

# Report to Parliament

on France's  
Arms Exports

  
**2024**



Analyses & Références





Like every year since 1998, the Ministry for the Armed Forces responds to the imperative of responsibility and transparency towards the national representation, and the French people at large, by drawing up a public report on France's arms exports.

In a strongly deteriorating geostrategic context, where the international order is faltering in the face of the return to relations between States primarily based on power dynamics, the defence and security of France and Europe cannot be ensured without putting strain on our defence tool. The shift of our defence industry to 'war economy' mode, set by the President of the Republic two years ago, can be observed in many sectors. Arms exports are fully part of this transformation, bringing a load capable of justifying investments in the production tool, but also forcing our industry to innovate and adapt to remain at the best world level. It is therefore an essential lever to preserve its ability to equip our own forces and our allies, in particular Ukraine in the face of the brutal aggression it is suffering.

More generally, arms exports contribute, through their political dimension, their impact on operational cooperation, or their industrial stakes, to the building of partnerships and networks of alliances.

These considerations justify an active export policy. It must naturally be exercised in strict compliance with our international commitments, in particular respect for international humanitarian law, but also with concern for consistency with our diplomacy, the preservation of our industrial sovereignty or the control of diversion or dissemination risks. This requires a wide mobilisation of state services to ensure high-quality control. It also requires deepened transparency, of which this report constitutes the foundation through all the information presented, information that we also address each year for some of it to the United Nations Register in the context of the Arms Trade Treaty as well as to the European External Action Service, in accordance with our commitments in the context of the Council of the European Union's Common Position.

After an exceptional year in 2022 due to the export of Rafale to the United Arab Emirates, 2023 is more balanced. Orders taken, which amount to €8.2 billion, are notably based on Rafale, but also on Patroller UAVs, Caesar guns or corvettes. This balance illustrates the ability of our industrial base to meet the varied needs of our partners in all environments.

Regarding deliveries, more than half of the flows were destined for European countries. This European dimension is fully consistent with the work carried out to strengthen the European defence industry, in which France is fully involved.

Sébastien Lecornu  
Minister for the Armed Forces



# Contents

**ABSTRACT**

**PART 1: AN EXPORT POLICY CONSISTENT WITH FRANCE'S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES**

1. Exports that contribute to the preservation of international security ..... 10

    1.1. Contribution to States' self-defence ..... 10

    1.2. Strengthening our defense partnerships ..... 12

    1.3. Preserving regional stability and fighting terrorism ..... 14

2. Exports that are essential to our strategic autonomy and to the development of Europe of Defence .... 17

    2.1. An autonomy essential to our strategic ambition – the issue of maintaining the DTIB ..... 17

    2.2. A European ambition ..... 20

    2.3. Coordination between exporter countries ..... 22

**PART 2: AN EXPORT POLICY SUBJECT TO A RIGOROUS INTER-MINISTERIAL CONTROL PROCESS**

1. Exports controlled and compliant with France's international commitments ..... 26

    1.1. International framework ..... 26

    1.2. European regulations ..... 28

    1.3. Arms embargoes ..... 28

2. War material exports strictly controlled at interdepartmental level ..... 31

    2.1. The principle of prohibition applied to an annually updated scope ..... 31

    2.2. A governmental responsibility ..... 32

    2.3. An assessment of licence applications on a case-by-case basis ..... 34

    2.4. The special case of export transfers ..... 38

    2.5. Transparency at national and international levels ..... 38

3. A control being part of policy to control arms and to fight against dissemination of small arms and light weapons ..... 40

    3.1. Regulated and monitored operations (conditions and NRC, ex-post control) ..... 40

    3.2. Licences re-assessed against the context ..... 43

**APPENDICIES**

1. Number of licences granted since 2015 ..... 46

2. Number and value of licences granted in 2023 by country and Military List Category ..... 50

3. Detailed breakdown of military technology and equipment deliveries by country and region since 2014 ..... 64

4. France’s annual report 2024 (on the calendar 2023) pursuant to Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty ..... 68



# Abstract

This Report to Parliament meets a requirement for transparency towards the national representation in the exercise of its supervisory powers. It presents the arms exports policy, as conducted by the different state departments, for the three aspects of consistency with strategic priorities, export control, and support for export.

Like all major countries that have a defence industry, France considers that the export policy cannot be dissociated from its defence policy, and forms an integral part of its international relations.

France's arms export policy has two objectives:

- On the one hand, to contribute to international security by meeting our partners' legitimate defence needs, while acting as a lever to strengthen with them the defence cooperation necessary to our own security. In a strongly deteriorating strategic context, with growing conflicts and latent threats, we must assume, in full sovereignty, our responsibility as a Member of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and, to this end, participate in the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, according to Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. The conflict in Ukraine has indeed shown the decisive role arms deliveries can play in enabling an attacked state to exercise its legitimate right to defend itself. However, this argument also applies in times of peace, with arms exports to countries attached to the stability of their region playing potentially a preventing role towards neighbours that would be tempted by a return to power politics.
- On the other hand, to have, over the long term, a French and European industry able to equip our forces in a manner consistent with our strategic ambitions and our armed forces model. With the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, a paradigm shift has occurred: the return of a major threat forces us to reconsider the possibility of a high-intensity war in which France and Europe could be involved, and to redefine the defence industry model we need. In this new model, the crucial nature of exports is even more justified than in the past. Exports remain a necessary condition to ensure the maintenance of an industrial base capable of equipping our forces. Currently, in the context of 'war economy', they also guarantee long-term workload, convincing the industry to finance the necessary investments to improve their reactivity and accelerate their production rates. Exports also play a crucial role economically, with the sector representing 210,000 jobs spread across France, with a perspective of stable, sustainable jobs in the coming years and working for our security.

• These objectives are pursued in strict compliance with our international commitments, especially the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 amending Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, and the embargo measures introduced by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Arms control, the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, our

forces protection, and the fight against the dissemination of small arms and light weapons are also systematically taken into account. The export control process is based on a very strict regulation set out in the Code of Defence and implemented through a rigorous interdepartmental system according to a general prohibition principle it can only be derogated from through an authorisation from the administrative authority subordinated to the Prime Minister.

- Each licence application is thoroughly assessed on a case-by-case basis against all the above-mentioned rules and assessment criteria of the concerned administrations. Their assessment mobilises in fact advanced geopolitical, industrial, technical and military skills of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, coordinated by the Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security (SGDSN). Licences set the precise framework for the authorised operation and define the conditions for carrying it out in terms of verifications, certificates or commitments requested from the different parties. However, they do not systematically lead to subsequent export, as the authorised operation may not be carried out.

In 2023, order intakes amounted to €8,2 billion. They are centered around the entry into force of an eighteen Rafale order for Indonesia for €2.6 billion, several contracts over €200 million (Caesar guns for Lithuania, several contracts with Greece, including the acquisition of Patroller UAVs, corvettes for Angola), and a stable and from one year to another regular base of less than €200 million contracts. The latter corresponds to maintenance, training or modernisation activities that result from previous major contracts, as well as less emblematic equipment that help cover the full capacity spectrum. While the year 2023 may seem relatively modest in terms of order intakes, it does not correspond to a long-term trend: the evolution of our exports should be assessed over longer time scales, as the annual balance is very fluctuating, depending on the number and amount of major contracts that came into force during the year. The first trends for 2024 indicate a much higher order intake figure, with in particular a new entry into force in Indonesia and the Netherlands' choice of Naval Group for its submarines.





# PART 1

## AN EXPORT POLICY CONSISTENT WITH FRANCE'S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

1. Exports that contribute to the preservation of international security .....	10
1.1. Contribution to States' self-defence .....	10
1.2. Strengthening our defense partnerships .....	12
1.3. Preserving regional stability and fighting terrorism.....	14
2. Exports that are essential to our strategic autonomy and to the development of Europe of Defence ....	17
2.1. An autonomy essential to our strategic ambition – the issue of maintaining the DTIB .....	17
2.2. A European ambition .....	20
2.3. Coordination between exporter countries .....	22

## AN EXPORT POLICY CONSISTENT WITH FRANCE'S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Return of a tougher strategic competition between great powers, continuation of a conventional war by the Russian Federation under nuclear threat on the doorstep of Europe in Ukraine, nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, persistence and internationalisation of the terrorism risk, rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and, since 7 October, conflict in the Middle East following a terrorist attack: 2023 has been a year of acceleration of all imbalances. As a nuclear power and permanent member of the Security Council, France intends to fully assume its responsibilities to work in favour of a rules-based international order and collective security.

Because they are an essential instrument of foreign policy and are likely to modify balances of powers, France clearly identifies its arms exports as a major contributor to this objective. In the context of a declared conflict such as in Ukraine, support to an attacked country through arms deliveries has demonstrated its effectiveness in allowing the latter to ensure its self-defence within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In the context of tense regional situations, well-analysed arms exports in terms of their strategic consequences can have a stabilising effect, by re-establishing a balance of power or by fostering the status quo. More generally, supporting through arms exports States that are France's strategic partners and have a positive action in favour of international peace and security contributes to this same peace and security.

Because they share our values, because they may be engaged alongside us in the event of a major conflict, and because they meet the criteria of the EU's Common Position on export control as applied by France, EU and NATO countries are privileged destinations for French arms exports. In this regard, it is necessary to foster prospects towards these countries by developing an offer that best meets their expectations, notably by ensuring interoperability with NATO standards, possible returns in terms of industrial workload or, in some cases, shared procurement mechanisms or more global defence partnerships.

Beyond EU and NATO, France has long-standing strategic partnerships with countries such as India, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Brazil, countries with which there are therefore dense relations in terms of armaments. Many other partners remain committed to the French offer. Their number is even expected to increase, as a growing number of countries, particularly (but not exclusively) in Central Asia and Southeast Asia, which have acquired military equipment from Russia in the past, are seeking to reduce their strategic dependence by turning to new suppliers.

Finally, the last determining factor in our exports is the industrial sustainability of the model historically chosen for our own arms acquisitions. France has chosen to equip itself sovereignly on the majority of the capability spectrum, with a purely national core consisting notably of nuclear deterrence and means that can be acquired in cooperation, but whose critical technologies

and know-how we master within our Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). This choice aims to allow the use, maintenance or modification of these capabilities in complete sovereignty. The acquisition of defence products from foreign countries, even when they are allies, does not guarantee this sovereignty. It entails a number of constraints for accessing the most sensitive capacities, adapting to the concepts of employment of our armed forces, the free use of these means, and finally the possibilities of complementary acquisitions in case of a crisis, particularly for ammunition and missiles. The tensions on supplies in recent years - including in areas far removed from the military field - have shown the importance of having one's own sources of supply. Furthermore, the lessons of the Russian invasion of Ukraine underscore the key role played by the DTIB in the ability of an army to sustain a long-term effort. Given the level of sophistication and complexity of modern weapons systems, a DTIB can only survive if it reaches a critical size. The size of the DTIB is also a crucial parameter for meeting a sudden increase in demand on time, in the event that we were engaged in a high-intensity conflict in the future, with consumption and attrition of equipment far exceeding what we have been accustomed to in the past thirty years. To give it this critical size, it is essential to give it access to a market that goes far beyond the national market, and even the European one.

For these reasons, France fully assumes its status as an arms exporter. It also wants to be a responsible exporter. It adheres to many international regimes aimed at regulating the arms trade, combating proliferation, banning certain categories of weapons or certain destinations. In its national legislation, it subjects all arms exports to direct state control according to a strict regulation. Export control procedures are rigorously applied, according to a detailed government policy.

### 1. Exports that contribute to the preservation of international security

#### 1.1. Contribution to States' self-defence

The outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is to be considered a strategic turning point. Firstly, because it marks a profound break in the conduct of international relations: we are witnessing a return of traditional warfare, in the Clausewitzian sense, as a means of achieving a political objective by submitting other States to one's will, whereas the creation of the United Nations after World War II aimed precisely to prevent war as a means of settling international disputes. Secondly, because the geography of the conflict itself, which is taking place on Europe's doorstep, requires anticipation of scenarios where it could spread to the territory of an EU or NATO country, the latter now comprising, with the accession of Finland and Sweden, more than 2,500 kilometres of common border with Russia. Added to this are numerous latent conflicts and threats that could one day evolve into open warfare, such

as a disruption of the status quo on the situation in Taiwan, the extension of the Israel-Hamas conflict to neighboring regions, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or the rise of Islamist terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel region. In the face of this worsening of the international security context, many countries are opting to strengthen their means to be able to ensure their self-defence in the event of an armed aggression, as authorised by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As an exporter of military equipment with recognised qualities and covering the full capability range, France can respond to this growing demand and help countries that request it build their defence apparatus, provided that this is done in coherence with our country's international obligations and political choices.

Ukraine is undoubtedly an important destination for French weapons. The first two years of the conflict on Ukrainian soil have shown that deliveries of arms from non-belligerent supplier countries, especially if those deliveries are accompanied by training and appropriate logistical support, are capable of significantly changing the course of a conflict.

The war in Ukraine has also led many countries to reconsider their defence strategy, leading to developments in the arms market. Several dynamics are at work. The first one concerns European countries, which, between catching up on a chronic investment deficit in their defence since the beginning of the century and the need to replace the equipment handed over to Ukraine, are massively increasing their production and imports. The second one comes from countries seeking to reduce their strategic dependence on Russia for their defence, but also for their other essential supplies (energy, food, etc.) and which are diversifying their partnerships: a particularly observable dynamic in Central Asia. In addition, certain countries that have mainly procured their weapons from the Soviet Union or Russia are now questioning the sustainability of their fleet in the face of new sources of difficulties, such as American pressure not to buy Russian weapons, or uncertainty about Russian industry support, which must primarily meet national needs. All these dynamics constitute opportunities for France to forge new partnerships and develop its armament relations, thereby strengthening its DTIB and giving it lasting prospects

#### MEASURES IN FAVOUR OF UKRAINE

France's support to Ukraine contributes to the political objective, repeatedly stated by the President of the Republic: "Russia cannot and must not win this war". It is part of a collective effort made by the other European countries, the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.

The characteristic of this support is to be evolving, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in order to remain permanently aligned with the political objective while taking into account strategic and field realities. In the spring of 2022, the situation required immediate deliveries of already operational equipment, which were therefore taken from the stocks of the armies, with some complements found in industrial stocks.

In 2023, the effort extended to the maintenance in operational condition of already delivered equipment and replenishments through additional transfers or industrial productions. The current challenge is to continue assistance in the long term, in key capability areas such as artillery, deep strike or ground-to-air defence: it will be a matter of reestablishing the balance of force in the face of an adversary who has also placed himself in war economy.

Between 24 February 2022 and 1 May 2024, France delivered military equipment to Ukraine for a total value of €3.035 billion, to which are added €2.1 billion paid to the European Peace Facility (EPF), for a total support of more than €5.135 billion. This financial effort is accompanied by a determined action in terms of training, since nearly 12,000 Ukrainian soldiers have already been trained by the armies in Poland and France.

Although it is an indicator of the level of commitment, the financial volume of aid to Ukraine should not be confused with the operational effectiveness resulting from it on the ground. Beyond the figures, French aid aims to influence the course of events and the final outcome of the war as much as possible. It has specific features that are its trademark and are particularly appreciated by the Ukrainian side:

- Equipment with recognised capacities, sometimes already combat-proven on other battlefields (such as CAESAR guns during Operation CHAMMAL in Iraq);
- The provision of a complete capacity that includes, in addition to the equipment itself, formation and training, as well as support. Associated with the organisation, the human resources and the doctrine, which are to be defined by the Ukrainian side, it allows to reach, according to the analysis of the French Defence Staff (EMA)<sup>1</sup>, the full combat readiness of a force;
- Adaptation to the needs expressed by the Ukrainian side and strategic objectives. For example, in the initial phase of the conflict, Caesar gun deliveries contributed to a collective effort by countries supporting Ukraine to stop the offensive and avert the scenario of a victorious blitzkrieg. Subsequently, the need shifted to ground-to-air defence, to which was responded by deliveries of Mistral, Crotale and Mamba systems with their Aster missiles, to counter missile and drone attacks.

Finally, France has decided to develop a complementary approach to continue military aid to Ukraine, in the form of industrial partnerships. Partnerships with the Ukrainian industry will aim in particular to ensure the maintenance, and possibly the production of spare parts, in a reactive and proximity manner with the ground, for the weapons systems delivered by the French DTIB. The objective is to be able to sustain the effort in the long term.

(EMA) <sup>1</sup> The French Defence Staff defines six 'capability pillars' which are essential to a force's full combat readiness: doctrine, organisation, human resource, training and education, support, equipment.

**SUPPORT TO ARMENIA**

Armenia continues to diversify its security partnerships, based on the finding that security guarantees incumbent on Russia under various international agreements to which it is a party (notably the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) are insufficient.

While the security situation remains volatile and Armenia is facing a challenge to its territorial integrity from Azerbaijan, whose forces are positioned in several points of its territory, France is firmly committed to Armenia's sovereignty and resilience. It is in this context that a defence partnership with Armenia has been decided, which is expected to intensify in the coming months.

The creation of a defence section in Armenia as of January 2023 represented the first tangible manifestation of the strengthening of our defence cooperation. On 3 October 2023, during a visit to Yerevan, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Catherine Colonna, announced that France had agreed to the conclusion of contracts allowing for the delivery of defensive military equipment to Armenia. A symbol of the strengthening of our defence partnership, the Minister for the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, also travelled to Yerevan on 22 and 23 February 2024. This was the first visit of a French Minister for the Armed Forces to Armenia. This visit allowed for the identification, in conjunction with Armenian authorities, of key areas of cooperation.

A first contract for the delivery of Bastion troop transport vehicles was signed with the company Arquus in the summer of 2023. On 23 October, the the Minister for the Armed Forces also received his Armenian counterpart in Paris. This visit was an opportunity to announce the signing of a contract for the acquisition of three GM-200 air surveillance radars. In order to strengthen this system, a letter of intent regarding air defence was also signed. In the intelligence and surveillance domains, Armenia has at the same time acquired night vision goggles from the Safran manufacturer. They will allow it to improve its population protection capabilities and acquire a better understanding of the situation on its borders. Finally, on 17 June, the Minister for the Armed Forces and the Armenian Defence Minister, Suren Papikian, signed a contract for the acquisition of Caesar guns.

These acquisitions, which are strictly defensive in nature, are intended to contribute to the defence of Armenia's population and territorial integrity. The objective is also to contribute to the development of Armenia's DTIB.

Defence cooperation between Armenia and France is conducted in a spirit of responsibility and de-escalation.

France will continue to work, alongside its partners, in favour of establishing a just and lasting peace in the South Caucasus, with respect for international law and to the benefit of all populations in the region.

**1.2. Strengthening our defence partnerships**

If the effectiveness of aid to Ukraine is a crucial signal sent regarding the United Nations' ability to enforce international law, a similar effort should be made everywhere in the world where policies of power reaffirm themselves with destabilising regional effects. The acceleration of the geostrategic context and the observation of a more systematic return to force to settle disputes between States naturally leads many countries to re-examine their own security situation, and, for some of them, to diversify their partners for their defence and arms acquisitions. In this regard, France intends to present itself as both a partner reliable to its historical allies and attentive to others.

This approach is applied, in the first place, in Europe. On the armament aspect, following the creation of the European Defence Agency (2004), Permanent Structured Cooperation (2017) has enabled EU countries to have a framework to develop their cooperation on defence capability needs, and the European Defence Fund (EDF), adopted in April 2019, has allowed for the establishment of European funding (€8 billion over the period 2021/2027) to develop research and technology for future defence equipment. However, all these actions have not erased the major strategic determinant of the past 20/30 years, which has been chronic underinvestment by European countries in their defence. New initiatives have therefore emerged, such as the adoption of ASAP<sup>1</sup> and EDIRPA<sup>2</sup> tools, aimed at boosting the production of the European DTIB and acquisitions by EU countries from this same base, including, of course, the French arms industry. Several European countries (Greece, Belgium) are already historical customers of France in terms of armaments, others have chosen France for more recent acquisitions (Rafale for Croatia, observation satellites for Poland), and finally others (the Netherlands, Romania, Norway, etc.) are currently issuing calls for tenders for major programmes to which France is applying.

**DENSIFICATION OF THE NETWORK OF MILITARY ATTACHÉS IN EUROPE**

The defence diplomatic network (93 defence sections worldwide, covering 164 countries) is a valuable tool for monitoring and analysing arms markets, as well as supporting the French export policy for war material. In some cases, an armament attaché is integrated into the defence section, but most of the time, it is the defence attaché himself who handles arms-related issues, in close coordination with the

<sup>1</sup> Act in Support to ammunition production.

<sup>2</sup> European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act.

DGA. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a particular effort has led to a densification of the network in Europe, in order to better meet the needs and expectations of partner countries, whether it be to better understand their capability needs or to better express the resulting demands for military equipment. Several defence sections have thus come into being between 2022/2024 in Estonia, Armenia and Moldova, while efforts were made to strengthen certain sections in Poland, Austria, Italy, Georgia, Greece and Ukraine.

In the rest of the world, France is developing regional strategies based on partnerships, which aim to strengthen the security of partner countries while consolidating France's presence and clout in the region. With 120,369 km<sup>2</sup> of overseas territories, representing 18% of the total French territory and 2.2 million inhabitants, to which are added the approximately 2.5 million French expatriates in other countries, France is represented all over the world. Its interests also depend on security considerations far from its borders, such as the securing of heavily used commercial maritime routes (Suez Canal, Persian Gulf, China Sea, etc.), which require coordinated action with neighbouring countries. This results in exchanges with strategic partners in key regions such as the Near and Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, etc.), the Indo-Pacific (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.), Africa (Senegal, Republic of Ivory Coast, Gabon, etc.) or Latin America (Brazil, Chile, etc.). These partnerships enable France to advance its interests and to exchange, in a relationship of trust, on defence and security issues, as well as on regional and global challenges calling for a concerted, if not, joint response. Moreover, France is always open to new applicants who are looking for new partners to diversify their defence relations and/or reduce their strategic dependence on a given major power (Russia, China, etc.). This dynamic, which was quite characteristic of the Middle East in the 2010s, is now also starting to be observed in Central Asia (see § 1.1) and in Southeast Asia.

Concerning French exports of war material and similar items, they are tangible demonstrations of our defence support by helping partner states strengthen and adapt their military capabilities. Beyond the acquisition of equipment with recognised performance, the French accompaniment enables our partners to acquire real defence capabilities<sup>1</sup>, also by including service support for equipment, employment training, technical assistance, provision of spare parts, all flows that can last several decades and that can take place over a long period of time, just as a partnership aimed at strengthening the stability and security of a country or region should be. Furthermore, for the most important strategic partners who also have local industrial potential, French arms exports can be accompanied by technology and/or production transfers (offsets), which help the partner to progress in building its own autonomy.

<sup>1</sup> Defence capability in the DORESE sense: doctrine, organisation, human resources, equipment, support and training.

## DEFENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND INDIA

Since the signing of their strategic partnership in 1998, whose 25th anniversary was celebrated in 2023, India and France have been developing an intense bilateral military cooperation, based in particular on a shared vision of the stakes in the Indo-Pacific. In a region that has become the new epicenter of global trade, diplomacy and military relations, the two nations want to contribute to the stabilisation and securing of this strategic zone. As the maritime routes that cross it have become paramount to the world economy, the defence of a free, safe, and open Indo-Pacific goes hand in hand with respect for international law, and in particular, the law of the sea. In this regard, India and France have developed a joint strategy, adopted in 2019, which was supplemented in 2022 by a road map on blue economy<sup>2</sup> and ocean governance.

### Intense defence industrial cooperation

The defense industrial cooperation between the two countries is ancient and deep. The contracts for Scorpène submarines and Rafale aircraft, already concluded, have raised India to the rank of the first acquirer of French equipment in the Indo-Pacific over the period 2013-2022. Discussions are underway for the delivery of 26 Rafale Marine and three additional Scorpène submarines.

### On the ground, joint training

A tangible illustration of this strategic partnership on the ground, the French and Indian Armed Forces regularly organise joint manoeuvres to ensure the security of the Indo-Pacific zone. Planned in 2023 and carried out at the beginning of 2024, the "Desert Knight" exercise brought together the French, Indian, and Emirian air forces for their first trilateral exercise. In January 2023, the Carrier Strike Group, formed around the Charles de Gaulle, was deployed to the Indian Ocean. It conducted, with the Indian Navy, the annual exercise "Varuna" which marked the upgrade of this operational partnership. Two months later, the Jeanne d'Arc mission made a stopover in India where it notably participated in the joint exercise "Frinjex23" and conducted the multinational exercise "Lapérouse". Australia, the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom were also present. In addition to these naval exercises, air ("Garuda") and land ("Shakti") exercises also take place periodically.

<sup>2</sup> The Blue Economy encompasses all sectors and industries related to oceans, seas and coastlines, whether they are directly related to the marine environment or the terrestrial one. It covers a wide range of diverse activities, marked by a concern for sustainable development.





exercice Joint "Frinjex23".



persist in the area, such as piracy, terrorism, trafficking, illegal fishing, and the disastrous consequences of climate change.

The general posture of balancing power announced by the President of the Republic remains the guiding framework for France's action, adapting to the lessons learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this context, France's ambitions are to preserve its influence and ability to act, maintain a security environment conducive to the protection of its nationals, the exercise of its sovereignty and economic activities, as well as those of its partners. The South Pacific Defence Ministers' meeting (SPDMM) held in December 2023 in New Caledonia - bringing together 7 member states and 3 observers - has helped illustrate these challenges for our country.

Illustrating the military component of the French Indo-Pacific strategy, the ASIA 23 mission of the surveillance frigate *Prairial* has allowed, among other things, an autonomous assessment of activities in this strategic zone, but also strengthened partnerships with coastal countries through fisheries police patrols and information sharing with the Forum Fisheries Agency, and finally joint manoeuvres with the navies of partner countries in the region, notably the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, or the United States.

### 1.3. Preserving regional stability and fighting terrorism

Wherever it takes place in the world, a regional crisis can impact France's security and interests. To give our partners the means to assume their responsibilities to preserve or restore stability in their region is thus as much a security issue as a duty for France, in line with its international commitments and its conception of bilateral relations. Because they contribute directly to enabling partner states to defend themselves, exports of war material and similar items are a way of preserving regional stability in the service of shared interests.

#### Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: a balanced strategy to preserve regional stability

France is a sovereign nation of the Indo-Pacific. Today, this space is the stage of numerous geostrategic developments, which have direct consequences on the interests of France and its partners. As such, it intends to fully assume its role as a regional power, in order to protect its sovereign interests, ensure the security of its citizens, and actively contribute to regional stability and security. Consequently, it established a Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific in 2019.

The assertion of power and territorial claims of strategic competitors, the arms race, the risk of proliferation, and the intensification of Chinese-US competition have lastingly altered regional balances in the Indo-Pacific. Transnational threats also



© Ministère des Armées.

2023 SPDMM

Securing maritime routes

Affirming to support Hamas against Israel, the Houthi rebels pose a permanent threat in the southern Red Sea, as well as in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic maritime space where military and commercial vessels are regularly attacked.

In order to ensure maritime security for these routes, France notably deploys multi-mission frigates to protect the commercial and security interests of France, the EU and the international community. They conduct patrols in maritime zones where the Houthis operate, including as part of the European Union's "Aspides" operation and in coordination with the "Prosperity Guardian" operation, a naval coalition of several countries launched on 18 December and led by the United States. The results of French action in the Red Sea, particularly since 8 December 2023, are already visible: a reduced number of merchant ships have been affected, thanks in part to the effectiveness of the Aster missile of the French multi-mission and air defence frigates, as well as the Italian frigates engaged in the operation. This defensive-minded missile also equips the navies of regional countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.



An Aster missile fired from the frigate *Lorraine*

An example of a direct export operation related to immediate regional security concerns is the order of patrol vessels and associated equipment by several countries along the Gulf of Guinea (Senegal, Angola, the Republic of Ivory Coast, Nigeria, among others), in order to improve maritime safety (fight against piracy and illegal fishing) in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Since 1990, one to two French vessels, reinforced by a maritime patrol aircraft, have been deployed to the Gulf of Guinea on a near-permanent basis as part of Operation "Corymbe". By strengthening the capacities of the coastal navies, France is contributing to the development of the security architecture resulting from the Yaoundé process. Operation "Corymbe" complements the French presence in West Africa by participating in the maritime component of operational cooperations, which is illustrated in particular in the fight against piracy. Furthermore, this deployment is consistent with the concept of coordinated maritime presence promoted by the European Union.

This presence also allows to accompany the development of the capacities of the countries in the region, as illustrated by the strengthening of the Senegalese maritime means with the delivery in 2023 of two of the 3 OPV 58 S built by Piriou, or of Angola, as evidenced by the acquisition of corvettes, interceptors, "trimaran" patrol vessels, as well as landing craft. Part of these means were indeed engaged in the context of the "Grand African Nemo 2023" exercise, which brought together 18 coastal nations of the Gulf of Guinea, 35 naval units and 6 aircraft; it aims to strengthen interregional cooperation resulting from the Yaoundé maritime security summit.



Admiral Abdou Sene, Senegalese Chief of the Naval, the Ambassador of Senegal to France, El Hadji Magatte Seye and President of Piriou, Vincent Faujour.



The Walo – Missile-Launching Warship OPV 58 S

To ensure this stability beyond our sole agreements, each export operation of war material and similar items is assessed against the internal and regional situation of the destination country, its interest for it and its regional partners in terms of security, with particular attention to the risk of destabilisation it could cause. By offering assets that are adapted and proportionate to the threats they are confronted with, France intends to support the preservation of regional stability of its partners and thus secure its strategic interests in the areas concerned.



## 2. Exports that are essential to our strategic autonomy and to the development of Europe of Defence

### 2.1. An autonomy essential to our strategic ambition – the issue of maintaining the DTIB

Strategic autonomy is the ability for France to anticipate, decide and act with partners – but also alone, where appropriate – for the defence of its interests by carrying out, on an entirely independent basis, the actions necessary to assess, evaluate, decide, and then, if necessary, take action. It is notably based on a good control over armament procurement.

The procurement of defence products from foreign countries, even if they are allies, entails a number of constraints in terms of access to the most sensitive capabilities, adaptation to the concepts of employment of our Armed Forces, the free use of these means, and finally, the possibilities of complementary procurements in the event of a crisis, particularly for munitions and missiles. Tensions on supplies over the last years – including in areas far from the military field – have shown the importance of controlling the chains of values. Besides, the lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine underline the key role played by the DTIB in an Armed Forces's capacity to sustain an effort over the long term.

Thanks to constant and continuous action in research and investment for more than 60 years, France has a strong, extended, diversified, innovative and competitive DTIB, which is recognised internationally for its many assets, and able to carry out the armament programmes it needs.

This DTIB is made up of resident companies that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the development, manufacturing, maintenance in operational condition and dismantling of national defence systems across the full spectrum of technologies France needs to preserve a full Armed Forces model. It guarantees the security of the national supply of sovereignty equipment and critical weapons systems and is, as such, an essential component of our national autonomy.

#### The critical role of export for the sustainability of the DTIB

However, such an industry cannot survive through national orders alone: export plays a crucial role in the maintenance and development of the DTIB.

First, there is the need to ensure continuity of production, which cannot always rely exclusively on national programmes. In the case of the Rafale for example, the production chain can only be viable with a minimum number of aircraft produced annually. In the previous MPAs, the schedule for the renewal of the fleets of the Air and Space Force and of the French Navy was incompatible with this rate. A bet had to be placed on exports, and has been won.

Increased series also allow to reduce unit costs degressively, leading to a reduction in the acquisition cost for the State.

Defence industrial activity is characterised by a permanent development and modernisation process, directed and encouraged by the State, and driven by the constant evolution of threats and spaces of conflicts. In this field, the possible loss of critical skills and know-how for lack of investment should be avoided, since it could prove particularly complex, slow and costly to reconstitute them.

However, skill maintenance cannot always be ensured by national programmes only, which follow each other at widely spaced intervals of time. Export orders can enable to maintain the presence and know-how of the personnel employed in the engineering and design departments and in the production units during these intervals, smoothing out the associated jolts and extra costs.

So, for instance, in the context of its Rafale aircraft purchase, India requested new features for its radar, which required software and hardware developments for the equipment. This request allowed to maintain the workload of Thales' engineering offices in cutting-edge areas of combat aviation for several years.

Finally, competition on export markets force manufacturers to be more innovative, while maintaining competitive costs to keep up with global competition.

The analysis of export potential and the implementation of the resulting precautionary measures are now systematic from the preparation phase of armament programmes onwards. This will ensure that we continue to have competitive products on the export market in the long term. This approach associates the manufacturer, who may therefore be requested to participate in the funding of developments, thereby reducing the effort to be borne by the French state. This approach, which had been used at the beginning of the Rafale programme, has also been implemented more recently in missile programmes such as the MMP<sup>1</sup>.

Ultimately, export is essential to the perennality of a DTIB able to equip our forces and to contribute to the success of operations France is engaged in. It is therefore a major security and sovereignty issue for our country.

#### CONTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS TO THE WAR ECONOMY

In a strategic context marked by the return of high-intensity conflict to Europe, it is essential, as the National Strategic Review of November 2022 prescribed it, that the industrial tool organises itself to sustain a war effort over time, where necessary for our Armed Forces or in support for a partner.

To meet these commitments, the DGA has notably initiated a collaborative work between State and industry on key topics of war economy: strategic stocks, resilience, technical innovation,

<sup>1</sup> Middle-range (anti-tank) missile.


human resources in critical jobs, maintenance in operational condition, strengthening of the DTIB, enhanced agility of the DTIB, etc.

In this respect, exports, which are essential to strengthening the DTIB, are part of the war economy. In particular, they offer market prospects for companies, providing an important incentive to replenish stocks, anticipate long-cycle supplies and certain manufacturing processes, and, finally, keep production lines operational. Exports will enable companies to replenish their stocks more quickly, and to benefit from more stocks or equipment that is well under construction. Exports can also encourage manufacturers to invest in their production facilities, by reducing the risk of national orders being staggered: this is certainly not the case today, but certain investments are evaluated over the long term.

#### **An economic and industrial issue as well**

The French DTIB is deeply rooted in the French economic, social and industrial fabric. It is made up of nine major groups (the industrial project managers) of European and global scope, which are able to integrate complex solutions. A vast network of subcontractors and suppliers made up of several thousand, often highly innovative, start-ups, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) and intermediate-sized enterprises, among which about 800 companies are identified as strategic or critical, is organised around them. The DTIB mobilises around 210,000 direct and indirect jobs (that is as many as the automobile production sector), often highly qualified and, by nature, not easily relocatable, which are spread across production and research centres throughout the country. Thus, the defence industrial activity plays a decisive role in the constitution of certain departmental employment pools, notably Yvelines, Hauts-de-Seine and Essonne (numerous industrial sites of the main stakeholders of the DTIB), Haute-Garonne and Bouches du Rhône (many jobs in aeronautics and space), Gironde (especially in the aeronautics sector), Var, Finistère, Manche, Morbihan, and Loire-Atlantique (jobs in the naval sector), Cher (missile sector), or Loire (land sector): see map below.

# Jobs per region



Beyond the DTIB, arms exports contribute to France's economic development.

In terms of exportable equipment, our defense industry, which has exported nearly half of its sales on average in recent years, is traditionally and structurally a net and positive contributor to France's balance of trade.

Moreover, military export contracts are part of a process of adaptation of the whole French industry to globalisation by fostering its international development through the conclusion of industrial partnerships and local establishments on the most promising markets. Thus, in the wake of major export contracts, a correlation can be observed between commercial exchanges in all fields and the signing of defence export contracts.

Finally, the vast majority of DTIB companies also has a civilian activity, which allows them to have a balanced portfolio, civilian, military, national market and exports, which makes them more resilient to sectoral or geographic downturns. In particular, as defence activities are less dependent on the economic situation, they allow these companies to better weather periods of crisis. Finally, advances in the military field have major civilian spinoffs in the fields of aeronautics, space, and information and communication technologies.

As a national centre of excellence, the defence and security industry plays a driving and stimulating role for the economy as a whole, and contributes to the development of technologies that give French industry a competitive edge.

## 2.2. A European ambition

France intends to maintain a double ambition: to preserve its strategic autonomy and to help build a stronger Europe in the face of multiplying common challenges, be it within NATO, through the European Union and/or in bilateral/minilateral formats<sup>1</sup>.

An innovative, competitive and resilient EDTIB, which guarantees security of supply and cutting-edge technologies, is more important than ever in view of the security and sovereignty challenges facing the European Union.

### European or multilateral tools to support the European defence industry

The launch in December 2017 of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), enabling the emergence of major federating projects designed to meet the needs of European armed forces and the establishment of the EDF provide the means for this ambition. With a budget of €8 billion for the period 2021-2027, this fund enables the European Union budget to contribute to the development of the EDTIB through the financing of cooperative research and development initiatives.

<sup>1</sup> Formats consisting of a limited number of countries based on common or thematic projects outside institutional frameworks.

With regard to the EDF's 2023 work programme, for which the selection of industrial bids will be known in June 2024, we can already note that France is supporting eighteen development and eight research projects. Topics include in particular quantum technologies, collaborative air combat and pilot environment enhancement, technology building blocks for future helicopter programmes, high-altitude platform systems (balloons with ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance] capabilities, etc.).

These projects illustrate the growing power of a Europe that must also enable its members to be present on the export market and free to make their own export choices, while respecting the Common Position. Dedicated tools have been put in place to facilitate exchanges between partners and anticipate these problems.

### THE GENERAL TRANSFER LICENCE LGT FR 111 FOR DEFENCE PRODUCTS DEVELOPED BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The creation of the EDF fosters cooperation between European manufacturers on defence R&T in an environment where transfers of data, information or classified equipment between European countries remain subject to the normal control regime. It is therefore important to have a system that meets a twofold challenge: to maintain the quality and robustness of export controls for transfers of technology and know-how that can be very sensitive, and to make the transfer process more fluid so that the requirements linked to these controls do not unduly delay projects in highly technological fields where time is paramount to remain competitive.

The creation of the general licence LGT FR 111 (published by interministerial decree of 29 April 2022) has been created to meet this need. It is the twelfth text implementing the Directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 ("simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community"), extend its scope to «intergovernmental cooperation programmes concerning the development, production and use of one or more defence-related products" (Art. 5-3°). It is applicable to French participants in projects having received a European subvention, either from the EDF or the schemes that preceded it.

This licence provides administrative fluidity in the transferring and exchanging of classified products between members of the consortium carrying out the project by replacing all the individual licences that would be necessary. It provides an exchange framework that is formalised and subject to state control within the industrial consortium, and entails a "commitment not to re-transfer" to third countries.

It is adapted to all the exchanges of a projet (product, product type, documentation) for which end-user control would be necessary. Through this mechanism, products and their by-products, while remaining under control, thus become freely exchangeable and usable within the project, not only for the phase financed by European funds, but also, later on,

for activities carried out by the members of the consortium following this initial phase.

As for the other general licences, the use of the LGT FR 111 requires prior registration, which will allow the exporter to use the licence for all the projects he wishes to participate in<sup>1</sup>. Today, over fifty operators have been authorised to use the LGT FR 111 licence for about twenty EDF projects.

The EDF supports research and development, but it is not designed to help with the acquisition of equipment. The latter is the responsibility of the Member States, potentially within industrial cooperation schemes that the EDF will have helped set up. Associated with other incentive measures, the EDF is therefore a tool, one of whose objectives is to guide our partners towards European acquisitions.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has sharply reminded of the need to strengthen the EDTIB. While the urgency leads some Member States to seek quick acquisitions, sometimes not European ones, it also underlies an unprecedented movement of orders towards the EDTIB, which France has anticipated by proposing, for example, a joint acquisition of Mistral missiles.

### THE JOINT ACQUISITION PROGRAMME OF MISTRAL MISSILES

Since October 2022, France has proposed to establish a joint acquisition eligible for EDIRPA support. At the air defence conference on 19 June 2023, a Letter of Intent (LoI) for the joint acquisition of Mistral 3 missiles was signed with Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia and Hungary.

As part of this LoI, a Framework Arrangement (FA) is being finalised between the participating States.

The entry into force of the FA is a prerequisite for the notification of various orders. These will be subject to Acquisition Orders (AO) between France, as the framework nation, and each participating country. Subsequently, the DGA, the contracting agency, will notify MBDA of subsequent contracts under the FA "Supply of Mistral weapons systems and associated services", which was notified to MBDA on 20 November 2023.

The launch of tools aimed at promoting joint acquisition between European States (EDIRPA - European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) or strengthening production capabilities (ASAP - Act in Support of Ammunition Production) is the implementation of the orientations given by the Versailles summit, in March 2022, and by the Strategic Compass, adopted in March 2022 under the French presidency of the Council of the European Union.

<sup>1</sup> For example, ODIN'S EYE, ENGRT, EICAS projects.

### EUROPEAN SUPPORT TO THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Recent ASAP and EDIRPA schemes aim to promote investments within the EDTIB:

- the ASAP scheme aims to strengthen European production capacities for shells and missiles, as well as those for necessary raw materials (powders and explosives). This support takes the form of direct funding to defence industries to increase their production capacity. The regulation also plans to establish a ramp-up fund to grant loans to companies to limit their risks and accelerate the expansion of their production capacity;
- the EDIRPA scheme provides financial support to EU Member States (from the EU budget) to offset the complexity of interstate cooperation during the acquisition phase and thus encourage the joint acquisition of defence products. The scheme should notably cover the technical and administrative costs of joint acquisitions involving consortia of at least three EU Member States.

The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), announced by European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech in September 2023, and presented on 5 March 2024 (alongside one of its implementation tools), aims to build a long-term political vision for EU action in the defence industry.

Implementation will rely on a dedicated regulation (EDIP - European Defense Industry Programme), including new governance instruments and tools that will complement ASAP and EDIRPA, which will also be incorporated in a more sustainable form. The Commission's proposals are currently being discussed with Member States and will subsequently be discussed with the European Parliament.

### Cooperative programs

This European dimension can lead, in the first place, to the implementation of bilateral projects built in synergy with an export logic. This logic is illustrated by the continued pursuit of the CaMo<sup>2</sup> strategic partnership signed between France and Belgium in 2019, under which France is mandated by Belgium to procure equipment on its behalf and for its own account. Contracts were completed in December 2023 with the acquisition contracts for MEPAC<sup>3</sup> vehicles and additional Caesar artillery systems.

Likewise, France and Sweden have initiated a new framework for cooperation on the medium-range anti-tank missile system MMP to develop new capabilities with the signing of a framework arrangement in April 2023.

<sup>2</sup> Motorised capability

<sup>3</sup> Mortier embarqué pour l'appui de contact (Embedded Mortar for Close Support). The MEPAC is a GRIFFON vehicle equipped with an integrated mortar.

But the European dimension also leads to projects that are conducted cooperatively from the start, whose main advances in 2023 can be listed.

In the field of air defence, France and Italy have strengthened their cooperation with the notification in January 2023 by the OCCAR<sup>1</sup> of the production contract for the SAMP/T NG ground-based medium-range air defence system for the French Air Force and the Italian Army. This cooperation was extended in July 2023 with the notification of the SAMP/T NG production by the OCCAR for the Italian Air Force.

In the naval field, France and Italy have continued their cooperation with the notification in July 2023 by the OCCAR of the mid-life upgrade of the four Horizon air defence frigates, including the integration of a new generation of surface-to-air defence system based on Aster.

In the aeronautical field, France, Germany and Spain officially launched, in April 2023, in Madrid, the phase 1B works of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme.

In the land domain, France and Germany decided in September 2023 in Évreux to launch the new phase of the future Main Ground Combat System (MGCS programme) as soon as possible by developing a pillar-based approach similar to that of the FCAS programme. This momentum was realised in 2024 with the signing, on 26 April 2024, of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Minister for the Armed Forces and the Federal Minister of Defence.

In the range of reconnaissance vehicles, France and Belgium have launched cooperation on the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle with the notification on 6 December 2023 by the OCCAR of the pre-concept contract.

The export capacity of European programmes is an essential dimension of the European strategic autonomy. For many weapons systems, the domestic market alone cannot sustain the DTIBE. National defence industrial base issues naturally translate to the European level: just like a national DTIB, the EDTIB cannot maintain and develop without an export relay outside the EU.

These exports are carried out under the control of the competent national authorities. The progressive efforts of convergence of our export practices, already well advanced in respecting the criteria of the EU's Common Position on the export of military technologies and equipment, continue through discussions initiated within the COARM (EU Council working group on conventional arms exports), while preserving the sovereign decision-making freedom of EU Member States on this matter.

## 2.3. A coordination between exporter countries

Even if all allied countries have export control mechanisms that allow for a strict control of arms sales at state level, these mechanisms are specific to these countries, which can make cooperations complex. It therefore appeared necessary to make an effort to understand our respective regulations.

The coordination between exporting countries at the international and European levels takes place in particular within the framework of our European and international commitments, in particular the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of the European Union and the Arms Trade Treaty. These texts define a shared evaluation base - strictly respected by France - which allow to determine the compatibility of projected exports according to precise criteria - eight for the Common Position - and in accordance with the specific commitments of each of the countries concerned.

The Common Position 2008/944/CFSP also promotes the convergence of practices in Europe through a mechanism for notifying refusals and consulting between Member States. These exchanges take place monthly within the EU Council's conventional arms working group, the COARM. The COARM also works on updating the Common Position to improve the shared vision of the Member States' practices in the field of export control.

As for the Arms Trade Treaty, France actively participates in the EU programme for the implementation and universalisation of the treaty, which has been entrusted to Expertise France and the German BAFA. In this context, Expertise France carries out training and dissemination of best practices abroad to facilitate the implementation of the treaty by signatory States and to promote awareness-raising actions towards non-signatory States to universalise the treaty.

France also participates in best practice exchanges with European partners, both in dedicated fora such as the Letter of Intent framework agreement, which offers a space for free discussion between the six main European weapons producers (Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden), and within the framework of the multilateral agreement between France, Germany and Spain on arms exports, which facilitates export processes between them to third States. This agreement is open to new members, which see it as a means of promoting further cooperation in the field of armaments within the European continent.

Finally, France is also involved in international for a dedicated to arms export control, notably within the Wassenaar Arrangement, which aims to define shared lists of controlled equipment. As for multilateral control regimes, France is also active in international policies limiting dissemination, such as the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions, which respectively prohibit the manufacturing, trade and use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.

<sup>1</sup> Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation.



#### THE FRANCO-GERMAN-SPANISH AGREEMENT ON DEFENCE EXPORT CONTROL

On 23 October 2019, France and Germany signed an agreement on defence export control. This agreement was replaced on 17 September 2021 by a multilateral agreement also involving Spain, which incorporates the principles of the previous French German bilateral agreement. This new agreement expresses the shared will to strengthen the integration and synergies of French, German and Spanish defence companies.

It remains essential that the industry of these three States strengthen their ability to jointly develop and produce future programmes, such as the FCAS or the MGCS. This imperative obviously implies that the parties agree on the exportability or non-exportability of the resulting equipment.

The purpose of this agreement is to build the legal security needed to establish and develop the cooperations in which France, Germany and Spain participate, which are also essential and concrete elements of European defense. From now on, for defence products resulting from these cooperations, France, Germany and Spain will immediately grant transfer authorisations to other partners, unless the operation jeopardises the direct interests or national security of one of the partners concerned. In this case, high-level consultations must be organised to identify appropriate solutions.

For components intended for integration outside of intergovernmental programmes and industrial cooperations, the agreement also provides for a specific rule, known as "de minimis" rule, which allows for simplification of control procedures if the economic contribution is below a defined threshold. This principle, based on mutual trust and transparency, concerns day-to-day operations between French, German and Spanish companies that maintain flows of components integrated into re-exported systems.

The very positive outcome of the facilitation provided by this agreement has generated interest from other European partners with significant defence industries. As the depositary State of the agreement, France has initiated in-depth discussions with Germany and Spain on all aspects related to expanding the agreement. Any future expansion will have to meet with the unanimous decision of the States party to the agreement.





# PART 2

## AN EXPORT POLICY TO A RIGOROUS INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTROL PROCESS

- 1. Exports controlled and compliant with France's international commitments ..... 26
  - 1.1. International framework ..... 26
  - 1.2. European regulations ..... 28
  - 1.3. Arms embargoes ..... 28
- 2. War material exports strictly controlled at interdepartmental level ..... 31
  - 2.1. The principle of prohibition applied to an annually updated scope ..... 31
  - 2.2. A governmental responsibility ..... 32
  - 2.3. An assessment of licence applications on a case-by-case basis ..... 34
  - 2.4. The special case of export transfers ..... 38
  - 2.5. Transparency at national and international levels ..... 38
- 3. A control being part of policy to control arms and to fight against dissemination of small arms and light weapons ..... 40
  - 3.1. Regulated and monitored operations (conditions and NRC, ex-post control) ..... 40
  - 3.2. Licences re-assessed against the context ..... 43

AN EXPORT POLICY SUBJECT TO A RIGOROUS INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTROL PROCESS

1. Exports controlled and compliant with France’s international commitments

France’s exports of war materials and related materials meet key political guidelines, as set out in the previous part. Because of the particular nature of the considered material and the involved issues, these exports fall necessarily within a strict national (regulatory and legislative) and international framework. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a European Union Member State, a major exporter and a nuclear weapon power, France has particular responsibilities regarding export control. It therefore adheres to all the international arms control and non-proliferation agreements it considers relevant to strengthen international security and limit the humanitarian consequences of conflicts.

1.1. International framework

France’s export control action falls within a precise international framework. This framework primarily enables to ensure the diffusion of high control standards in a growing number of countries and to improve the sharing of best practice in regulation (control regimes) and prohibition (ban agreements). While an ever increasing number of emerging countries position themselves as arms exporters, it is essential that all these players adopt a responsible approach that enables to avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilising transfers, to combat illegal trafficking, and to ensure that exports meet effective and proportionate needs. This is the challenge France’s commitment to the various control regimes, international conventions and treaties seeks to meet.

France is a founding member and actively participates in multilateral export control regimes (see box). The latter aim to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, conventional weapons, and sensitive goods and technologies. There are four multilateral export control regimes.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL REGIMES

Multilateral export control regimes are pillars of the international security architecture. They are in fact an irreplaceable instrument in the non-proliferation policy of States by providing a unique multilateral framework for high-level technical exchanges between international experts. This technical work aims at achieving a shared understanding of the sensitivity of certain goods or materials. Finally, these regimes also aim at developing and enhancing international control standards, well beyond the member countries of these regimes.

France is a founding member and active participant in the four control regimes aimed at preventing the uncontrolled spread of sensitive weapons and technologies, namely:

- the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for sensitive nuclear goods and technologies, i.e. that can be used for nuclear weapon programmes<sup>1</sup>;
- the Australia Group (AG), for goods that can be used for the composition or manufacturing of biological and chemical weapons<sup>2</sup>;
- the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), for missiles and related technologies that can be used as weapons of mass destruction delivery systems<sup>3</sup>;
- the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), for conventional weapons and dual-use goods that are particularly sensitive because of the risk of destabilising accumulation or diversion to terrorist or criminal groups<sup>4</sup>. Participating States control the export of all goods included in the two lists<sup>5</sup>, with the aim of preventing unauthorised transfers or re-exports of these goods.

Multilateral control regimes have among their qualities the fact that they go beyond regional logics. They are non-discriminatory and fully incorporate the right to development and peaceful use of technologies.

Multilateral control regimes today face fundamental challenges, notably the multiplication of networks for circumventing controls through third countries, and the exponential pace of technological development.

To face current challenges, it is necessary to contribute actively to the preservation and improvement of multilateral control regimes through the following lines of action, to which France contributes actively:

- to value the essential technical work carried out under the control regimes in order to maintain their status as global export control standards;
- to fuel exchanges between experts on technological developments and the updating of lists of goods and technologies to be controlled;

1 <https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/index.php/en/>.  
2 <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/index.html>.  
3 <https://www.mtcr.info/en>.  
4 <https://www.wassenaar.org/en/>.  
5 <https://waassenaar.org/en/control-lists/>.

- to ensure an active promotion of this work to countries that are not members to the regimes and to make sure that the regimes are open to States, whose candidacy is legitimate and relevant.

Participation in these regimes is essential, as it enables to draw up a coordinated list of the most sensitive goods that will be subject to controls. These lists are updated annually, based on technical expert meetings of participating States, in order to take into account, the most recent technological developments.

France also participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which brings together about hundred States engaged in actions of detection and disruption of flows of proliferating items (weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems and related materials). Moreover, a certain number of international conventions include export control provisions (most often bans). As a State Party to these conventions, France applies their provisions in its export policy. This includes in particular the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines.

France is also among the first countries to have ratified, as early as April 2014, the ATT, the first legally binding international instrument aiming at better regulating the transfer of conventional weapons and at strengthening the fight against illicit trafficking (see box below). The Treaty represents a major step forward in terms of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, which are at the heart of the criteria that the States Parties undertake to respect before authorising any arms export.

### ARMS TRADE TREATY

Adopted on 2 April 2013 by the United Nations General Assembly and entered into force on 24 December 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) intends to make States more aware of their responsibilities with regard to international transfers of conventional weapons in order to contribute to international peace and security. It pursues a twofold objective in this regard. First, the Treaty aims at better regulating the licit international trade in conventional arms by introducing common standards for export, import, transit, transshipment and brokering. Secondly, it intends to strengthen the fight against illicit arms trafficking and their diversion to unauthorised end-users. The Treaty also aims at promoting transparency in the international trade in conventional arms and, to that end, States Parties are required to report annually on their arms exports and imports (Appendix 4).

As of 1 April 2023, the Treaty had 113 States Parties, including all the European Union Member States and 130 signatories. Efforts must still be made to progress towards universalisation of the Treaty, and thus consolidate its status as an international standard for regulating arms transfers. In order to help States, comply with their obligations under the Treaty, several assistance mechanisms have been introduced. For example, a Voluntary Trust Fund (VFT) enables to fund activities to support the enforcement of the Treaty. For its part, the European Union has set up an assistance programme, as soon as the Treaty came

into force: the EU Arms Trade Treaty - Outreach Project (ATT OP). The French Agency Expertise France has been mandated to implement part of this project, which, in its third phase, will receive funding of more than €3,5M (for the period 2022-2025). On the one hand, this funding enables to accompany States that are not party to the ATT with a view to a possible accession, in order to contribute to its universalisation, through the voluntary and gradual introduction in these States of an export control system and national regulations that comply with the Treaty. On the other hand, and also through the ATT OP programme, States Parties to the Treaty can benefit from an assistance in enforcing the Treaty. Within this framework, Expertise France undertook several activities in 2023 for the benefit of Benin, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Mexico, Niger, Madagascar, Comoros or Senegal. French control experts regularly take part in those activities alongside foreign experts and representatives of civil society.

In 2023, the theme of the role of industry animated the ninth conference of the States parties (CEP 9). While only States can be parties to the ATT and are therefore responsible for implementing its provisions, industry contributes to the effectiveness of the treaty through its involvement in the various stages of arms exports. In this regard, France has emphasised the essential role played by industry in the French export control system, which is based in particular on the accountability of arms manufacturers, who are required to respect numerous obligations under national legislation and regulations. In addition, industry is also involved in the implementation and evolution of control through regular dialogue with the administration, during which it can raise questions, proposals, and any difficulties encountered. Private actors can also use their experience and expertise to benefit the international community. They provide valuable technical expertise, for example, to ensure that regulations are tailored to the specifics of this type of transaction and applicable by all stakeholders.

The adoption of the ATT was a priority for France, which actively participated in the different phases of negotiation.

The EU Member States were already implementing a number of control standards, which were then taken up, at their initiative, in the ATT. France has thus firmly committed to ensuring that respect for international law, human rights, and international humanitarian law occupies a central place in the treaty. It has contributed to the taking into account in its provisions, not only of exports, but also of all the operations participating in the transfer chain (import, transit, transshipment and brokering), the fight against corruption and international judicial cooperation. At the proposal of France, a clause has been introduced in the ATT to allow its scope of application to be expanded to take into account technological developments in the field of armaments.

Today, France continues to firmly commit to the work of this treaty today by conducting outreach actions to third countries (see box above), as well as by introducing proposals aimed at better sharing experiences in terms of control. The fight against diversion was thus introduced in the 2018 works at the

initiative of France. To this end, a French-inspired Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) was created, a sui generis body within the ATT, whose objective is to allow States parties and signatory States to share tangible and operational information on suspected or proven cases of diversion that they have or have had to deal with, in order to effectively prevent these cases, treat them properly when they have already occurred or help other States prevent or treat them. France had the honour of presiding over the work of this forum in 2023, demonstrating through its involvement the great importance France attaches to the DIEF and, more broadly, its commitment to the implementation of the ATT.

In accordance with the provisions of the ATT, France refuses a certain number of arms exports each year (see box page 39).

### 1.2. European regulations

France's control system is also based on the various instruments of EU law – which are part of the European acquis<sup>1</sup> –, which define common rules or regulate the trade of military equipment or of so-called "sensitive" goods.

Like all its European partners, France thus applies the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP "defining common rules governing the control of exports of military equipment and technologies". This decision has been amended by Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 of 16 September 2019. Within this framework, France committed to assessing licence applications against eight cumulative examination criteria. Moreover, it informs the other Member States of licence refusals issued at national level to ensure they will handle a similar export application the same way and to avoid the risk of circumvention of European rules. Finally, France submits an annual report to the European External Action Service (EEAS) on its arms exports (accessible on-line).

The Common Position 2008/944/CFSP is periodically reviewed every 5 years by the Member States within the framework of the Council of the European Union's Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). The next review exercise has been launched in 2022 and is due to be completed in 2024 (see box page 29).

Three working groups (called Focus Groups - FG) were set up in late 2021/early 2022, as part of the preparatory work for the revision of the Common Position. The objective was to identify the main strands of reflection and guide the work to respond to the time constraints of the exercise (which has as a deadline the end of 2024).

Additionally, regarding exports of war materials to the other Member States of the European Union, France applies Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community. This Directive

facilitates Intra-Community Transfers (ICT), in particular through the introduction of general transfer licences, such as for example the LGT FR 111 licence (see box in Part 1) to facilitate the conduct of the multinational EDF-funded programmes.

#### PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE COARM WITH A VIEW TO REVIEWING THE COMMON POSITION IN 2024

The Common Position of the Council of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing the export control of military technology and equipment aims to establish high common standards for transfers of military technology and equipment and to strengthen information exchange between EU Member States to ensure greater transparency in this area. It is an essential instrument for strengthening cooperation between Member States.

The Common Position includes, in particular, a series of eight criteria for examining requests for export licenses for weapons of war, which form a solid method of common analysis of license requests. It also contains a set of essential provisions on the transparency of decisions (including decisions to refuse) between Member States.

The Common Position is re-examined every five years - the last exercise took place in 2019. In preparation for its update in 2024, the COARM has begun in-depth discussions on all aspects relating to the implementation of this text as early as the end of 2021 or the beginning of 2022. To do so, three working groups (Focus Groups) were created:

- Focus Group #1 (co-led by France and the Netherlands) worked on the aspects of the export control of cooperative projects, in particular those related to the EDF;
- Focus Group #2 (co-led by Germany and Sweden) focused its reflections on the convergence of export policies;
- Focus Group #3 (co-led by Italy and the Czech Republic) studied the legal challenges of export control.

The conclusions of these Focus Groups now serve as a basis for amending the text of the Common Position, the User Guide and/or the Council's decision. The co-pilots of the FGs are now co-authors in the negotiation of the texts. France contributed to this exercise by presenting a number of proposals, including for smoothing out decision-making processes for cooperative programs or for strengthening the exchange of best practices within the COARM on various topics related to the daily implementation of the Common Position by the control authorities of the Member States.

<sup>1</sup> All these texts are available on the site of the European Union: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>.

1.3. Arms embargoes (see box)

France rigorously applies the sanctions regimes and restrictive measures imposed by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

These measures can evolve depending on international crises and their partial or total resolution, for example when the public authorities of a State stabilise. In July, then in December 2023, the United Nations Security Council thus lifted the arms embargo towards, respectively, security forces and public services in charge of maintaining order in the Central African Republic<sup>1</sup> (integrated into the European sanctions regime in November 2023<sup>2</sup>), as well as towards the government and public authorities of Somalia, while renewing the sanctions regime and the arms embargo concerning non-state actors Chabab<sup>3</sup>.

Licence applications submitted for embargoed countries receive special treatment. Each embargo covers a specific category or list of goods, as well as a geographical area, or a category of final recipients, to which the export of these goods is prohibited. Most of the time, exemptions or derogations are also provided for certain uses (see box below). The United Nations sanctions regime against the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, evolved in 2022 by establishing an exception to the notification obligation when exports of war materials are intended for the defense and security forces of the State<sup>4</sup>.

Control teams determine the status of the licence with regard to the rules imposed by the embargo. If the licence falls within the scope of the embargo and does not meet the conditions for an exemption, the CIEEMG automatically issues an unfavourable advice. Otherwise, the licence is examined against the usual criteria. If the CIEEMG gives a favourable advice, France notifies the latter to the Sanctions Committee, or requests the authorisation of the latter in accordance with the conditions laid down for controlling the embargo. Only once it has received the acknowledgement of receipt or formal authorisation from the Sanctions Committee does the CIEEMG notifies the export authorisation to the manufacturer.

In addition, the French scheme allows for a high degree of adaptability to changes in the international political and legal context, with the law providing for the possibility for the Prime Minister to suspend, modify, abrogate or withdraw export licences issued, in particular on the basis of France's international commitments.

1 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2693 (2023), 23 July 2023.  
2 Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2487 of 9 November 2023 amending Decision 2013/798/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Central African Republic, Article 2, 1., g).  
3 UNSC, Resolutions S/RES/2713 (2023) and S/RES/2714 (2023), 1 December 2023.  
4 UNSC, Resolution S/RES/2667, 20 December 2022.

ARMS EMBARGOES

Arms embargoes are meant to reduce the availability of war materials and limit the risks of dissemination in a zone of conflict or instability by prohibiting or restricting their trade or supply.

The UNSC can impose arms embargoes under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Eleven are currently in force, with the expiration of the conventional arms embargo on Iran on 18 October 2020. States and regional organisations can also adopt unilateral sanction measures. This is the case of the EU or the OSCE. In the case of the EU, these are restrictive measures taken either in application of resolutions adopted by the UNSC or on an autonomous basis (based on Article 215, par. 1 TFEU). The EU thus imposes an arms embargo on 8 countries: Belarus, Burma, China, Iran, Russia, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

The coverage of these embargoes varies both in terms of their scope (whole territory, specific region or targeted entities) and the material concerned (arms and related materials, equipment likely to be used for internal repression, etc.) or the activities targeted (exports, provision of technical assistance, training, etc.).

In most of the cases, exemptions (a priori exclusions of the application of restrictive measures) or derogations (exclusions, on demand and on a case-by-case basis, of the application of restrictive measures) are provided for. They may for example concern the transfer of "non-lethal military material" for UN personnel, humanitarian actors or media for humanitarian or protective purposes.

France plays a driving role in the adoption, renewal and implementation of UN sanctions regimes as a permanent member of the Security Council. It makes sure that these measures are rigorously implemented, permanently adapted, and that they are part of a genuine political and diplomatic strategy. Finally, France is a member of sanctions committees and cooperates with the panels of experts in charge of the proper application of sanctions. France always responded favourably to requests from panels of experts to facilitate the gathering of information on cases of alleged violations of restrictive measures (request for additional information, organisation of field visits, etc.). It also takes part in actions to enforce arms embargoes in accordance with provisions of relevant resolutions. For example, after having implemented means in the framework of the European naval operation Sophia, France remains committed to the application of the embargo on arms to and from Libya by taking part in operation Irini, which was established on 31 March 2020 and prolonged in March 2023 until 31 March 2025.




**The case of Russia**

The European embargo on arms to or from Russia has been in force since 2014. Also targeting exports of dual-use goods and technologies (see report to Parliament on exports of dual-use goods), it was considerably strengthened following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with the scope of the restrictive measures extended to other goods and technologies as well as numerous activities.

This embargo previously included a derogation commonly known as the "grandfather clause", which authorised the performance of contracts concluded before 1 August 2014 (when the embargo came into force) or ancillary contracts

necessary for the performance of these contracts, and the supply of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union. There was therefore, from France as from several other European countries, a residual flow of deliveries linked to this derogation and traced in the annual reports to Parliament since 2014, which has gradually died down to zero (see Appendix 1). It should also be noted that these deliveries corresponded to goods classified as military equipment, but which were not arms as such, as attested by the reports to the ATT, where France has always declared a nil situation with regard to arms exports to Russia. The grandfather clause was abolished by Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/578 of 8 April 2022 following the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

ARMS EMBARGOES IN FORCE (UN, EU AND OSCE) AS OF 1<sup>ER</sup> FEBRUARY 2024



2. War material exports strictly controlled at interdepartmental level

2.1. The principle of prohibition applied to an annually updated scope

According to the national legal regime (see box below), any activity related to the manufacturing of or trade in arms is prohibited, unless authorised by the State. The defence sector and its flows as a whole are therefore subject to a prohibition regime.

In France, the manufacturing of and trade in war materials, arms, ammunition and their elements, as well as any intermediation activity in this field, therefore require a state authorisation (Manufacturing, Trade and Intermediation Authorisation (AFCI). These authorisations are delivered either by the Home Ministry or by the Ministry for the Armed Forces according to the concerned materials for a (renewable) maximum five-year period. Moreover the exercise of this activity is subject to conditions and controls.

The perimeter of materials subject to the intra-community export and transfer prohibition regime is updated annually by updating the decree of 27 June 2012<sup>1</sup>, whose last amendment dates back to December 2023. This perimeter notably includes the Military List, which is defined according to specific criteria, annexed to the European Directive 2009/43/EC<sup>2</sup> and annually updated by the European Union. It also includes other additional materials or components (in particular operational formations, satellite or space-based systems), whose export France controls. This control scope is thus very large: it includes whole systems, but also their components that are specifically designed for military use, as well the provision of data classified as war materials or similar items (documentation specifying the performance of the systems for instance).

ARMAMENT EXPORTS  
IN THE DEFENCE CODE

Title III of the Defence Code (Articles L2331-1 to L2339-19 and, for the regulatory part, Articles R2331-1 to R2339-5) governs "War materials, weapons and ammunition". In this matter, the first stage of French control occurs at the stage of manufacturing and trade. In general, Article L2332-1 provides that the activities manufacturing, trade and intermediation of certain war materials, weapons and ammunition are subject to authorisation from the Ministry for the Armed Forces (or the Home Ministry, depending on the classification of material<sup>3</sup>). Furthermore, the activities of import and export of war materials are prohibited unless previously

authorised by the administrative authority (Articles L2335-1 and L2335-2), an authorisation which is also necessary in case of transfers<sup>4</sup> (Article L2335-9). There are different modes of authorising an export or transfer which take the form of an individual, global or general license, which may be subject to certain conditions or restrictions (Articles L2335-3 and L2335-10). These conditions, which concern notably the re-export, must be integrated into the contract and notified to the recipients of the export or transfer by the exporter (Articles L2335-5 and L2335-13) under penalty of sanction (Article L2339-11-2, para. 1).

The State control over activities related to war materials can lead the administration to revoke an authorisation of export or transfer. Pursuant to articles L2335-4 and L2335-12, a license can thus be suspended, modified, revoked or withdrawn.

State control also occurs ex-post through monitoring, consultation and request for information relating to exports or transfers. Companies must thus communicate periodic reports of their order intakes and exports or transfers to the administration. They are also required to keep data relating to their exports or transfers in a register, as well as any document related to the transaction for a ten-year period (Articles L2335-6 and L2335-14), under penalty of sanction (article L2339-11-1 para. 2). In this perspective, pursuant to Article L2339-1, a order adopted on 30 November 2011 has created the Ministerial Committee for ex-Post Control (CMCAP), in charge of a posteriori control of the Ministry for the Armed Forces (see § 3.1.2, page 41).

Export authorisations take the form of licences called transfer licences for defence-related products, when the operation is destined for an EU Member State, or export licences of war materials and related materials; when it is destined for third countries outside the EU:

- the individual licence, which authorises the dispatch of goods in one or more consignments, up to a certain quantity, to an identified recipient;
- the global licence, which authorises the dispatch of goods to one or several identified recipients with no limit on quantity or amount;
- the general licence, which allows any exporter or provider having the right to use it to carry out export or transfer operations included in a scope that is clearly defined and set out in the licence. It authorizes unlimited operations in terms of quantity or amount, to one or more identified recipients.

1 Equipment defined and designed for military use only.  
2 Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community amended by Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 of 16 September 2019.  
3 For the classification of material, see Appendix 1 and in particular p. 59.  
4 See below.

## THE VARIOUS REGIMES FOR THE CONTROL OF SENSITIVE GOODS

The items subject to this report are war materials and related items, as defined by the decree of 27 June 2012, modified. The authority responsible for certifying that a good belongs to this list is the Directorate General of Armament.

However, other control regimes also exist:

### - Dual-use items

Dual-use items are "products, including software and technologies, which are likely to have both a civilian and a military use" and especially, "goods that could be used for the purpose of designing, developing, manufacturing, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or their delivery systems"<sup>1</sup>.

Except in specific cases, exports of dual-use goods to non-EU countries are subject to authorisation, issued by the Dual-Use Goods Department of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. For export requests with particular sensitivity, authorizations for dual-use goods and technology licenses are examined by the Interministerial Commission for Dual-Use Goods, in which the Ministry for the Armed Forces is represented. The presidency of this Commission is ensured by the SGDSN. The exports of dual-use goods and technologies have been the subject of a specific Parliamentary Report since 2022.

### - Explosive products

Export of any equipment containing powder or explosives (if it is not classified as war material or related material) is subject to the issuance of an authorisation for the export of powders and explosive substances. These authorisations are issued by the Minister in charge of Customs following an interdepartmental procedure that may involve the Foreign, Home, Economy or Defence Ministers.

### - Firearms and ammunition for civilian use

Export and transfer of so-called civilian firearms and ammunition, and their parts, are subject to authorisation. This authorisation is granted by the Minister in charge of Customs after obtaining the advice of the Defence, Home or Foreign Ministers according to their respective remit. The issuance of the licence (licence for the export of firearms) is first subject to the presentation of the import authorisation of the importer third country, or of the non-objection of transit. The Customs then obtains the advice of the ministries concerned, which takes account of the quantity of arms exported, the sensitivity of the destination country, and the quality of the recipient. Initiated in October 2022,

the ongoing review of the European firearms regulation<sup>2</sup> is to result in coordination and simplification of procedures related to authorisations for exportation and transfer, as well as new rules regarding the import of firearms falling under the civilian category in the European Union, particularly in terms of customs with the introduction of a European electronic system for issuing authorisations. The objective is to better prevent cases of trafficking and facilitate the lawful trade of firearms, while preserving the sovereign competence of States in matters of trade and control of weapons that are classified as war material under the common list of military equipment of the European Union, excluded from the scope of the regulation.

The CIEEMG examines every year 4,000 to 5,000 new license applications issued by exporting companies and declared to the administration<sup>3</sup>. It also rules on around 2,500 license modification<sup>4</sup> requests. The average processing time is approximately 45 days.

## 2.2. A governmental responsibility

By virtue of the separation of powers provided for by the Constitution, export control is a governmental competence. The Prime Minister or, by delegation, the Secretary General for Defence and National Security, signs the licences for the transfer or exports of war materials and related materials on the basis of the advice provided by the CIEEMG.

The decision to grant a licence is taken after thorough examination on a case-by-case basis by the four members with voting rights of the CIEEMG: the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry for the Armed Forces, and the Secretariat-General for Defence and National Security.

<sup>1</sup> Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items, Article 2.

<sup>2</sup> Regulation (EU) 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations Protocol against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, their parts, components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisations, as well as measures concerning the import and transit of firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.

<sup>3</sup> A geographical distribution of exporters with a valid licence is specified in the illustration on the following page 35 (for large groups, only the services that file the licence appear, usually located at the group's headquarters or in the main establishments).

<sup>4</sup> Requests for modifications are issued when the scope of the licence (quantities, trade circuit, supply amount) evolves during negotiations or after the signing of a contract, as part of amendments.



**EXPORT CONTROL IN PRACTISE:  
THE CASE OF TRAINING OPERATIONS**

Operational formations constitute a particularly illustrative example of the completeness and robustness of the French arms export control system.

The European reference for materials subject to export control is the Military List (ML1 to ML22) which emanates from the Wassenaar Arrangement<sup>1</sup>, a multilateral control regime bringing together 33 member States, including France. The aim of this regime is to promote responsible export policies for war materials and dual-use goods in order to prevent destabilising arms build-ups or their dissemination to criminal or terrorist groups. As the objective is the regulation of the flows of physical goods, operational formations are not included in the list of goods established by the Wassenaar Arrangement to allow member states to develop their national control lists. There are categories intended to cover the case of intangible goods (ML21: software and ML22: technologies), but here again these goods are subject to control only if they constitute a military system in themselves, or are an integral part of an arms programme: here again, operational formations do not formally fall into this category.

In France, the Defence Staff considers formation and training, just like equipment, to be a "capability pillars," meaning a necessary condition for an army to be able to carry out its missions and deliver the desired military effects during conflicts. Therefore, their provision to foreign powers raises the same security issues as the actual exports of military materials, and as a result, France has deemed it appropriate to subject them to an identical control regime. This is why operational formations have been included in the list of materials subject to control, attached to the decree of June 27 2012, in the 4th paragraph of the second part of the appendix dedicated to "other similar materials," or AMA4.

Formations classified as AMA4 are those specifically designed for military applications or characterised by the use of war materials and similar materials listed in the annex to the decree of 27 June 27, or by the particular sensitivity of the information or supports transmitted, requiring restrictions on their dissemination, as follows:

- a) formations on the use and exploitation of war materials and similar materials set out in the annex to the decree, other than those provided in the context of "technical assistance" and classified as ML22, conferring military capacities;
- b) tactical formations at a level of superior military coordination;

c) formations other than those abovementioned, involving the transmission of information or supports bringing military expertise or in the field of defence.

Just like for the export licenses of materials, the CIEEMG can set conditions associated with the granting of licenses for operational formations. A typical and frequent example is the mandatory addition of a complementary training module on the law of armed conflicts, approved by the Defence Staff, when the subject of the training (targeting, aerial campaign planning, intelligence, drone piloting, etc.) is directly related to this issue. In 2023, 50 licenses related to operational formations were issued with this condition.

The non-reexport requirement applies to operational formations as expertise conferring military capacities, in the same way as any other tangible or intangible item classified as war material. In practice, the foreign organisation that requested the training signs a Non-Reexport Commitment (CNR), and each participating trainee individually signs a non-disclosure agreement. These documents are transmitted to the French administration at the end of the training.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2023/12/List-of-Dual-Use-Goods-and-Technologies-Munitions-List-2023-1.pdf>.

### 2.3. An assessment of licence applications on a case-by-case basis

Members with voting rights examine each licence application against their own appraisal criteria, and issue an advice (favourable, favourable with conditions, or unfavourable):

- the representatives of the Ministry for the Armed Forces conduct their assessment according to strategic, industrial and technological issues, the operational impact and the potential risk that these exports could represent for French forces and those of their allies. This assessment process is characterised by a high level of technicity linked, in particular, to the diversity and sensitivity of processed information (knowledge of materials and of their use, operational data, knowledge of end-users and their activities, etc.);
- the role of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs is, first and foremost, to assess the geopolitical impact of operations and the appropriateness of applications to France's foreign policy guidelines and international commitments;
- the advices of the Ministry of Economy are based on the appraisal of projects with regard to the financial resources of the buyer country, and on the analysis of the capacity of this country to honour any payments that will be due to the French exporter, especially when the latter requests a state guarantee through Bpifrance Assurance Export. They also take account of the industrial dimension, and, in particular, of the interest that represent the export application for the maintenance, or even the survival of an industrial sector;
- the Secretariat-General for Defence and National Security ensures that the positions of the different ministries are robust and provides, if necessary, useful insight based on its own competences in the field of defence and national security.

Each member with voting rights is brought to provide a critical advice on the arguments brought forward by the other members. For each application, the elements of appraisal of other ministries, intelligence agencies and diplomatic posts may be required. Based on the elements provided by each member with voting rights, the CIEEMG may decide to postpone the provision of its advice to pursue the assessment of the licence application. During the year 2023, out of 490 full committee meetings of the CIEEMG, the commission pronounced 143 postponements, which means that in 29% of cases, at the end of the investigation, the CIEEMG full committee wished to obtain additional information or better visibility on the local situation in order to make a decision.

The General Directorate for Customs and Indirect Taxation (DGDDI) notifies the decision (grant or refusal of a licence) to the applicant. Before a decision is taken, several controls are put in place at the level of the different members with voting rights to make sure that the conditions imposed in the licence are complied with. The DGDDI also plays a key role in the control operations.

In general, the DGDDI polices goods in transit. To that end, it has various means of action allowing it to intervene in all the control phases.


The DGDDI carries out an ex-ante control of exports that takes place at the time of customs clearance after targeting and blocking certain customs declarations following a risk analysis performed by the automated customs clearance system DELTA (on-line customs clearance using automated processing). This control consists in checking the conformity of the declaration with the documents submitted. For sensitive products, the ex-ante control also consists in checking the presence of an export licence and to impute the exported amounts on the document. Since 2023, when the licence is dematerialised (global export licence / individual export licence notified after 16 January 2023), this documentary check and the imputation of the licence are carried out on an automated basis as part of the computer link between DELTA and SIGALE. In doubt, customs officials may perform a physical control of the goods.

The DGDDI may also perform an ex-post control, i.e. after the customs clearance, within three years of the export operation. To that end, the Customs Code provides it with investigation powers including organisation of hearings, right of access to and seizure of documents, right to visit professional premises and homes. It also allows it to record and sanction infractions.

Beyond the controls performed when completing customs formalities, the DGDDI may also control the circulation of sensitive goods, including arms and war materials, all over the territory.

Lastly, Customs play a key role in controlling and intercepting flows of goods destined for embargoed countries. The DELTA system permits to target and, as the case may be, block customs declarations for goods exported to these countries. The goods will be released only after the customs authorities have checked that the exported material is not subject to an embargo.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FRENCH EXPORT COMPANIES



## PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING A LICENCE APPLICATION

The processing of a licence application encompasses numerous steps that can be grouped into three separate phases: the admissibility phase, the ministerial assessment phase, and the interministerial assessment phase. For most of the applications, the processing is linear. For complex operations, applications can have several admissibility or assessment phases.

The admissibility phase encompasses an administrative and a technical part that allows to check the application fullness, readability and coherence. At the end of this phase, if the application is declared inadmissible, the exporter is informed about the reasons why his application has been rejected and can modify it by taking account of the remarks made by the administration.

Once the application is declared admissible, the phase of ministerial instructions is carried out in parallel by the four voting members, including the three ministries and the Secretariat General for National Defence and Security (SGDSN), president and secretary of the Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Material Exports (CIEEMG). The SGDSN and each ministry process the applications according to their appreciation criteria. If necessary, they mobilise legal, technical, operational, or political skills to assess the application and develop their opinion. This assessment may lead to meetings with the exporter or the setting up of dedicated ministerial or interministerial working groups to analyse the application in a global perspective. It requires legal expertise to ensure compliance with international commitments, technical expertise for the study of materials proposed for export, as well as for the study of industrial consequences in case of subcontracting or transfer of know-how to a foreign country, operational expertise to evaluate the capability contribution to the forces receiving the materials, and geopolitical expertise for the evaluation of regional consequences in case of granting the license. Ministerial assessments also rely on precedents (agreements or refusals) pronounced by the CIEEMG or by other EU Member States and on the (technical, political) evolutions likely to change the decisions made so far. At the end of the assessment, each voting member considers the opportunity of the operation and issues an opinion on the application. This opinion can be favourable, favourable with conditions, or unfavourable. Conditions allow to limit the operation on a technical or organisational level. They can also block the export of certain supplies, limit their quantities, require the exporter to provide proof of delivery, or request commitments from the end user of the material and intermediaries or integrators.


The interministerial assessment phase begins, once all ministries with voting rights have provided their advice. This phase is led by the SGDSN. If a member with voting rights has issued an unfavourable advice or if the issue should be

discussed by all members with voting rights, the application is placed on the agenda of a plenary session of the CIEEMG. During these plenary sessions, each member with voting rights issues an advice on the applications placed on the agenda. After consultation of all the members, the Commission issues an advice that enables the licensing authority to take a decision. If further information is expected from the applicant or if a member with voting rights asks for more time to finalise the assessment of an application, the latter may be postponed for the necessary duration of time. Decisions are notified by the DGDDI to the applicant.

In order to speed up and simplify, under certain conditions, licence application assessments, improvements are regularly made.

Licence applications are submitted by exporting companies declared to the administration. A geographical distribution of exporters with a valid licence is shown in the illustration on page 35 (for large groups, only the departments filing the licence, generally located at the headquarters or in the main establishments, are shown).

INDIVIDUAL OR GLOBAL LICENCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS



2.4. The special case of export transfers

France may decide to carry out equipment transfers, either free of charge or for a consideration, to certain recipient States. The Ministry for the Armed Forces proceeds (in accordance with Article L3212-2 8° of the General Code of Public Property) to free transfers of moveable property of the Ministry, including war materials and related items, in favour of foreign States when they contribute to an action of public interest, in particular a diplomatic one, support for operations and international military cooperation. Transfers may concern items acquired for this purpose or items that the Ministry no longer uses. The value of the transferred goods cannot exceed an annual ceiling set by joint decree of the Minister for the Armed Forces and the Minister of Finance. It was significantly increased in 2023 in the context of aid to Ukraine.

In application of Article R3211-35 of the General Code of Public Property, the Ministry for the Armed Forces is also competent to carry out onerous transfers of war materials and related items, in particular for export purposes.

These transfers, whether free or for a fee, are subject to export control in the same way as new productions. The mechanisms<sup>1</sup> in place within the Ministry for the Armed Forces allow for precise steering of operations based on the objectives set: strengthening defence partnerships, supporting the fight against terrorism, as well as valorising stocks, reducing dismantling operations, etc.

From a budgetary perspective, revenue from transfers for a fee constitutes a resource in the implementation of the finance law.

2.5. Transparency at national and international levels

In addition to information on its national control scheme, France also provides data on its arms transfers. France has participated in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms<sup>2</sup> since it was set up in 1992, providing information each year on its arms exports and imports, including Small Arms and Light Weapons. It also provides additional data on the in-service equipment of its Armed Forces, as well as on procurements from its national industry. A copy of this report is submitted each year to the permanent secretariat of the ATT, in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Treaty. France also sends information to its partners in the Wassenaar Arrangement (export of military equipment and of certain dual-use goods) and the OSCE (import, export and destruction of Small Arms and Light Weapons; reports on national control procedures). Lastly, France fully participates in the information exchange mechanisms set up within the European Union (COARM, refusal notification system, national contribution to the European Union's annual report).

1 Decree of 29 August 2016 relating to the organisation of the governance of export transfers of moveable goods of the Ministry of Defence.

2 [www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/](http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/).

TRANSPARENCY EXERCISES:  
UN, ATT, EU, WASSENAAR, OSCE

As a State Party to the ATT, France contributes annually to the transparency exercise set out in the Treaty, and communicates all statistical data concerning arms imports and exports. France also submits an annual report on its imports and exports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Created in 1992, this tool is designed to ensure greater transparency in conventional arms transfers and to strengthen confidence among States. It is a living tool whose continued functioning and relevance are examined every three years by governmental experts, notably French ones. This group of experts notably met in the first half of 2022. France also participates in the exchanges of information on conventional arms transfers within the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE. Finally, France provides the European External Action Service (EEAS) with statistical data on its exports of military technology and equipment in order to contribute to the EU annual report, in application of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 as amended.

Subject to contribution of all States, these transparency exercises permit to draw up each year a global report on arms transfers. They permit to prevent the accumulation of weapons by certain States, thereby helping strengthen confidence among States and enhance international stability and security. France participates actively in the initiatives to promote these exercises and increase participation.

However, it has to be emphasised that the production of such statistics is a complex exercise, since it mobilises numerous departments and requires a common interpretation by the States of the different categories to be carried forward for the different exercises (see box below).

THE INTERPRETATION OF NATIONAL STATISTICAL DATA

Appendix 1 provides the number of licences granted by country and the associated amounts. Details by category of the Military List are shown in Appendix 2, while Appendix 3 shows deliveries.

The amounts of order intakes are only weakly correlated with the amounts of licences granted, and represent no more than a few percentages of the latter in overall value. There are several reasons for this, which have to do with the very principle of licensing:

- all the licences do not lead to the conclusion of a contract. They may indeed concern export operations, where a competing bid can win the contract, but also operations, where the need of the customer is not yet proven (e.g. for maintenance in operational condition or the supply of spare parts), and where the manufacturer may wish to

apply in advance for a licence in order to be ready to make an offer at any time;

- the same exporter may apply for several licences to cover the same business, for example when several options exist in terms of industrial set-up or commercial circuit (one licence per mounting), or when he wishes to offer several products to best meet his customer's needs;
- licences are granted for an estimated maximum scope – quantities and types of materials – and financial volume: the exporter mentions in his application a maximum set of systems, equipment or services he wishes to sell in the framework of his prospect (in the case of individual licences, the administration remains vigilant to ensure that the quantities requested are not disproportionate to the customer's estimated needs). When the actual order is taken, the quantities ordered as well as the prices after negotiation are generally lower;
- in the case of demonstrations, e.g. for participation in international arms fairs, manufacturers need a licence to clear customs with their equipment and declare its value, even if it is to be returned to France.

**INTERPRETATION OF FIGURES TRANSMITTED FOR  
TRANSPARENCY EXERCISES**

France contributes each year to all the transparency exercises (ATT, UNRoCA, EU, Wassenaar Arrangement, and OSCE) and communicates each year actual delivery figures for the previous year.

These exercises are complex in many ways.

Indeed, the communication of national import and export data involves many actors for the recovery, aggregation, and analysis of the required information. It also requires a common interpretation of the categories of different exercises by all actors. Declarations as part of transparency exercises therefore require a precise understanding of the technical and operational parameters of weapons in order to compare them to the definitions of different categories. For example, rockets of Unitary Rocket Launchers fall under the category of "missiles and missile launchers" of conventional weapons in the sense of the UN Register and the ATT, but their delivery systems, Unitary Rocket Launchers fall under the category of "artillery and heavy caliber systems" (which includes Multiple Rocket Launch Systems).

Therefore, it is necessary not only to ensure that the elements requested by each regime are included in the data reported, but also that they are declared in the appropriate category, depending on the exercises. Indeed, the categories of materials may differ. For instance, when it comes to warships, the UN Register counts "armed and equipped ships and

submarines with a normal displacement of 500 metric tons or more", while that of Wassenaar takes into account those "of a normal displacement of 150 metric tons or more". Furthermore, the UN Register includes portable anti-aircraft systems in the category of conventional weapons, while that of Wassenaar places them (for MANPADS only) in the category of small arms and light weapons.

Differences also exist among countries with regard to counting references and category interpretation. Certain States may declare imports of equipment that do not have to be accounted for in the transparency exercises, and are not necessarily counted as exports by the delivery state.

Likewise, if France records its actual exports at the border, other States have not chosen to retain a criterion for accounting at delivery, but rather at the order placed. This can lead to temporal shifts in the submitted figures: a client State of France can record as imports equipment ordered, but not delivered. On the other hand, France will not record any export if the materials have not crossed the border. Furthermore, materials that have crossed the French border do not arrive in the final destination country overnight. Thus, a material exported by France (and included in its annual balance sheets) may not be declared at import if, for example, the material is blocked in transit.

**LICENCE REFUSALS  
(REFUSALS NOTIFIED AND LICENCES NOT GRANTED)**

A member with voting rights, which is opposed to the grant of a licence, informs the SGDSN about it. The plenary sessions of the CIEEMG allow each member with voting rights to express and explain its advice on applications being debated.

The CIEEMG's unfavourable advices result in a refusal to grant the licence, notified to the exporter. As part of the transparency exercise provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560, France reports its refusal decisions to the COARM. Refusal notifications are binding not only for France, but also for the other EU Member States. In the three years following a refusal notification, any country that would like to give a favourable advice on a similar operation must consult the country that notified the refusal before deciding to disregard this precedent. France notified eight licence refusals to the COARM in 2023.

To the refusal decisions notified to the COARM are added applications, whose processing cannot be carried out in the required timeline due to unresolved difficulties. The Code of Defence (Article R2335-46) rules that if the administration did not respond within a nine-month period, the application is rejected (implicit refusal). In 2023, this provision applied to fifteen applications.

Moreover, manufacturers, through exchanges they have with assessing authorities, are aware of the main trends of



France's war material export policy. Some of them anticipate refusals by not submitting or withdrawing applications that would have no chance of obtaining a favourable advice from the CIEEMG. About hundred licence applications or licence amendment applications have been withdrawn by the applicants themselves.

Finally, the CIEEMG can grant a licence partially by excluding certain supplies or by applying restrictive conditions. In conclusion, if the number of licence refusal may seem low compared to the number of new licence applications processed per year, one must keep in mind that licences granted are now accompanied by conditions that restrict their scope of application. A refusal of issuance should therefore be considered as the impossibility of restricting the scope of the license to the strict acceptable need (see § 3.1.1).

### 3. A control being part of a policy to control arms and to fight against dissemination of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Arms control and the fight against dissemination are key appraisal criteria to grant export licences and set conditions, as the case may be. The issues at stake are of several kinds. The aim is to check that transferred materials and technologies:

- do not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;
- are not used to manufacture conventional weapons covered by a ban convention that France has ratified (cluster munitions, anti-personnel mines, blinding laser weapons, etc.);
- are not likely, once delivered, to be re-exported or diverted to unauthorised recipients or likely to misuse them (re-export to embargoed countries, theft or diversion to terrorist or organised crime groups).

The control tools set out below have been introduced to meet these requirements. To this end, they draw on provisions provided for in the control regimes and international conventions (MTCR, Ottawa and Oslo conventions, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, ATT, etc.), to which France acceded and which it has transposed into its national law for legally binding provisions. They are complemented, for the other sensitive items that are not classified as war materials (firearms, powders and explosives, dual-use goods) by domestic regimes that are specific to them (see box in § 2.1).

The methods for combating the dissemination of small arms and light weapons and the diversion of conventional weapons are evolving. In 2023, a new political instrument was created: the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management.

It aims to address the risks posed by the diversion of conventional ammunition to unauthorised recipients and the trafficking of this ammunition on illegal markets, including their subsequent use in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. It promotes the management of conventional ammunition throughout their life cycle through international cooperation and assistance. It presents a set of political commitments according to fifteen objectives. Two objectives are of primary importance: promoting the transparency of the supply chain in order to minimise and mitigate, in a comprehensive manner, the risks of diversion, when transfers of conventional ammunition are authorised and mitigating the risk that conventional ammunition is diverted after their transfer, notably through end-user certificates or equivalent documents with bilaterally determined clauses.

Beyond these instruments, the fight against the dissemination of small arms and light weapons is also exercised through a constant exchange of precise information between the authorities of the EU Member States, which, through their cooperation, allow for the reduction of identified diversion risks.

Furthermore, in the context of the war of aggression waged by Russia in Ukraine, the massive delivery of military equipment and the significant cross-border movements caused by the conflict exacerbate the risk of dissemination of conventional weapons. In this context, France, and more broadly the European continent, may have to face a circulation of arms similar to that generated by the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.

Faced with this risk, France has tools structuring the fight against the dissemination of conventional armament:

- this fight first passes through the daily action of the judicial police and customs on the national territory, the fight against arms trafficking being at the heart of their prerogatives;
- furthermore, interministerial work makes it possible to understand the risks associated with the dissemination of conventional armament, ranging from the characterisation of the threat to the operational response provided;
- finally, this risk is also apprehended through increased international cooperation, in particular with our European partners.

#### 3.1. Regulated and monitored operations (conditions and NRC, ex-post control)

##### 3.1.1 *A priori control: conditions associated with licences and NRCs*

Export licence is the main means for control authorities to carry out their mission and ensure that arms exports are part of a responsible policy. Different conditions may be attached to them.



It is in fact frequent (more than half of licences) that export authorisations are granted subject to conditions that ensure compliance with the appraisal criteria applied when licence applications are assessed.

Conditions are obligations to be fulfilled by exporters in relation to specific deadlines (contract signature, shipment, etc.). These conditions may relate to the nature of the operation and/or materials, as well as to the end-user and re-export. They may be technical, administrative or legal in nature and apply either to the licence as a whole (general conditions) or only to a piece of equipment (equipment conditions). Compliance with regulations relating to classified information may also give rise to the imposition of conditions.

Conditions are said to be suspensive (blocking), when the right to export equipment is blocked pending verification by the administration that certain conditions, particularly technical ones, have been met. In this case, the exporter must provide the administration with supporting documents to ensure that the suspensive conditions associated with the licence have been met. A new version of the licence will be issued once the conditions have been lifted.

Conditions are said to be non-suspensive (non-blocking), when the licence grants the right to export, but requires the exporter to retain supporting documents. These may be subject to verification as part of a posteriori control.

The conditions are notified to the exporter by the DGA and may notably concern:

- the exclusion of certain materials or technical limitations;
- a verification by the administration of the performance of the materials and, more generally, of their technical compliance;
- a verification by the administration of the content of the documentation;
- quantities, which may be lower than those subject to the request;
- the opportunity to authorise all the requested operations, which may be limited to the communication of information in the context of negotiating a contract, accepting an order or signing a contract;
- the need for an intergovernmental agreement or arrangement to be concluded with the client country;
- the need for the manufacturer to have a Non Disclosure Agreement (NDA) signed;
- the need for the exporter to have a document signed proving that the equipment has reached its final destination and

recipient. This proof takes the form of a certified declaration (Cerfa n°15649) by the final recipient;

- the signing of commitments: such as a End-Use or a Non-Reexport Certificate (NRC), general or specific for SALWs.

#### NON-REEXPORT CERTIFICATES

End-Use and Non-Reexport Certificates (NRCs) correspond to commitments made by foreign operators who are the final recipients of exported (or transferred) materials, and/or by the governments of the destination countries.

To avoid the risk of falsification or signature of the NRC by an inappropriate hierarchical level, authentication of the person and function of the signatory may be required. This authentication is carried out by the diplomatic post in the destination country.

A foreign client who has signed a non-reexport clause may request the agreement of the French government to lift this clause and definitively or temporarily reexport the material to a new final recipient. He then makes a request for lifting the NRC, which will be studied by the CIEEMG. Lifting of the NRCs is accompanied by a transfer of commitments related to the NRC to the new recipient.

The End-User and Non-reexport certificates take the form of the same document (to date, this is the Cerfa n° 10919 or, for SALWs, Cerfa n° 16203\*01), titled "End-Use Non-Reexport Certificate":

- sections 1 to 7 correspond to the description of the operation concerned and are mandatory when a End-Use or Non-Reexport Certificate is requested;
- the End-Use Certificate corresponds to section 8, which enable to know the intended use of the exported material or transferred product to be known;
- the Non-Reexport Certificate corresponds to sections 9 and 10, which present the commitments of the end user and/or the destination State in terms of re-export.

The CIEEMG gives an opinion on the choice of sections to be required by the recipient, and the NRC or EUC must be signed before the export of supplies.

#### 3.1.2 A posteriori control

Compliance with authorisations issued is controlled by an ex-post control scheme based on the work of authorised agents, who identify possible discrepancies, then of a committee in charge of deciding what action to take on these findings. These actions permit to ensure that operators comply with the conditions that may have been imposed, when the licence was issued.

This ex-post control is carried out by means of two additional control procedures carried out by authorised agents of the Ministry for the Armed Forces:

- a paper control to check the consistency between, on the one hand, the licences held and, on the other hand, the reports and information sent to the administration. The administration relies on the obligation imposed on exporters of war materials to transmit to it commercial contracts related to exports, and to provide it with a half-yearly report. It is thus possible for it to verify the conformity of commercial acts and flows with what the licence provides for;
- an on-site control carried out in the premises of transfer or export licence holders in order to check the consistency between the licences obtained, on the one hand, and all the registers and supporting documents held by the companies, on the other hand. The time spent by agents in exporting companies during on-site inspections allows them, beyond compliance checks, to perceive the quality of the company's organisation. The information they collect thus enriches their findings.

These paper and on-site controls result in reports that are drawn up by the authorised agents of the Ministry. Recording findings, these reports are sent for comment to the exporters concerned, who provide their remarks and specify, where appropriate, their plan of action to remedy discrepancies identified.

The reports and the exporter's response are then forwarded to the Ministerial Committee for Ex-Post Controls of War Material Exports (CMCAP), which decides what action to take. Depending on the seriousness of the discrepancies identified, the CMCAP may send to the company concerned a warning letter reminding the company of the applicable legal and regulatory obligations, or a formal notice to take corrective measures.


In accordance with the French Defence Code (see box above on exports in the Defence Code), the CMCAP forwards the reports to the relevant public prosecutor, each with an opinion on the merits of the case. It may also ask the SGDSN to suspend, modify or abrogate certain licences.

In the event of non-compliance with an injunction to bring a company's export process in line, the CMCAP may also refer the matter to a sanctions committee, which may inflict, as the case may be, a financial administrative sanction.

In 2023, fourteen companies were subject to an on-site control of their commercial operations, compared to eight in 2022. By contrast, the paper control made it possible to monitor the activity of all exporters with valid licences for the sale of war materials or related items, establishing eleven paper control reports. Twelve on-site control reports and 11 paper control reports were examined by the CMCAP in 2023.

A control aimed at verifying the company's response to a formal notice resulted in the referral of the case to the sanctions committee by the CMCAP in 2023.

FOLLOW-UPS BY CMCAP OF 2023 REPORTS



MAIN CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EX-POST CONTROL OF EXPORTS SINCE 2015

Since it was reorganised in 2013-2014, the ex-post control system managed by the CMCAP is a crucial pillar of the national export and transfer control policy. Through its on-site or paper controls, it contributes directly to the reliability of the continuous control chain that ranges from the assessment of the licence application, through to the shipment of classified materials and products, the examination by the CIEEMG and the notification of the authorisation to export.

Having gained maturity and experience, the scheme allowed, through about twenty to forty missions annually, to control on-site a large amount of the 608 companies having an active licence in 2023. Since 2015, about 70 % of companies holding more than ten export or transfer licences and 90 % of those having more than fifty licences were visited by sworn agents of the Ministry for the Armed Forces. Besides, as part of the paper control, a little more than 1,100 half-yearly reports and over 4,500 supporting documents are also analysed each year. Since 2015, 365 paper and on-site control reports have been reviewed by the CMCAP. For 35 % of them, no further action was taken, whereas 55 % led to reminders of the law or warning letters bringing the concerned companies to better organise their export control scheme and to acquire the necessary internal control tools. 5 % of reports led to a formal notice. Used from 2017 on a regular basis, formal notice to the

exporters, whose internal control scheme presents significant gaps, permitted to enhance the control effectiveness. By prescribing the corrective measures needed to deploy a system able to guarantee compliance with regulations, it has in fact permitted to rapidly correct risk organisations or practices, while avoiding that one of the administrative sanctions provided for by Article R. 2339- 4 of the Code of Defence be imposed upon the concerned companies. A first referral to the Sanctions Committee took place late 2020 and resulted in a pecuniary administrative sanction in early 2021. A second referral to the Sanctions Committee took place in late 2023 and is currently being processed. The results of controls show that, with the deployment of the Unique Licence from 2014, the proportion of exports and transfers carried out without authorisation tends to decrease year after year, and that, as a result, war material exports are better regulated and monitored. Managing conditions and updating licences granted as commercial offers evolve or as a result of concrete export operations, as well as better regulation of exports and transfers of classified intangible assets (technical data, immaterial training or technical assistance services), remain important areas for progress.

### 3.2. Licences re-assessed against the context

Elements having led to the grant of a licence may evolve over time. As a result, control authorities may re-assess the opportunity of an export operation. Pursuant to provisions of the Defence Code (see box above), suspension or abrogation of an export licence may be requested, notably to meet France's international commitments.

Likewise, derogations from the obligation of prior approval applicable to certain exports or transfers, e.g. those related to operations otherwise authorised (re-export of an already exported material after it was repaired in France), may also be suspended according to the Defence Code.



# APPENDICIES

- 1. Number of licences granted since 2015..... 46
- 2. Number and value of licences granted in 2023 by country and Military List Category ..... 50
- 3. Detailed breakdown of military technology and equipment deliveries by country and region since 2014 ..... 64
- 4. France’s annual report 2024 (on the calendar 2023) pursuant to Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty ..... 68

# Appendix 1

Number of licences granted since 2015

COUNTRIES	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	TOTAL
Libya	45	39	26	18	31	24	19	14	18	234
Morocco	3	2	-	3	1	-	2	-	2	13
Tunisia	68	51	47	81	83	61	54	59	40	544
Total NORTH AFRICA	26	31	20	26	22	14	16	11	12	178
South Africa	142	123	93	128	137	99	91	84	72	969
Angola	57	43	36	53	30	20	17	13	15	284
Benin	6	3	1	1	3	-	2	7	3	26
Botswana	3	9	6	16	6	4	2	19	18	83
Burkina Faso	5	15	7	4	7	10	8	7	2	65
Burundi	4	14	21	19	13	21	10	9	4	115
Cameroon	8	-	-	1	1	-	1	4	2	17
Comoros	22	18	12	10	18	8	8	11	8	115
Congo	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	2	4	4	-	7	-	-	-	-	17
Ivory Coast	2	1	-	2	2	10	2	3	3	25
Djibouti	10	29	23	15	17	12	19	22	24	171
Ethiopia	3	7	5	5	6	7	7	9	5	54
Gabon	3	4	2	5	-	2	1	-	1	18
Gambia	32	5	3	12	9	3	7	1	5	77
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Guinea	2	3	-	1	4	-	5	4	-	19
Equatorial Guinea	3	3	7	7	1	4	3	9	5	42
Kenya	3	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
Liberia	6	5	9	4	6	6	8	5	4	53
Madagascar	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	4
Malawi	4	7	4	2	4	3	1	-	-	25
Mali	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	3
Mauritius	11	15	13	20	19	27	15	2	2	124
Mauritania	-	1	-	2	1	3	-	5	1	13
Mozambique	7	7	5	4	6	5	4	6	2	46
Namibia	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	1	-	5
Niger	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	4
Nigeria	12	15	24	7	16	22	23	12	13	144
Uganda	21	19	10	20	15	9	10	21	7	132
Central African Republic	3	1	1	-	4	3	3	2	1	18
Rwanda (Republic of)	-	3	6	1	2	7	4	-	-	23
Senegal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	5
Seychelles	16	21	26	15	13	10	14	17	13	145



COUNTRIES	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	TOTAL
Seychelles	3	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5
Sierra Leone	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Somalia	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Sudan	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Tanzania	3	1	5	5	1	-	2	4	-	21
Chad	13	12	11	7	6	15	12	14	11	101
Togo	10	7	14	7	9	14	7	7	6	81
Zambia	1	1	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	6
Total SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	279	279	259	246	232	227	200	220	158	2 100
Costa Rica	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Guatemala	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	4
Haiti	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	4
Honduras	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	5
Mexico	46	34	25	17	15	11	8	17	6	179
Panama	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Dominican Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Salvador	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Trinidad and Tobago	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	51	37	27	19	16	12	10	20	9	201
Canada	47	52	64	59	68	52	47	44	46	479
United States	193	186	180	194	203	188	157	153	159	1 613
Total NORTH AMERICA	240	238	244	253	271	240	204	197	205	2 092
Argentina	24	19	26	15	6	7	6	9	8	120
Bolivia	5	2	4	5	2	-	1	1	2	22
Brazil	110	54	82	97	58	56	45	26	34	562
Chile	59	39	56	36	27	29	24	20	15	305
Colombia	23	26	14	26	16	12	24	13	11	165
Ecuador	9	7	10	7	3	4	1	4	2	47
Guyana	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	4
Paraguay	8	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
Peru	26	18	16	20	8	14	9	11	7	129
Suriname	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	3	6
Uruguay	3	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	1	8
Venezuela	10	7	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	18
Total SOUTH AMERICA	278	174	211	207	121	123	114	86	83	1 397
Azerbaijan	9	2	-	5	3	1	1	-	1	22
Kazakhstan	25	20	12	20	14	6	10	6	23	136
Kyrgyzstan	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	4
Uzbekistan	20	7	4	1	9	12	1	4	12	70
Tajikistan	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Turkmenistan	5	5	4	13	6	-	2	2	9	46
Total CENTRAL ASIA	61	34	21	39	34	19	14	12	45	279
China	112	104	69	98	74	88	45	23	24	637
South Korea	168	108	114	123	87	99	81	93	104	977
Japan	66	42	48	46	38	36	35	22	42	375

COUNTRIES	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	TOTAL
Mongolia	3	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	7
Total NORTH EAST ASIA	349	254	231	269	199	224	161	138	171	1 996
Afghanistan	2	1	1	3	-	-	8	-	-	15
Bangladesh	8	15	7	12	16	15	9	13	2	97
India	307	260	260	323	286	233	230	208	215	2 322
Nepal	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Pakistan	126	86	91	50	45	41	29	33	16	517
Sri Lanka	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	4
Total SOUTH ASIA	443	364	360	390	347	289	277	254	233	2 957
Brunei	34	9	-	10	7	8	14	8	9	99
Cambodia	1	-	1	2	1	1	2	-	2	10
Indonesia	73	67	60	70	60	44	68	50	73	565
Malaysia (Federation of)	102	69	63	73	53	45	43	45	36	529
Philippines	19	14	9	21	38	23	11	16	14	165
Singapore	132	106	107	75	83	87	67	52	43	752
Thailand	52	39	20	26	29	23	19	17	18	243
East Timor	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Vietnam	20	20	17	27	25	11	12	15	26	173
Total SOUTH EAST ASIA	433	326	277	304	296	242	236	203	221	2 538
Albania	3	1	-	2	3	1	2	-	1	13
Andorra	1	1	1	2	4	2	-	1	2	14
Armenia	1	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	18	23
Belarus	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	4	1	-	2	2	2	4	2	22
Georgia	4	5	6	2	3	2	1	4	7	34
Gibraltar	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Iceland	-	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	2	6
Kosovo	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
Liechtenstein	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Macedonia (ARYM)	4	3	1	-	1	-	1	6	3	19
Moldova	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	6	11
Monaco	4	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	1	9
Montenegro	2	3	-	1	2	2	-	-	1	11
Norway	48	38	41	52	52	39	34	40	42	386
United Kingdom	248	204	225	267	200	177	191	169	167	1 848
Russia	36	15	7	8	9	1	2	-	-	78
Serbia	15	11	18	19	23	20	20	22	24	172
Switzerland	64	81	57	82	91	68	60	63	93	659
Turkey	148	100	104	108	62	51	58	35	34	700
Ukraine	25	22	9	18	15	15	26	112	144	386
Total OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	610	492	471	570	471	381	402	457	548	4 402
Australia	81	52	80	73	71	62	57	49	24	549
Fidji (Islands)	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	3
New Zealand	6	8	6	11	8	5	4	7	7	62
Papua New Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2
Tonga	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2
Vanuatu	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	4
Total OCEANIA	88	60	88	84	80	71	61	56	34	622

COUNTRIES	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	TOTAL
Saudi Arabia	219	218	174	191	137	121	92	91	119	1 362
Bahrain	21	7	7	4	5	4	4	1	2	55
Egypt	63	82	75	107	64	58	55	57	27	588
United Arab Emirates	256	189	150	183	160	155	151	144	172	1 560
Iraq	33	16	11	11	12	8	15	12	10	128
Israel	163	90	124	101	76	79	65	69	75	842
Jordan	18	15	7	18	10	8	7	10	4	97
Kuwait	91	46	38	39	44	13	16	29	9	325
Lebanon	36	24	17	29	23	17	6	7	14	173
Oman	67	43	32	73	27	28	23	30	32	355
Qatar	142	70	70	136	96	78	66	53	71	782
Yemen	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total MIDDLE EAST	1 109	800	705	892	655	569	500	503	535	6 268
Germany	205	153	174	208	181	213	147	141	148	1 570
Austria	12	18	14	21	16	9	17	17	12	136
Belgium	94	99	115	129	131	99	107	93	73	940
Bulgaria	9	13	6	7	9	13	6	13	12	88
Cyprus	10	7	7	12	15	11	7	11	6	86
Croatia	4	2	6	9	5	8	7	8	11	60
Denmark	14	13	14	18	26	18	15	18	23	159
Spain	146	121	129	104	137	130	120	128	113	1 128
Estonia	12	6	2	7	12	9	14	10	10	82
Finland	26	33	22	27	34	24	26	26	25	243
Greece	30	14	23	28	21	54	44	44	37	295
Hungary	3	8	6	8	11	12	13	19	14	94
Ireland	3	4	3	4	1	1	5	3	7	31
Italy	186	176	128	170	137	172	123	145	154	1 391
Latvia	5	5	4	4	6	8	7	2	3	44
Lithuania	8	8	18	11	7	11	8	8	9	88
Luxembourg	5	10	12	14	8	12	7	9	7	84
Malta	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
Netherlands	80	73	62	36	59	39	30	46	43	468
Poland	61	61	55	48	52	37	34	41	56	445
Portugal	14	20	11	15	16	11	15	15	13	130
Romania	7	16	23	31	18	33	20	31	26	205
Slovakia	4	3	3	3	7	13	5	10	12	60
Slovenia	9	1	5	9	4	17	8	6	13	72
Sweden	71	54	50	63	88	57	53	77	67	580
Czechia	21	27	30	30	24	34	22	25	26	239
Total EUROPEAN UNION	1 039	945	922	1 017	1 025	1 045	861	946	920	8 720
Multi-Countries(1)	333	317	384	541	733	682	675	618	713	4 996
Others (2)	35	11	14	16	17	13	21	14	14	155
Total	5 490	4 454	4 307	4 975	4 634	4 236	3 827	3 808	3 961	39 692

(1) Deliveries to final destination in several countries on the same export authorization.  
(2) International organisations, non-member States of the United Nations, etc.

# Appendix 2

Number and value (€) of licences granted in 2023 by country and Military List Category

a = Number of licences - b = Value of licences

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
Algeria	a			1				2			3	2
	b			16 825 000				27 687 000			244 700 000	10 150 000
Libya	a											
	b											
Morocco	a	5	2	3	10		1		1	1	3	2
	b	1 123 350	663 040	45 162 190	464 214 116		1 040 460		10 000 000	450 480 000	116 996 434	1 953 501 000
Tunisia	a	2		1	2	1	1				2	
	b	214 055		118 440	1 593 700 000	20 500 000	519 590				5 010 002	
NORTH AFRICA	a	7	2	5	12	1	2	2	1	1	8	4
	b	1 337 405	663 040	62 105 630	2 057 914 116	20 500 000	1 560 050	27 687 000	10 000 000	450 480 000	366 706 436	1 963 651 000
South Africa	a				3				1		1	1
	b				4 151 000				261 120		320 000	1 110 000
Angola	a				1		1					1
	b				147 000 000		22 550 000					555 000 006
Benin	a						8			1	1	
	b						5 123 278			94 980 000	1 600 000	
Botswana	a										1	
	b										55 100 000	
Burkina Faso	a	1					1				1	
	b	310 400					300 000				5 744 852	
Burundi	a											
	b											
Cameroon	a	2		1			2					1
	b	34 872		20 000			516 127					8 000
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	a	1					1					
	b	22 680					28 800 000					
Ivory Coast	a	4		2		4	2				2	2
	b	152 571		48 607		103 412 505	22 730 000				182 300 000	404 000
Djibouti	a				1		1					
	b				1 385		7 200 000					
Ethiopia	a											
	b											
Gabon	a				1		1				2	
	b				6 600		1 040 000				95 125	
Guinea	a						1			1	1	
	b						755 602			7 375 000	10 680 000	
Kenya	a					1	1				1	
	b					7 162 500	930 000				5 100 000	
Mali	a			1			1					
	b			337 890			300 000					
Mauritius	a	1										
	b	8 500										
Mauritania	a											
	b											

ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
1		4			2				2	AMA4 : 1	18
6 400		68 671 373			53 329 000				6 155 000	AMA4 : 2 700 198	430 223 971
										AMA4 : 2	2
										AMA4 : 17 400 360	17 400 360
3		4		2		1			1	AMA1 : 1	40
50 432		231 470 162		58 000		3 000 000			4	AMA1 : 3 000 002	3 280 759 190
				1	1				1		12
				121 000	18 000 000				1 000		1 638 184 087
4		8		3	3	1			4	AMA1 : 1 AMA4 : 3	72
56 832		300 141 535		179 000	71 329 000	3 000 000			6 156 004	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA4 : 20 100 558	5 366 567 608
2		2		1	2				1	AMA1 : 1	15
103 000 000		22 933 100		3 400 000	12 407 040				1	AMA1 : 3 000 002	150 582 263
											3
											724 550 006
4		3								AMA4 : 1	18
243 882		15 460 647								AMA4 : 1 200 132	118 607 939
		1									2
		920 000									56 020 000
1											4
320 000											6 675 252
		1							1		2
		480 000							3 220 735		3 700 735
1		1									8
104 120		556 000									1 239 118,46
1											3
184 000											29 006 680
2		2							3	AMA1 : 1	24
73 590		34 414 973							107 940 000	AMA1 : 6 820 000	458 296 245,7
3											5
281 597											7 482 982
									1		1
									20 000		20 000
1											5
32 419											1 174 144,1
2											5
7 503 535											26 314 136,6
								1			4
								25 750 000			38 942 500
											2
											637 890
											1
											8 500
		1								AMA4 : 1	2
		2 310 660								AMA4 : 162 020	2 472 680

1. Space equipment, operational training.

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
Niger	a	2		1	1	1	1					
	b	15 801		810 217	1 239 395	4 327 500	4 350 000					
Nigeria	a						1			1	4	
	b						45 100 000			115 100 000	152 065 720	
Uganda	a					1						
	b					43 600 000						
Rwanda (Repu- blic of)	a										2	
	b										11 500 000	
Senegal	a		3		2	1	1				3	1
	b		1 369 000		33 214 000	16 513 000	22 000 000				4 372 968	2 100 000
Chad	a	2		1			3				1	1
	b	157 000		368 828			25 610 175				1 645 000	1 628
Togo	a										1	
	b										69 500	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	a	13	3	6	9	8	26		1	3	21	7
	b	701 824	1 369 000	1 585 542	185 612 380	175 015 505	187 305 182		261 120	217 455 000	430 593 165	558 623 634
Guatemala	a											
	b											
Haiti	a											
	b											
Jamaica	a											
	b											
Mexico	a					1	1				3	
	b					3 676 000	320 000				113 640 326	
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	a					1	1				3	
	b					3 676 000	320 000				113 640 326	
Canada	a		3	1	2		2			1	3	1
	b		103 100	219 120 000	107 700		62 130 000			80 109	196 701	220 016
United States	a	6	1	2	10	8	4		3	2	29	22
	b	1 394 982	720 000	210 000 000	50 898 976	94 973 047	21 169 167		2 668 630	23 571 450	75 761 965	48 504 737
NORTH AME- RICA	a	6	4	3	12	8	6		3	3	32	23
	b	1 394 982	823 100	429 120 000	51 006 676	94 973 047	83 299 167		2 668 630	23 651 559	75 958 666	48 724 753
Argentina	a										1	
	b										3 000 000	
Bolivia	a											
	b											
Brazil	a		1		3	2				2	7	2
	b		427 030 000		15 066 905	464 599 500				39 500 000	325 815 004	4 252 000
Chile	a				2	2				2	3	2
	b				3 110 000	23 100 000				6 084 002	19 485 000	31 380 000
Colombia	a				3	2						4
	b				291 127 273	32 799 500						429 840 000
Ecuador	a											1
	b											600 000
Peru	a				2	1					1	2
	b				276 000 000	49 000 000					32 040 000	34 000 000
Suriname	a	1	1	1								
	b	391 101	4 230 000	1 671 580								



ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
4		1							1	AMA4 : 1	13
534 615		1 323							3 550 000	AMA4 : 127 200	14 956 051,88
1											7
50 000											312 315 720
											1
											43 600 000
										AMA4 : 1	3
										AMA4 : 600 020	12 100 020
									1	AMA4 : 1	13
									30 000	AMA4 : 127 200	79 726 168
2									1		11
84 479									7 300 000		35 167 109,62
4	1										6
99 678	11 644										180 821,96
28	1	12		1	2			1	9	AMA1 : 2 AMA4 : 5	158
112 511 915	11 644	77 076 703		3 400 000	12 407 040			25 750 000	122 060 736	AMA1 : 9 820 002 AMA4 : 2 216 572	2 123 776 963
									1		1
									10 110 000		10 110 000
1											1
214 840											214 840
		1									1
		3 015 000									3 015 000
1											6
200 000											117 836 326
2		1							1		9
414 840		3 015 000							10 110 000		131 176 166
4	1	9	3	2	1			5	6	AMA1 : 1 AMA2 : 1	46
31 058 765	26 200	206 117 893	8 963 882	39 300 000	501 000			4 452 304	704 412	AMA1 : 5 000 002 AMA2 : 20 000 001	598 082 085,2
4	2	13	2	4	1			6	20	AMA1 : 7 AMA2 : 9 AMA3 : 4	159
16 842 177	929 000	229 943 819	6 087 684	20 489	63 352 000			408 333 001	203 342 795	AMA1 : 172 872 383 AMA2 : 321 867 921 AMA3 : 50 103 914	2 003 358 135
8	3	22	5	6	2			11	26	AMA1 : 8 AMA2 : 10 AMA3 : 4	205
47 900 942	955 200	436 061 712	15 051 566	39 320 489	63 853 000			412 785 305	204 047 207	AMA1 : 177 872 385 AMA2 : 341 867 922 AMA3 : 50 103 914	2 601 440 220
									2	AMA1 : 4 AMA4 : 1	8
									1 200 000	AMA1 : 10 493 006 AMA4 : 100 200	14 793 206
									2		2
									38 330 000		38 330 000
2		4	1		2				7	AMA4 : 1	34
10 200 400		31 490 000	14 098 529		24 300 000				69 742 000	AMA4 : 5 850 198	1 431 944 536
		1						1	2		15
		3 740 000						1 909 220	1 650 001		90 458 223
1									1		11
60									1 000 000		754 766 833
		1									2
		15 260 000									15 860 000
									1		7
									7		391 040 007
											3
											6 292 681,29

1. Space equipment, operational training.

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
Uruguay	a		1									
	b		230 000									
SOUTH AMERICA	a	1	3	1	10	7				4	12	11
	b	391 101	431 490 000	1 671 580	585 304 178	569 499 000				45 584 002	380 340 004	500 072 000
Azerbaijan	a											
	b											
Kazakhstan	a				4	5						2
	b				894 700 000	811 918 600						5 560 000
Uzbekistan	a	1	2									
	b	1 558 000	17 600 000									
Turkmenistan	a				2	2					2	
	b				388 850 000	28 650 000					7 664 642	
CENTRAL ASIA	a	1	2		6	7					2	2
	b	1 558 000	17 600 000		1 283 550 000	840 568 600					7 664 642	5 560 000
China	a					1					5	1
	b					15 620 000					48 573 069	2 715 000
South Korea	a	1	1	2	11	11	5	1	10	3	12	6
	b	800 000	51 505 000	137 850 000	106 411 555	84 802 365	1 982 402	200 200	18 659 850	162 230 000	734 070 780	38 550 000
Japan	a					1			1	3	9	7
	b					3 952 500			264 000	5 544 000	336 528 868	89 005 032
Mongolia	a											
	b											
NORTH EAST ASIA	a	1	1	2	11	13	5	1	11	6	26	14
	b	800 000	51 505 000	137 850 000	106 411 555	104 374 865	1 982 402	200 200	18 923 850	167 774 000	1 119 172 717	130 270 032
Bangladesh	a											
	b											
India	a		4	1	16	19	4			28	39	25
	b		1 495 700 000	700 000	3 896 258 542	2 127 725 521	12 961 255			557 161 319	11 311 600 873	376 435 000
Pakistan	a			2	1	1				4	4	1
	b			10 735 000	7 100 000	3 126 003				12 038 580	40 537 568	10 000 000
SOUTH ASIA	a		4	3	17	20	4			32	43	26
	b		1 495 700 000	11 435 000	3 903 358 542	2 130 851 524	12 961 255			569 199 899	11 352 138 440	386 435 000
Brunei	a						5				1	
	b						5 112 140				122 506	
Cambodia	a						1					
	b						1 000 001					
Indonesia	a	1	1		3	6	2			2	7	4
	b	1 547 000	51 505 000		125 900 000	33 187 500	42 000 000			42 600 000	174 275 103	182 610 000
Malaysia (Federation of)	a		1	2	2	6				4	4	2
	b		649 970 000	188 220 000	300 000	215 349 730				176 100 000	54 008 456	4 200 001

ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
											1
											230 000
3		6	1		2			1	15	AMA1 : 4 AMA4 : 2	83
10 200 460		50 490 000	14 098 529		24 300 000			1 909 220	111 922 008	AMA1 : 10 493 006 AMA4 : 5 950 398	2 743 715 487
										AMA1 : 1	1
										AMA1 : 3 180 021	3180 021
1		8							3		23
1 000 000		204 136 000							17 100 000		1 934 414 600
		6			1				2		12
		202 783 000			9 301 000				4 001 000		235 243 000
		3									9
		73 530 000									498 694 642,5
1		17			1				5	AMA1 : 1	45
1 000 000		480 449 000			9 301 000				21 101 000	AMA1 : 3 180 021	2 671 532 263
		12							1	AMA1 : 2 AMA3 : 2	24
		78 159 208							34 310	AMA1 : 24 865 521 AMA3 : 650 300	170 617 408
1	1	7	4	1	6	1		1	12	AMA1 : 3 AMA2 : 3 AMA4 : 1	104
2 400 000		10 647 000	6 610 630	153 000	18 911 251	2 600 000		3 591 050	73 761 005	AMA1 : 7 110 006 AMA2 : 35 435 182 AMA3 : 100 100	1 499 731 376
5	1	2	1	2				1	5	AMA1 : 2 AMA3 : 1 AMA4 : 1	42
70 099 600	620 001	160 030 000	1 000 001	39 666				582 702	8 102 002	AMA1 : 14 920 802 AMA3 : 2 500 000 AMA4 : 100 200	693 289 374
		1									1
		1 650 000									1 650 000
6	1	22	5	3	6	1		2	18	AMA1 : 7 AMA2 : 3 AMA3 : 3 AMA4 : 2	171
72 499 600	620 001	250 486 208	7 610 631	192 666	18 911 251	2 600 000		4 173 752	81 897 317	AMA1 : 46 896 329 AMA2 : 35 435 182 AMA3 : 3 150 300 AMA4 : 200 300	2 365 288 158
		1				1					2
		62 342				2 700 000					2 762 342
3	2	19	4	3	8			2	32	AMA1 : 5 AMA2 : 1	215
2 511 500	209 850 000	58 660 700	29 305 207	51 500	54 260 421			77 401 000	10 503 440 841	AMA1 : 20 011 406 AMA2 : 300 050 000	31 034 085 085
		1							1	AMA3 : 1	16
		1 309 780							2 400 000	AMA3 : 750 005	87 996 935,43
3	2	21	4	3	8	1		2	33	AMA1 : 5 AMA2 : 1 AMA3 : 1	233
2 511 500	209 850 000	60 032 822	29 305 207	51 500	54 260 421	2 700 000		77 401 000	10 505 840 841	AMA1 : 20 011 406 AMA2 : 300 050 000 AMA3 : 750 005	31 124 844 362
										AMA4 : 3	9
										AMA4 : 3 154 698	8 389 344,32
1											2
5 000 000											6 000 001
2	1	2		4				3	21	AMA1 : 2 AMA4 : 12	73
7 000 000	10 900 000	193 020 000		1 797 385				74 770 000	1 740 215 550	AMA1 : 6 000 004 AMA4 : 18 447 274	2 705 774 815
2		4						1	4	AMA1 : 2 AMA4 : 2	36
15 000 000		10 210 000						16 000 000	310 823 000	AMA1 : 6 000 004 AMA4 : 104 063	1 646 285 254

1. Space equipment, operational training.

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
Philippines	a		1	1			1			2	1	
	b		51 505 000	45 600 000			229 300 000			636 570 000	52 231	
Singapore	a			1	4	3	1	1		2	3	6
	b			92 600 000	1 573 800 001	9 901 900	2 230 000	7 979 000		197 700 000	79 535 000	72 845 000
Thailand	a	1		1		3					1	3
	b	500 000		1 000 000		14 125 000					2 675 439	152 375 000
Vietnam	a		1	2	1	2	1	1		2	1	5
	b		51 505 000	4 075 000	4 789 000	18 957 500	9 225 000	190 000		60 500 000	100 000 004	6 715 000
SOUTH EAST ASIA	a	2	4	7	10	20	11	2		12	18	20
	b	2 047 000	804 485 000	331 495 000	1 704 789 001	291 521 630	288 867 141	8 169 000		1 113 470 000	410 668 738	418 745 001
Albania	a				1							
	b				103 700 000							
Andorra	a	2										
	b	6 000										
Armenia	a	1	1	1	2	2	1				1	2
	b	1 850 000	28 300 000	100 671 750	193 400 000	622 100 000	43 100 000				89 800 000	146 480 000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	a								1			
	b								29 000			
Georgia	a					1						2
	b					132 850 000						3 342 002
Iceland	a										1	
	b										6 810 000	
Kosovo	a											
	b											
Macedonia del Norte	a				1							
	b				103 700 000							
Moldova	a	1	1		2	1						
	b	92 102	42 360 000		246 575 000	245 100 000						
Monaco	a											
	b											
Montenegro	a											
	b											
Norway	a	1		2	7	1	1		2	1		5
	b	48 356		127 715 490	1 269 070 000	5 460 000	124 000		19 488 500	127 000		18 950 000
United Kingdom	a	1	2	4	16	9	3	4	3	8	37	20
	b	8 000	3 021 300	387 511 650	30 642 287	17 462 647	649 500	900 220	2 888 000	86 791 205	346 220 736	395 578 875
Serbia	a			4	2	2					5	4
	b			581 400 000	2 618 600 000	10 460 000					3 628 189 899	8 200 002
Switzerland	a	20	4	11	1	5	1		3	1	7	2
	b	145 169	2 054 100	418 636 296	175	156 880 000	3 020 000		1 562 170	20 001 000	79 339 543	7 150 000
Turkey	a		1	1	1	8	1	1			2	1
	b		2 000 000	14 000	50 200 000	27 832 500	1 500 000	160 000			22 017 725	93 000 000
Ukraine	a	15	6	8	23	12	20	4	1		3	19
	b	36 160 526	2 272 434 970	839 156 812	1 695 625 234	881 420 111	259 954 338	516 506	90 000		154 200 000	208 377 302

ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
									3	AMA1 : 1 AMA4 : 4	14
									66 125	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA4 : 5 490 360	971 583 718
3		1		1				2	8	AMA1 : 2 AMA4 : 5	43
25 600 000		5 001		440 000				659 601 000	8 094 002	AMA1 : 6 000 004 AMA4 : 9 337 220	2 745 668 128
1						1		3	2	AMA4 : 2	18
20 000 000						2 850 000		65 500 000	1 570 000	AMA4 : 5 950 398	266 545 837
		1			2			1	2	AMA1 : 1 AMA4 : 3	26
		135 000			7 821 790			27 550 000	4 005 000	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA4 : 4 300 430	302 768 726
9	1	8		5	2	1		10	40	AMA1 : 8 AMA4 : 31	221
72 600 000	10 900 000	203 370 001		2 237 385	7 821 790	2 850 000		843 421 000	2 064 773 677	AMA1 : 24 000 016 AMA4 : 46 784 443	8 653 015 823
											1
											103 700 000
											2
											6 000
		3							4		18
		129 200 000							223 251 000		1 578 152 750
					1						2
					500 000						529 000
1		1							1	AMA4 : 1	7
200 000		239 643							72 300 000	AMA4 : 100 500	209 032 145
										AMA1 : 1	2
										AMA1 : 3 000 002	9 810 002
1											1
13 650											13 650
		2									3
		220 645 000									324 345 000
									1		6
									91 600 000		625 727 102
1											1
5 456											5 456
									1		1
									100 000		100 000
1		3	1	1				3	9	AMA2 : 1 AMA3 : 1 AMA4 : 2	42
2 000 000		6 480 000	5 700 001	70 000				4 832 696	4 364 004	AMA2 : 121 000 AMA3 : 10 050 000 AMA4 : 5 900 480	1 480 501 527
3	3	14	2	1	1			4	26	AMA1 : 6	167
110 002 401	73 801	339 667 390	18 150 000	12 000	2 250 000			918 676	41 159 102	AMA1 : 90 300 010	1 874 207 799
		3			1			2	1		24
		40 900 000			140 000			465 000	20 000		6 888 374 901
6	4		1	1	4			2	11	AMA1 : 1 AMA2 : 3 AMA4 : 5	93
3 415 424	73 859 382		10 020 000	12 500	12 547 500			388 420	2 420 996	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA2 : 10 430 216 AMA4 : 9 554 838	814 437 731
4		6	1						6	AMA3 : 1	34
354 500 000		18 671 600	900 000						53 306 500	AMA3 : 510 000	624 612 325
9	1	14	1						6	AMA4 : 2	144
26 741 500	36 425	495 133 146	64 080 000						284 860 008	5 500 501	7 224 287 379

1. Space equipment, operational training.

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES	a	41	15	31	56	41	27	9	10	10	56	55
	b	38 310 153	2 350 170 370	2 455 105 998	6 311 512 696	2 099 565 258	308 347 838	1 576 726	24 057 670	106 919 205	4 326 577 903	881 078 181
Australia	a	3		1	1	1			1	3	2	1
	b	178 307		7 690 000	4 620 000	22 000 000			125 000	76 060 820	55 492 600	1 100 000
Fidji (Islands)	a											
	b											
New Zealand	a	1									1	
	b	5 672									7 612	
Papua New Guinea	a											
	b											
Vanuatu	a	1										
	b	42 285										
OCEANIA	a	5		1	1	1			1	3	3	1
	b	226 264		7 690 000	4 620 000	22 000 000			125 000	76 060 820	55 500 212	1 100 000
Saudi Arabia	a		4	2	7	10	5			6	9	10
	b		107 978 410	48 740 000	4 023 331 680	1 005 202 146	412 420 001			453 802 540	21 403 740 862	1 537 414 040
Bahrain	a											
	b											
Egypt	a		1	2		3	1		1	2	4	2
	b		786 000	103 000 000		15 617 000	4 500		10 000 000	47 500 002	15 712 850	17 550 000
United Arab Emirates	a	1	2	6	15	9	6	5		1	18	16
	b	228 140	555 000	620 830	2 971 274 664	954 170 000	10 732 273 380	62 096 175		972 420 800	191 551 821	1 463 330 534
Iraq	a	1	1			1				2	1	1
	b	1 673	6 200 000			31 000 000				235 238 020	176 600 000	94 600 000
Israel	a		1		4	8	2		1		8	4
	b		57 500		18 190 100	3 300 765	6 125 000		279 300		1 869 579	3 645 000
Jordan	a			1	1		1	1				
	b			99 350 000	249 750 000		60 257	19 824				
Kuwait	a				2		1					
	b				1 170		500 000					
Lebanon	a	3				1	2				2	
	b	63 233				457 000	2 705 924				2 000 000	
Oman	a				2	2	1			1		2
	b				279 902 000	16 820 000	1 980 000			18 800 000		33 120 000
Qatar	a		2	1	1	3	4			1	1	5
	b		287 600	135 450 000	491 900	3 575 872	141 720 000			4 800 000	18 344 000	571 410 004
MIDDLE EAST	a	5	11	12	32	37	23	6	2	13	43	40
	b	293 046	115 864 510	387 160 830	7 542 941 514	2 030 142 783	11 297 789 062	62 115 999	10 279 300	1 732 561 362	21 809 819 112	3 721 069 578



ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
26	8	46	6	3	7			11	66	AMA1 : 8 AMA2 : 4 AMA3 : 2 AMA4 : 10	548
496 878 431	73 969 608	1 250 936 779	98 850 001	94 500	15 437 500			6 604 792	773 381 610	AMA1 : 96 300 014 AMA2 : 10 551 216 AMA3 : 10 560 000 AMA4 : 21 056 319	21 757 842 769
1	1	2	1	1				1	2	AMA1 : 1 AMA2 : 1	24
30 000 000	4 600 000	19 400 000	1 980 000	173				1 000 000	1 920 000	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA2 : 12 036 000	241 202 902
										AMA1 : 1	1
										AMA1 : 3 000 002	3 000 002
								4		AMA1 : 1	7
								18 125 723		AMA1 : 3 000 002	21 139 009
										AMA1 : 1	1
										AMA1 : 3 000 002	3 000 002
											1
											42 285
1	1	2	1	1				5	2	AMA2 : 1 AMA3 : 1	34
30 000 000	4 600 000	19 400 000	1 980 000	173				19 125 723	1 920 000	AMA2 : 1 220 000 AMA3 : 1 500 000	268 384 199
1	1	7			3			3	24	AMA1 : 2 AMA3 : 1 AMA4 : 24	119
15 500 000	2 700 030	483 251 000			313 911 600			54 960 000	1 553 438 078	AMA1 : 2 429 000 014 AMA3 : 40 000 AMA4 : 54 015 245	33 899 445 646
1		1									2
17 000		5 500 000									5 517 000
1								2	5	AMA1 : 1 AMA3 : 1 AMA4 : 27	27
785 000								570 000	10 728 000	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA3 : 10 920 000 AMA4 : 120 000	236 293 354
5	4	6		1	1	1		5	33	AMA3 : 3 AMA4 : 34	172
440 050 000	10 191 000	203 874 000		100 840 001	42 650 000	7 000 000		1 802 606 016	2 590 714 023	AMA3 : 25 070 002 AMA4 : 50 212 135	2 2621 728 522
		2								AMA1 : 1	10
		256 776								AMA1 : 15 000 000	558 896 469
12		17	3		3				7	AMA1 : 2 AMA2 : 3	75
90 517 000		32 203 000	4 700 000		455 800				6 441 002	AMA1 : 6 000 002 AMA2 : 2 468 541	176 252 588,86
											4
											349 180 081
	1	2								AMA4 : 3	9
	250 001	52 396 000								AMA4 : 11 751 938	64 899 109
3		3									14
2 330 046		3 513 200									11 069 403
		1						2	3	AMA1 : 1 AMA4 : 17	32
		46 650 000						1 623 400 000	5 820 035	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA4 : 12 686 707	2 042 178 744
		2		2				4	9	AMA4 : 36	71
		51 890 000		33 734				61 985 001	41 816 080	AMA4 : 100 798 173	1 132 602 364
23	6	41	3	3	7	1		16	81	AMA1 : 7 AMA2 : 3 AMA3 : 5 AMA4 : 115	535
549 199 046	13 141 031	879 533 976	4 700 000	100 873 735	357 017 400	7 000 000		3 543 521 017	4 208 957 218	AMA1 : 2 456 000 020 AMA2 : 2 468 541 AMA3 : 36 030 002 AMA4 : 229 584 198	61 098 063 280

1. Space equipment, operational training.

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
Germany	a	1	1	13	3	3	6	1	6	2	16	25
	b	1 877	7 516 000	404 772 000	2 916 001	218 712 000	30 721 000	160 000	10 340 865	53 500	3 083 571 267	115 637 340
Austria	a	2	1						1			1
	b	131 670	3 088						10 000			1 850 000
Belgium	a	6	5	9	8		4		1	3	5	1
	b	76 311 230	744 376 800	49 918 150	1 066 879 000		428 202 520		1 109 563	65 260 000	44 785 000	4 247 000
Bulgaria	a				2	1					1	
	b				14 350 100	316 000 000					21 000 000	
Cyprus	a				3		2			1		
	b				435 050 000		18 400 000			525 010 000		
Croatia	a			1	3	2						1
	b			500 000	1 073 000 000	1 238 000 000						830 000 000
Denmark	a			2	3	1	1				1	2
	b			78 410 000	576 318 434	76 400 000	4 200				2 280 000	2 565 939
Spain	a	1	1	10	14	1	2			8	14	7
	b	46 820	46 525	671 184 793	729 687 100	312 000	36 484 400			45 516 450	210 001 367	74 291 951
Estonia	a			1		1	3				2	1
	b			372 325 000		173 650 000	5 292 104 000				710 000	1 050 000
Finland	a				2	1			1		2	3
	b				900 400 200	100 000			7 180 800		23 525 000	4 520 000
Greece	a			1	7	1				3	5	
	b			156 700 000	1 601 253 000	7 000 000				27 810 600	16 842 800	
Hungary	a		1	1	2						2	1
	b		300 000	4 300 000	6 052 500						67 924 043	280 012
Ireland	a				1	2					2	
	b				1 457 000	265 600 000					374 600 065	
Italy	a	2	4	6	27	7	3		1	5	28	14
	b	10 024	47 990 000	164 930 000	90 293 347	5 184 377	1 010 000		489 500	593 638 577	67 059 201	744 182 282
Latvia	a			1		1					1	
	b			26 000 000		71 405 000					310 000	
Lithuania	a					2	1					2
	b					900 000	26 030 000					2 150 000
Luxembourg	a				1		1					1
	b				46 000		472 017					600 002
Netherlands	a	1			4	6	1	1		3	4	3
	b	1 413 750			10 112 200	425 714 477	3 000	75 760		71 400 002	50 375 685	5 810 000
Poland	a			4	1	11	1			2	2	10
	b			320 380 000	3 000 000	297 347 770	2 500 000			31 865 000	24 238 288	81 280 000
Portugal	a			1	1						6	
	b			230 000	46 000 000						69 311 984	
Romania	a	2		1	1	1	1				4	4
	b	111 430		57 875 000	4 400 200	13 750 000	17 400 003				261 906 510	200 010 040
Slovakia	a				5				1		1	1
	b				2 678 575 000				600 000		301 000	12 180 000
Slovenia	a		1	2	3	2	1	1			1	1
	b		1 541 230 000	1 625 000	1 837 725 000	1 423 410 000	500 000	478 000			87 800 075	9 800 000

ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
7	2	7	7	3	3			6	28	AMA1 : 2 AMA2 : 5 AMA3 : 1	148
14 660 034	75 300 000	222 866 000	14 311 364	3 800 479	450 000			19 899 460	23 739 108	AMA1 : 6 000 004 AMA2 : 6 891 001 AMA3 : 300 000	4 262 619 300
		4	1	1					1		12
		31 395 000	1 709 200	2 282 500					6 000		37 387 458
6	1	1						2	18	AMA1 : 2 AMA2 : 1	73
303 865 100	312 220	100 000						7 200 001	38 911 556	AMA1 : 3 015 002 AMA2 : 3 178 800	2 837 671 942
1		2		1					3	AMA1 : 1	12
1 250 000		290 250 000		479					1 060 000	AMA1 : 3 000 002	646 910 581
											6
											978 460 000
1				1					2		11
502 500				14 000					520 000		3 142 536 500
2	1	1		1				2	3	AMA1 : 3	23
1 005 001	18 704 062	151 300 000		4 498				59 827 003	2 955 001	AMA1 : 9 000 006	978 774 144
1	1	5	6	9	1			4	19	AMA1 : 5 AMA2 : 1 AMA3 : 3	113
1 000 000	4 000 000	29 057 000	35 656 050	103 740 729	20 000			3 094 309	50 080 741	AMA1 : 1 343 100 006 AMA2 : 13 020 AMA3 : 6 060 000	3 343 393 261
				1					1		10
				70 000					239 750 000		6 079 659 000
1	2	1		2				3	7		25
10 000 000	58 600 000	11 700 000		7 331				84 500 000	7 042 000		1 107 575 331
	1			2				4	11	AMA1 : 1 AMA3 : 1	37
	124 000			121 544				468 852 038	198 991 200	AMA1 : 3 000 002 AMA2 : 10 050 000	2 490 745 184
3					1			1	2		14
1 760 000					1 000 000			24 100 000	68 310 000		174 026 555
									1	AMA1 : 1	7
									1 000 000	AMA1 : 3 000 002	645 657 067
4		3	17	2	3			3	19	AMA1 : 2 AMA2 : 3 AMA3 : 1	154
5 800 000		600 000	58 455 944	7 190 000	6 732 230			7 578 001	48 356 906	AMA1 : 17 300 002 AMA2 : 20 058 010 AMA3 : 2	1 886 858 404
											3
											97 715 000
				1	1				2		9
				20 000 000	1 000 000				44 800 002		94 880 002
		2							1	AMA1 : 1	7
		200 000							1 000	AMA1 : 1 190 000	2 509 019
4			1	1		1		5	6	AMA1 : 2	43
51 100 000			750 000	140 000		450 000		49 268 856	38 290 000	AMA1 : 6 000 004	710 903 734
7			7	3	1			2	4	AMA3 : 1	56
127 950 000			26 060 000	6 529	2 310 000			456 100	6 952 800	AMA3 : 500 000	924 846 487
				1				1	2	AMA1 : 1	13
				32 946				4 444 444	1 550 001	AMA1 : 3 000 002	124 569 377
3								4	5		26
5 054 750								88 705 000	9 522 000		658 734 933
1		1	1						1		12
2 500 000		11 215 000	57 635 000						2 820 000		2 765 826 000
									1		13
									6 310 000		4 908 878 075

1. Space equipment, operational training.

PAYS		ML1	ML2	ML3	ML4	ML5	ML6	ML7	ML8	ML9	ML10	ML11
Sweden	a		6	8	5	10			1	1	5	6
	b		117 623 972	392 395 370	76 832 300	63 586 505			365 300 000	450 580 000	27 655 100	36 855 520
Czechia	a	3	1	2		2	2		2		1	3
	b	27 894 020	11 700 000	217 425 000		8 920 000	173 724 000		9 000		7 850 000	14 576 012
EUROPEAN UNION	a	18	21	63	96	55	29	3	14	28	103	87
	b	105 920 821	2 470 786 385	2 918 970 313	11 154 347 382	4 605 992 129	6 027 555 140	713 760	385 039 728	1 811 134 129	4 442 047 385	2 141 886 098
Multi-Countries (1)	a	3	30	20	61	70	11			51	58	87
	b	68 169 400	3 597 285 093	6 562 715 000	4 654 094 174	2 754 440 099	629 985 540			14 028 772 027	8 668 288 026	11 885 076 262
Others (2)	a				5					1		1
	b				932 060 000					270 000 000		914 501
TOTAL	a	103	100	154	338	289	145	23	43	167	428	378
	b	221 149 995	11 337 741 498	13 306 904 893	40 477 522 213	15 743 120 439	18 839 972 778	100 462 685	451 355 298	20 613 062 002	53 559 115 773	22 643 206 039

(1) Deliveries to final destination in several countries on the same export authorization.  
(2) International organisations, non-member States of the United Nations, etc.

Overview of European Common Military List Categories and Other Items	
ML1	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibren of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components.
ML2	Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), projectors and accessories, and specially designed components.
ML3	Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially designed components
ML4	Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges and related equipment and accessories, and specially designed components
ML5	Fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessones
ML6	Ground vehicles and components
ML7	Chemical or biological toxic agents, *riot control agents’, radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials
ML8	‘Energetic materials’, and related substances
ML9	Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels
ML10	*Aircraft’, «lighter-than-air vehicles’, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (‘UAVs»), aero-engines and ‘aircraft’ equipment, related equipment, and components, specially designed or modified for military use
ML11	Electronic equipment, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List, and specially designed components
ML12	High velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, and specially designed components.
ML13	Armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components
ML14	Specialised equipment for military training’ or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or ML2, and specially designed components and accessories

ML13	ML14	ML15	ML16	ML17	ML18	ML19	ML20	ML21	ML22	Autres <sup>1</sup>	Total général
2	1	4	1		2			4	10	AMA1 : 1	67
5 750 000	2 000 000	36 580 000	340 000		1 940 000			8 997 238	2 488 361	AMA1 : 3 000 002	1 591 924 368
8					1					AMA1 : 1	26
66 029 662					2 555 000					AMA1 : 5 000 008	535 682 702
51	9	31	41	29	13	1		41	147	AMA1 : 22 AMA2 : 11 AMA3 : 7	920
598 227 047	159 040 282	785 263 000	194 917 558	137 411 037	16 007 230	450 000		826 922 450	793 456 676	AMA1 : 1 404 415 042 AMA2 : 31 330 831 AMA3 : 16 910 002	41 028 744 425
6	8	67	4	1	5			43	158	AMA1 : 10 AMA2 : 5 AMA3 : 14 AMA4 : 1	713
45 300 004	689 500 003	1 453 087 357	18 320 003	4 600 000	15 922 501			1 328 658 166	2 911 152 110	AMA1 : 512 501 012 AMA2 : 42 443 000 AMA3 : 87 573 013 AMA4 : 540 198	59 958 422 987
2				1				1	2	AMA1 : 1	14
3 500 000				240 000				1 810 000	22 550 000	AMA1 : 4 750 000	1 235 824 501
173	40	304	70	59	58	6		144	607	AMA1 : 88 AMA2 : 38 AMA3 : 36 AMA4 : 169	3961
2 042 800 617	1 162 587 769	6 249 344 093	384 833 495	288 600 484	666 568 133	18 600 000		7 092 082 425	21 839 326 404	AMA1 : 4 781 239 263 AMA2 : 776 182 692 AMA3 : 205 077 236 AMA4 : 326 432 986	243 128 639 212

1. Space equipment, operational training.

ML15	Imaging or countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories
ML16	Forgings, castings and other unfinished products specially designed for items specified by ML1 to ML4, ML6, ML9, ML10, ML12 or ML19 -ML16 applies to unfinished products when they are identifiable by material composition, geometry or function
ML17	Miscellaneous equipment, materials and ‘libraries’, and specially designed components
ML18	Production’ equipment and components of products referred to in the EU Common Military List
ML19	Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, and specially designed components
ML20	Cryogenic and ‘superconductive’ equipment, and specially designed components and accessories
ML21	‘Software’ specially designed or modified for the ‘development’, ‘production’, ‘use’ of equipment or materials controlled by the EU Common Military List
ML22	‘Technology’ for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the EU Common Military List.

Others items	
AMA 1	Sensing, intelligence, telecommunication or observation satellites, their subsets, observation and shooting equipment, the characteristics of which give them military capacities.
AMA 2	Rockets and space launchers with military ballistic capability, related equipment, associated manufacturing capabilities and test equipment.
AMA 3	Technology, within the meaning of ML22, needed for the development, production and use of AMA1 andAMA2 related equipment
AMA 4	Operational training

# Appendix 3

Detailed breakdown of military technology and equipment deliveries by country and region since 2014 (millions of €).

COUNTRIES	LV 2014	LV 2015	LV 2016	LV 2017	LV 2018	LV 2019	LV 2020	LV 2021	LV 2022	LV 2023	Total
Algeria	33,4	39,6	107,9	62,2	36,6	83,1	51,3	94,7	8,2	11,0	527,9
Libya	-	-	9,6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,6
Morocco	461,5	12,7	127,0	30,7	135,3	36,3	20,2	108,3	177,0	145,8	1 254,8
Tunisia	0,3	1,8	1,0	9,6	3,0	5,8	-	4,3	1,9	0,2	27,9
TOTAL NORTH AFRICA	495,2	54,1	245,5	102,5	174,9	125,2	71,5	207,3	187,1	157,0	1 820,3
South Africa	3,9	6,9	8,3	5,6	3,8	4,2	14,1	3,1	3,2	4,4	57,5
Angola	-	0,9	-	-	-	0,9	0,3	-	-	28,7	30,9
Benin	0,1	2,8	2,2	-	0,5	0,1	-	0,0	-	7,9	13,7
Botswana	-	2,1	8,5	0,5	63,9	151,8	0,3	55,0	0,9	0,2	283,2
Burkina Faso	0,6	-	0,2	1,6	0,9	3,3	0,3	1,1	0,9	0,4	9,4
Burundi	-	5,4	0,3	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	5,7
Cameroon	2,6	5,3	16,5	2,4	0,1	1,2	-	13,8	6,9	0,1	48,9
Cape Verde (Islands of)	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	0,0
Central African Republic	-	-	0,0	0,1	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	0,2
Congo	0,1	1,9	0,2	0,1	0,5	0,1	-	-	-	-	2,9
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	-	-	-	0,3	-	0,1	-	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,7
Ivory Coast	0,8	2,1	1,9	2,9	5,7	8,2	0,0	19,9	2,2	12,2	55,8
Djibouti	0,1	0,3	0,6	0,8	0,6	0,8	0,0	0,3	0,6	0,4	4,4
Eritrea	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	0,0
Ethiopia	-	0,9	2,6	1,0	-	0,2	-	-	-	0,3	5,0
Gabon	3,7	10,6	5,9	0,2	0,1	0,0	-	-	-	0,9	21,3
Guinea	0,0	0,3	0,2	0,1	-	0,1	-	0,1	-	0,7	1,5
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	0,1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,1
Kenya	-	-	0,1	0,1	3,3	0,1	-	0,1	0,4	-	4,0
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	0,0
Madagascar	-	0,1	0,1	0,1	-	-	-	0,5	-	-	0,8
Malawi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	0,0
Mali	6,3	6,4	6,2	0,6	2,4	6,2	0,3	2,3	0,1	0,5	31,2
Mauritius	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	-	-	-	-	0,5
Mauritania	0,7	0,7	0,1	0,2	0,7	3,2	0,4	10,7	0,6	3,4	20,6
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,4	
Namibia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,4	
Niger	0,0	-	0,6	4,3	27,5	18,5	1,1	25,0	3,0	1,5	81,5
Nigeria	-	0,3	2,3	12,1	6,4	10,8	3,4	30,1	0,7	38,8	104,9
Uganda	-	0,2	0,0	15,5	-	0,0	7,6	1,0	1,4	0,7	26,5
Senegal	1,6	13,7	30,7	0,4	18,0	29,6	0,4	12,0	2,5	100,9	209,8
Seychelles	-	0,0	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Sierra Leone	-	-	0,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,3
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	7,4	1,5	106,9	0,0	-	115,8



COUNTRIES	LV 2014	LV 2015	LV 2016	LV 2017	LV 2018	LV 2019	LV 2020	LV 2021	LV 2022	LV 2023	Total
Chad	5,6	0,5	0,0	0,1	11,8	3,3	0,4	2,5	3,4	16,6	44,2
Togo	6,7	0,1	3,1	1,5	-	11,3	0,1	8,8	1,4	0,9	34,0
Zambia	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
TOTAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	33,1	62,0	90,8	50,6	146,3	261,3	30,1	293,3	28,2	280,3	1 275,9
Dominican Republic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,2	0,2
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,2	0,2
Haiti	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Honduras	-	0,2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,2
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,5	0,5
Mexico	112,2	3,0	33,5	93,6	69,0	0,9	0,0	0,4	0,2	0,6	313,2
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,5	0,5
TOTAL CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	112,2	3,2	33,5	93,6	69,0	0,9	0,0	0,4	0,2	1,9	314,8
Canada	2,5	4,5	5,9	24,6	81,5	290,3	1,5	6,3	10,0	8,1	435,2
United States	167,7	141,9	157,1	156,6	171,4	190,3	112,0	241,1	159,3	155,5	1 652,9
TOTAL NORTH AMERICA	170,2	146,4	163,1	181,2	252,9	480,6	113,4	247,4	169,3	163,6	2 088,2
Argentina	1,7	3,9	1,9	2,2	3,4	31,2	0,3	178,0	2,2	0,7	225,5
Bolivia	0,3	-	39,9	30,9	1,8	44,8	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,5	118,7
Brazil	64,7	121,5	295,2	360,9	508,9	283,1	276,0	305,6	88,2	87,3	2 391,4
Chile	30,6	21,1	72,9	8,1	5,6	2,5	2,4	5,1	4,5	53,4	206,3
Colombia	1,7	6,3	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,8	0,9	1,3	12,1
Ecuador	11,4	0,8	0,0	2,3	0,7	0,1	0,2	-	1,4	0,3	17,1
Peru	33,4	37,0	6,2	2,8	0,9	0,5	0,5	0,0	4,1	0,9	86,3
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,5	0,5
Uruguay	-	0,1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,1
Venezuela	4,4	0,7	0,1	0,1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,3
TOTAL SOUTH AMERICA	148,2	191,5	416,3	407,5	521,4	362,5	280,1	489,7	101,2	144,8	3 063,3
Azerbaijan	0,2	140,2	8,0	-	-	0,0	0,0	0,9	0,0	-	149,3
Kazakhstan	0,4	4,9	1,2	13,8	29,3	18,1	29,8	29,0	18,8	32,9	178,1
Uzbekistan	0,1	61,0	125,8	0,6	60,9	5,9	48,6	40,1	25,0	-	367,9
Turkmenistan	1,2	5,5	23,5	5,1	-	-	0,4	2,4	2,0	3,2	43,3
TOTAL CENTRAL ASIA	1,9	211,6	158,4	19,5	90,2	24,0	78,8	72,3	45,7	36,1	738,6
China	114,8	105,2	105,6	84,1	134,4	135,6	44,6	97,9	70,0	36,4	928,6
South Korea	54,4	68,1	105,5	105,7	78,5	90,9	34,6	123,8	97,0	101,2	859,7
Japan	24,9	31,3	18,2	29,4	31,6	33,7	14,4	29,7	16,0	81,4	310,5
TOTAL NORTH EAST ASIA	194,1	204,6	229,2	219,2	244,5	260,2	93,6	251,4	183,0	218,9	2 098,8
Afghanistan	1,3	1,0	0,4	0,3	1,5	0,0	-	-	-	-	4,5
Bangladesh	1,7	3,0	2,0	-	0,7	4,6	5,1	12,8	11,3	26,4	67,7
India	369,5	1 050,0	954,3	689,5	620,6	753,9	1 587,1	4 446,4	1 123,4	273,3	11 868,0
Maldives	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	0,0
Nepal	-	-	-	-	1,8	-	-	-	-	-	1,8
Pakistan	139,2	85,5	90,1	74,7	83,0	86,7	37,9	96,5	37,6	20,3	751,6
Sri Lanka	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
TOTAL SOUTH ASIA	511,7	1 139,5	1 046,9	764,5	707,6	845,2	1 630,2	4 555,8	1 172,3	320,1	12 693,7

COUNTRIES	LV 2014	LV 2015	LV 2016	LV 2017	LV 2018	LV 2019	LV 2020	LV 2021	LV 2022	LV 2023	Total
Brunei	2,2	21,6	28,7	1,4	0,5	0,1	0,6	0,2	0,1	0,3	55,7
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Indonesia	67,2	189,2	210,3	224,5	157,9	57,8	14,9	46,4	75,9	47,8	1 091,9
Malaysia (Federation of)	77,9	32,5	40,3	41,7	70,9	19,8	10,2	3,6	7,0	11,3	315,3
Philippines	0,3	0,1	0,4	0,0	6,7	7,0	0,6	10,9	2,4	3,0	31,5
Singapore	95,2	115,5	86,6	109,8	167,9	203,7	33,8	155,5	433,7	33,4	1 435,0
Thailand	19,5	96,0	52,0	6,5	129,7	7,1	13,1	128,0	14,5	0,7	467,1
East Timor	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
Vietnam	1,7	1,1	1,1	8,8	18,7	20,4	1,5	17,8	8,9	1,1	81,1
<b>TOTAL SOUTH EAST ASIA</b>	<b>263,9</b>	<b>456,1</b>	<b>419,5</b>	<b>392,7</b>	<b>552,3</b>	<b>316,0</b>	<b>74,7</b>	<b>362,4</b>	<b>542,5</b>	<b>97,6</b>	<b>3 477,8</b>
Andorra	-	-	0,0	-	-	0,0	-	-	0,0	0,0	0,0
Albania	15,2	-	-	2,8	2,7		-	0,0	-	-	20,7
Armenia	-	0,0	-	-	-		-	-	-	11,5	11,5
Belarus	-	0,1	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	0,1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	0,1	0,0	-	0,0		-	0,9	-	0,3	1,3
Georgia	-	-	-	43,7	33,2	0,2	0,2	13,1	1,8	0,4	92,5
Iceland	-	0,0	0,0	-	0,0		0,1	-	-	-	0,1
Kosovo	-	-	-	-	0,1		0,0	1,1	0,0	0,0	1,2
Macedonia (ARYM)	0,1	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	0,1
Moldova	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	0,0
Monaco	-	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,4	0,0	-	-	-	-	0,4
Norway	16,2	18,2	14,4	25,2	29,9	45,3	19,0	46,9	31,4	24,3	270,8
United Kingdom	79,7	97,2	256,8	148,8	136,4	184,1	85,1	138,4	98,2	119,0	1 343,8
Russia	81,7	58,9	48,9	36,0	5,5	2,4	0,3	0,0	-	-	233,6
Serbia	1,2	0,3	7,7	2,9	5,0	5,3	0,6	4,3	133,1	16,3	176,9
Switzerland	9,7	6,4	15,3	9,8	34,6	15,7	8,3	41,2	42,7	26,3	210,0
Turkey	10,2	131,1	50,8	50,5	50,6	35,9	30,2	38,1	39,9	63,1	500,5
Ukraine*	1,6	1,0	8,1	0,5	8,1	7,8	0,1	0,8	640,5	1 091,6	1 760,2
<b>TOTAL OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES</b>	<b>215,6</b>	<b>313,3</b>	<b>402,2</b>	<b>320,2</b>	<b>306,5</b>	<b>296,7</b>	<b>143,8</b>	<b>284,8</b>	<b>987,7</b>	<b>1 352,9</b>	<b>4 623,8</b>
Australia	117,8	132,6	183,3	65,4	76,8	101,0	25,8	88,0	36,7	41,6	869,0
Fidji (Islands)	-	-	-	0,1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,1
New Zealand	38,1	8,0	4,4	4,6	9,9	6,9	2,2	12,9	8,0	1,4	96,3
Papua New Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	0,7	0,7
Vanuatu	-	-	-	-	0,0	-	-	-	-	-	0,0
<b>TOTAL OCEANIA</b>	<b>155,8</b>	<b>140,6</b>	<b>187,7</b>	<b>70,1</b>	<b>86,7</b>	<b>107,9</b>	<b>28,0</b>	<b>100,9</b>	<b>44,7</b>	<b>43,7</b>	<b>966,1</b>
Saudi Arabia	643,7	899,8	1 085,8	1 381,6	1 398,8	1 379,5	275,3	779,9	470,8	268,3	8 583,5
Bahrain	0,9	3,1	3,4	1,5	2,0	0,1	2,9	8,3	4,3	11,3	37,7
Egypt	103,0	1 240,2	1 329,6	1 478,2	1 276,3	1 029,3	118,0	318,0	162,4	58,7	7 113,6
United Arab Emirates	126,8	293,6	399,9	226,8	237,0	287,2	194,2	227,5	355,1	258,4	2 606,5
Iraq	3,7	12,1	0,1	8,2	17,0	0,1	0,1	46,8	92,0	-	180,1
Israel	14,0	19,5	30,2	18,1	22,1	22,7	7,3	25,6	15,3	30,1	204,9
Jordan	0,6	1,6	1,0	2,7	3,6	0,6	1,8	1,1	0,0	-	13,1
Kuwait	9,5	8,6	9,3	119,4	66,0	277,2	90,2	623,3	218,5	14,1	1 436,1
Lebanon	9,7	3,0	0,3	3,5	3,0	0,5	0,0	1,0	0,1	7,3	28,3

\* In 2022 and 2023: evaluation based on EPF (European Peace Facility) methods.

COUNTRIES	LV 2014	LV 2015	LV 2016	LV 2017	LV 2018	LV 2019	LV 2020	LV 2021	LV 2022	LV 2023	Total
Oman	85,6	32,0	90,1	105,4	29,8	43,7	3,1	17,2	57,4	90,9	555,2
Qatar	46,5	134,7	116,1	137,2	164,3	3 330,6	699,0	1 261,0	1 136,5	649,9	7 675,8
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST	1 043,8	2 648,3	3 065,5	3 482,6	3 219,9	6 371,6	1 392,0	3 309,7	2 512,4	1 388,9	28 434,7
Germany	83,2	76,9	80,8	76,7	149,3	93,2	81,3	161,4	67,0	169,9	1 039,7
Austria	1,0	5,5	0,9	0,5	0,7	0,9	0,6	3,9	2,0	3,4	19,3
Belgium	52,6	46,1	16,3	42,7	28,4	27,0	6,1	56,1	75,8	50,0	401,1
Bulgaria	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,1	0,8	-	0,1	2,4	3,9	8,3
Cyprus	0,3	0,5	3,7	2,4	5,5	5,8	11,1	2,2	7,8	109,5	148,8
Croatia	-	0,5	-	-	0,0	1,0	0,2	0,0	0,2	34,8	36,7
Denmark	8,7	1,9	18,0	1,1	5,4	5,3	5,8	9,3	19,8	25,4	100,7
Spain	93,7	32,3	35,7	65,9	58,2	32,0	17,6	168,8	79,4	56,6	640,2
Estonia	8,4	8,6	1,2	9,5	0,9	8,4	0,2	25,3	8,8	4,4	75,7
Finland	26,0	57,0	71,7	19,4	24,8	12,0	5,2	14,6	7,9	7,5	246,0
Greece	62,3	32,9	13,5	104,8	10,6	7,2	4,9	78,4	979,1	662,2	1 955,9
Hungary	0,0	0,2	8,9	9,9	12,4	3,9	27,6	2,5	2,3	254,6	322,3
Ireland	0,7	0,0	0,0	4,7	0,8	0,1	-	5,4	-	1,5	13,1
Italy	48,8	56,2	121,7	80,2	97,2	112,1	90,4	112,4	79,9	214,8	1 013,6
Latvia	-	0,1	0,8	1,5	1,4	0,7	0,0	0,6	1,3	2,2	8,5
Lithuania	0,7	0,1	1,9	0,4	0,4	0,2	3,7	1,9	3,1	1,6	13,9
Luxembourg	5,5	0,7	3,2	3,0	5,0	6,2	3,4	1,5	4,4	4,3	37,1
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	0,2	-	0,2
Netherlands	26,0	65,3	17,9	17,8	67,0	15,5	15,4	38,5	106,4	91,0	460,8
Poland	7,2	53,4	17,4	20,8	9,6	17,1	8,9	15,3	35,5	21,8	207,1
Portugal	1,7	1,2	2,6	1,3	1,9	1,1	0,3	0,9	1,0	1,4	13,5
Romania	2,2	0,9	0,5	0,8	1,9	3,9	1,4	8,5	3,8	121,6	145,5
Slovakia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	1,1	0,2	1,0	1,4	9,1	7,7	20,6
Slovenia	20,1	0,1	0,0	0,7	1,2	0,7	0,4	2,4	2,6	0,8	29,0
Sweden	40,2	48,0	101,7	72,5	22,0	22,8	11,0	68,1	51,0	49,7	487,0
Czechia	11,5	1,0	4,1	2,2	2,7	5,0	2,3	38,3	8,6	18,8	94,6
TOTAL EUROPEAN UNION	501,1	489,8	522,4	539,2	508,5	383,0	298,8	817,6	1 559,4	1 919,3	7 539,1
Others (1)	198,8	140,3	140,1	87,5	85,2	90,7	63,7	85,0	126,6	67,7	1 085,6
Multi-countries (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,0	16,7	2,3	16,1	43,1
TOTAL	4 045,4	6 201,5	7 121,0	6 730,9	6 966,0	9 925,8	4 306,7	11 094,7	7 662,7	6 208,9	70 263,6

0,0 MEANS A LOWER AMOUNT THAN 50 000 €.

(1) International organisations, non-member States of the United Nations, etc.

(2) Deliveries to final destination in several countries on the same export authorization.

# Appendix 4

## France’s Annual Report 2024 (on the calendar year 2023) pursuant to Article 13.3 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The information contained in this report is that transmitted each year by France to UN Register of Conventional Arms regarding the seven categories covered by the Register, as well as small arms and light weapons. It concerns actual flows (deliveries and imports), and only complete systems.

### 1. Exports

Catégories		Importers list	Number of pieces	State of origin	Intermediate location	Description of the piece	Observations related to the transfer
1	Battle tanks	Ukraine	38			Battle tank	Transfers
2	Armored combat vehicles	Spain	3			Armored combat vehicle	
		Benin	16			Armored combat vehicle	Transfers
		Ukraine	192			Armored combat vehicle	Transfers
3	Heavy artillery systems	Ukraine	12			155 mm cannon	Transfers
		Ukraine	2			Artillery system	Transfers
		Denmark	5			155 mm cannon	
		Senegal	1			155 mm cannon	
		Senegal	4			105 mm cannon	
		Sweden	4			105 mm cannon	
4	Fighter jets	Greece	8				Transfers
		Croatia	4				Transfers
5	Attack helicopters	Hungary	6			Combat helicopter	
		Qatar	4			Combat helicopter	
6	Warships	Senegal	2			Patrol boat	
		United Arab Emirates	1			Corvette	
		Angola	1			Projection ship	
7	(a) Missiles and missile launchers (b) Portable air defense systems"	Ukraine	302			Missiles and missile launchers	Transfers
		Arabie saoudite	1			Missiles	
		Brésil	20			Missiles	
		Chypre	21			Missile launchers	
		Croatie	97			Missiles	
			5			Missile launchers	
		Grèce	10			Missiles	
			2			Missile launchers	
			4			Missiles	
			4			Missile launchers	
		Maroc	2			Missile launchers	
			16			Missiles	
		Bahreïn	8			Missiles	
		Émirats arabes unis	36			Missiles	
		Indonésie	8			Missiles	
			3			Missiles	
		Liban	161			Missiles	Transfers
		Qatar	8			Missiles	

2. Imports

Catégories	Importing countries	Number of parts	Country of origin	Intermediate location	Piece description	Observations regarding the transfer
1 Battle tanks				Nil		
2 Armored combat vehicles						
3 Heavy artillery systems						
4 Combat aircraft						
5 Attack helicopters						
6 Warships						
7 Missiles and missile launchers						

### 3. Small arms and light weapons: export

		Importer countries	Number of rooms	State of origin	Intermediate location	Description of the piece	Observations related to the transfer
<b>SMALL CALIBER WEAPONS</b>							
1	Revolvers and semi-automatic pistols	Ukraine	10			Automatic Pistols	Transfers
		Germany	1			Automatic Pistols	
		Australia	98			Revolvers for sports shooting	
		Senegal	16			Automatic Pistols	
		Switzerland	87			Revolvers for sports shooting	
		Chad	2			Revolvers for sports shooting	
		New Zealand	5			Revolvers for sports shooting	
		Chad	115			Automatic Pistols	
			2			Revolvers for sports shooting	
		United States	401			Revolvers for sports shooting	
			400			Automatic Pistols	
		Norway	5			Revolvers for sports shooting	
		Morocco	2			Automatic Pistols	
2	Rifles and carbines	Switzerland	2			Carbines	
		Senegal	6			Rifles	
		Andorra	2			Rifles	
		Chad	2			Carbines	Transfers
		Morocco	2			Carbines	
		Ukraine	20			Rifles	Transfers
			15			Carbines	Transfers
3	Submachine guns	Ukraine	20			Submachine gun	Transfers
		Switzerland	10			Submachine gun	
4	Fusils d'assaut	Ukraine	1000			Assault rifles	Transfers
		Switzerland	18			Assault rifles	
		Belgium	60			Assault rifles	
5	Fusils mitrailleurs	Ukraine	180			Ukraine	Transfers
		Suisse	10			Switzerland	
		Bénin	8			Benin	Transfers
		Gabon	4			Gabon	
		Tchad	6			Chad	Transfers
		Tchèque (Rép.)	23			Czech Republic	
		Belgique	10			Belgium	
6	Others		Nil				
<b>LIGHT WEAPONS</b>							
1	Heavy machine guns	Ukraine	149			12.7 mm Machine guns	Transfers
		Saudi Arabia	12			12.7 mm Machine guns	
		Benin	8			12.7 mm Machine guns	Transfers
		Ivory Coast	6			12.7 mm Machine guns	Transfers
		Senegal	2			12.7 mm Machine guns	
2	Portable grenade launchers, detachable or mounted		Nil				
3	Anti-tank portable cannons		Nil				
4	Recoilless rifles		Nil				
5	Anti-tank portable missile launchers and rocket launchers.	Ukraine	316				Transfers
6	Mortars of caliber less than 75 mm		Nil				
7	Others		Nil				

4. Small arms and light weapons: imports

		Importer states	Number of pieces	State of origin	Intermediate location	Description de la pièce
SMALL CALIBER WEAPONS						
1	Revolvers and self-loading pistols	France	9 620	Austria		Automatic pistols
			22			
2	Rifles and carbines	France	655	Belgium		Carbines
			78	England		Carbines
			8	France		Carbines
			10	Finland		Carbines
			105	United States		Rifles
			1	United States		Carbines
			5	Belgium		Rifles
3	Submachine guns	France	130	Germany		Submachine guns
4	Assault rifles	France	34 174	Belgium		Assault rifle
			9 660	Germany		Assault rifle
			383	Germany		Assault rifle
			1	United States		Assault rifle
5	Light machine guns		Nil			
6	Others		Nil			
LIGHT WEAPONS						
1	Heavy machine guns	France	4	Belgium		Heavy machine guns
			76	Belgium		12.7 mm machine guns
2	Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers	France	867	Germany		Grenade launchers
			1	Belgium		Grenade launchers
			3	Germany		Grenade launchers
3	Portable antitank cannons		Nil			
4	Recoilless rifles		Nil			
5	Portable antitank missile launchers and rocket systems		Nil			
6	Mortars of caliber less than 75mm		Nil			
7	Others		Nil			



Managing editor: Olivia Penichou  
Project: Sarah Pineau  
Art director: Jean-Charles Mougeot  
Graphic designer: Christine Pirot  
Manufacturing: Vincent Allibert

**Photos' credits**

Cover (from left to right)

1 - Rafale © Dassault

2 - Corvette de combat Gowind ® Bani Yas © Naval Group

3 - Patroller © KOPTERCAM / Marco Godles / Safran

© Creation DICOd - January- 2025

n° ISBN : 978-2-11-179486-3