coordinate bilateral relations and guide defence diplomacy with our partners

This action aims to conduct a political-strategic dialogue with our allies and partners in support of ministerial exchanges.

It covers, in particular, the annual contribution paid by France to the Republic of Djibouti, and France's contribution to the budget of the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The Ministry's international action is also carried out through bilateral and multilateral scientific cooperation initiatives supporting the national strategy to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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